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Preface
In the dawn of the Internet era, I succeeded to buy an expensive computer. 
I started providing it to other people in return for a small fee. Later, at the 
age of 16, I bought 7 new computers and made an Internet cafe in the garage 
of my parents. During my work at the Internet cafe, I became familiar with 
the Internet. In these times, I learned about programming, web design, 
hacking, Linux, and other computer activities. Then, I registered myself as a 
law student in the former Technical University of Ruse (now University of 
Ruse). In Bulgaria, the Internet and law are two distant things. I really want-
ed to connect them, but in the University of Ruse there were neither experts 
in IT law, nor experts in a related discipline. I did not achieve the union of 
my interests and went to the Netherlands where I studied European law at 
the Radboud University Nijmegen.
In the Netherlands, I was pleased to learn about the Center for Law in 
the Internet Society at the Leiden University. After a meeting with prof. dr. 
Jaap van den Herik, I found the interesting topic of “Crowdsourced Online 
Dispute Resolution (CODR)”. I was particularly attracted to this topic by 
the fact that it requires research not only in field of Internet law, but also in 
the field of philosophy. For instance, during the research, I felt myself close 
to Plato’s idea for collective organisms and to Jung’s idea for collective con-
sciousness.
I firmly believe in the future of CODR. I also believe that justice should 
be free, fast, and available to everyone. Please do not understand me wrong-
ly; I know that expertise cannot be provided always for free. However, even 
if CODR can resolve fairly only some kinds of disputes (1) for lower cost 
than the costs, which need to be paid for traditional dispute resolution, and 
(2) faster than the traditional dispute resolution, it would be a great success.
Daniel Dimov
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CODR CODR is a term that encompasses some forms of 
ADR and court proceedings using the Internet and 
crowdsourcing as parts of the dispute resolution 
process. 
Collective decision “A collective decision occurs when members of a 
collectivity make individual decisions that they
would not make if the other members of the col-
lectivity were not making related decisions. A col-
lective decision thus entails coordination of inten-
tions” (Tideman, 2006, p.5).
Crowdsourcing Crowdsourcing is “the act of a company or institution 
taking a function once performed by employees and 
outsourcing it to an undefined (and generally large) 
network of people in the form of an open call.”
Due process Due process refers to fundamental procedural legal 
safeguards of which every citizen has an absolute 
right when a court or a state intends to take a deci-
sion which can affect any right of that citizen.
Objective procedural
fairness
Objective procedural fairness is a compliance of a 
procedure with a standard whereby the procedure 
is assessed by an individual or an organisation as 
just or unjust.
ODR ODR is a broad term that encompasses forms of 
ADR and court proceedings, which use ICT as a 
part of the dispute resolution process.
Subjective procedural 
fairness
Subjective procedural fairness is an individual’s 
subjective perception of the fairness of a procedure.
The crowd The crowd participating in CODR is a group of 
people who participate in the dispute resolution 
process through an open call.




4. League of Legends Tribunal, http://na.leagueoflegends.com/tribunal





9. Taobao User Dispute Resolution Center, http://pan.taobao.com
10. TrialJuries, http://www.trialjuries.com
11. VirtualJury, http://www.virtualjury.com
The abovementioned websites were last visited on 3rd of January 2017.
ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution
AJDR Alberta’s Judicial Dispute Resolution
AMT Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
BATNA Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement
CAPP A Facebook group called “Quickly, Canadians against 
Proroguing Parliament”
CODR Crowdsourced Online Dispute Resolution
DSR Detailed Seller Rating
EC European Communitiy
ECHR The European Convention on Human Rights
ECRF eBay’s Community Review Forum
ECtHR The European Court of Human Rights
ESP Extra Sensory Perception
FAQ Frequently Asked Questions
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICT Information and communications technology (ICT)
ODR Online Dispute Resolution
PS Problem statement
RQ Research question
UDRP Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy
USD United States dollar




In the past two decades, two new concepts appeared in the scientific domain 
in relation to decision making and information systems. These concepts are 
crowdsourcing and online dispute resolution (ODR). The latter concept is 
directly related to the discipline of law. The former concept is intriguing and 
may be applied to the framework of legal decisions. In this thesis, we inves-
tigate to what extent crowdsourcing is a fruitful concept to be incorporated 
in the set of legal decision procedures.
The concept of crowdsourcing was coined by Howe (2006). Basically, 
crowdsourcing is an act of outsourcing a job, previously done by workers, to 
a large group of people in the form of an open call.1 Nowadays, crowdsourc-
ing is used by commercial and public organisations. A widely known exam-
ple of an organisation using crowdsourcing is Wikipedia Foundation Inc. 
It is an American non-profit charitable organisation maintaining an online 
encyclopedia called Wikipedia. Wikipedia allows any Internet user to edit 
the Wikipedia articles.2 The users of Wikipedia are not paid for their contri-
butions. Nevertheless, by 3rd of January 2017, the English version of Wiki-
pedia contained 5,322,750 articles.3 Several studies indicate that the quality 
of the articles in Wikipedia is similar to the quality of paid encyclopedias 
(Clauson, Polen, Kamel Boulos, Dzenowagis, 2008; Leithner, Maurer-Ertl, 
Glehr, Friesenbichler, Leithner, Windhager, 2010; Wood and Struthers, 2010; 
Staub and Hodel, 2015).
ODR refers to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and court pro-
ceedings which use the Internet as a part of the dispute resolution process 
(cf. Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz, 2004, p. 7). The term ODR was coined 
in the period 1995-1998 (cf. Morek, 2006).4 Today, ODR is used by many 
1 There are several defi nitions of crowdsourcing. The most important ones can be found in 
Section 2.1.
2 The Wikipedia editing policy can be read at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Editing 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
3 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Size_of_Wikipedia (last visited Jan. 3, 
2017).
4 ODR is a result of virtualisation of dispute resolution, i.e., a process that occurs as a result 
of the use of information and communication technology and leads to decreasing depen-
dence on specifi c locations in time and space for acts of dispute resolution processes (cf. 
Mommers, 2005, p. 213). Virtualisation of dispute resolution may, for example, allow dis-
putants to meet online instead of in person or allow disputants to present evidence online 
instead of in a court room (cf. Mommers, 2005, p. 213).
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commercial and public organisations.5 A widely known example of an 
ODR procedure is ICANN’s Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution 
Policy (UDRP).6 UDRP is an online administrative procedure that allows 
disputants to resolve disputes concerning domain names. The decisions 
rendered through UDRP are enforced by the Registrar. The Registrar is an 
entity through which the respondent has registered a domain name that is 
the subject of a complaint.7
In 1999, Perception Corporation, an American company, started an ODR 
platform that uses crowdsourcing. The platform is called iCourthouse.8 In 
iCourthouse, anyone can start a dispute resolution process or become a 
juror. iCourthouse allows the plaintiffs to post any kind of dispute. iCourt-
house jurors select the cases they would like to decide from a list of cases. 
Every juror is entitled to post his9 “verdict” and thus help the parties to 
reach an agreement.10 The decisions rendered by iCourthouse are neither 
legally binding nor self-enforceable.
The dispute resolution procedure offered by iCourthouse uses both the 
Internet and crowdsourcing. It is also known as Crowdsourced Online Dis-
pute Resolution (CODR). The term CODR was used for the first time in a 
meeting in 2009 hosted by the Berkman Center for Internet & Society’s Law 
Lab.11
CODR encompasses some forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) using the Internet and crowdsourcing as parts of the dispute reso-
lution process.12 In the context of this definition, ADR refers to a method 
for resolving disputes, which is different from the normal trial process (cf. 
Thomson and Sherr 2012, p. 29). ADR mechanisms can be divided into 
two groups: (i) adjudicative mechanisms and (ii) non-adjudicative mech-
anisms (Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz, 2004, p. 56). In comparison with 
adjudicative mechanisms, non-adjudicative mechanisms may not achieve 
a result because the disputants using them may fail to agree on a settlement 
5 To demonstrate the popularity of ODR, it is suffi cient to note that the European Commis-
sion has created an ODR platform which is a single point of entry for consumers and 
traders seeking out-of-court disputes covered by the EU Regulation No 524/2013 on con-
sumer ODR. Pursuant to Article 14 of the same Regulation, all information society service 
providers based in the European Union should provide their customers with a link to the 
ODR platform. For more information on the history of the EU Regulation No 524/2013 
on consumer ODR, see Lodder (2016).
6 ICANN stands for the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
7 See ICANN’s Rules for the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy available 
at http://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp/rules (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
8 See www.icourthouse.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
9 For the sake of brevity, we use “he” and “his” whenever “he or she” and “his or her” are 
meant.
10 For more information on iCourthouse’s Rule of procedure, see http://www.i-court-
house.com/main.taf?area1_id=front&area2_id=rulesofproc (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
11 The report on the meeting can be found at http://lawlab.org/cODR_Workshop_
Report_7-8-09.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
12 For more information on the way this defi nition has been constructed, see Section 2.3.
Introduction 3
(Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz, 2004, p. 56). Some CODR procedures use 
adjudicative mechanisms, whereas other CODR procedures rely on non-
adjudicative mechanisms.13
Because CODR allows a quick dispute resolution at (almost) no cost for 
the disputants and is capable of resolving a large number of disputes, it 
has the potential to become an important dispute resolution mechanism for 
online disputes, such as disputes concerning feedback, online transactions, 
and relations in virtual worlds (cf. Rule and Nagarajan, 2010). The reason 
for this potential is that resolving online disputes through non-CODR pro-
cedures can be difficult (see Rule and Nagarajan, 2010).14 In practice, the 
difficulties are caused by (1) the high price and (2) slow speed of traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms as well as (3) their incapability to resolve a 
large number of online disputes (cf. Rule and Nagarajan, 2010, p. 5). Here, 
we explicitly remark that the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are 
incapable to resolve a large number of online disputes because the number 
of such disputes may amount to millions per year (See Section 1.1).
Our research focuses on the development of fair and just means involv-
ing crowdsourcing to help resolving a small and a large number of (online) 
disputes (cf. Van den Herik and Van Eijk, 2013).
The content of the first chapter is as follows. The three disadvantages of 
the traditional dispute resolution mentioned above are elaborated upon in 
Section 1.1. Section 1.2 describes eBay’s solution to the disadvantages of the 
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. The solution consists of an ODR 
procedure using crowdsourcing which is called eBay’s Community Review 
Forum (the ECRF). In Section 1.3, our problem statement is formulated. Sec-
tion 1.4 contains three research questions. Section 1.5 describes our research 
goal and research methodology. Section 1.6 describes the structure of the 
thesis.
13 For example, Taobao User Dispute Resolution Center (http://pan.taobao.com, last visit-
ed Jan. 3, 2017) and Markplaats Gebruikersjury (https://gebruikersjury-marktplaats.
modria.com, last visited Jan. 3, 2017) resolve disputes through adjudicatory mechanisms, 
i.e., the members of the crowd make decisions which are compulsorily enforced on the 
parties. In contrast, People Claim (http://www.peopleclaim.com, last visited Jan. 3, 
2017) uses a non-adjudicative mechanism for resolving disputes, i.e., the members of the 
crowd in PeopleClaim do not render a decision, but merely provide recommendations to 
the disputants on how to resolve their disputes. For an overview of Taobao User Dispute 
Resolution Center, Markplaats Gebruikersjury, and PeopleClaim, see Chapter 3.
14 Hereinafter, we refer to litigation, ADR, and ODR as traditional dispute resolution mech-
anisms.
4 Chapter 1
1.1 Three disadvantages of traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms
The three disadvantages of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms men-
tioned above, viz. (1) a high price, (2) a slow speed, and (3) the incapability 
to resolve a large number of online disputes are explained and substantiated 
by examples. 15
With regard to the high price of traditional dispute resolution mecha-
nisms, Rule and Nagarajan (2010, p. 4) note that, because the average value 
of online disputes is usually less than USD 100, and quite often less than 
USD 20, delivering an appropriate dispute resolution process at a price that 
is acceptable to the disputants and the platform administrators is extreme-
ly difficult to achieve.16 Tang (2015, p. 333) supports Rule and Nagarajan’s 
observations by stating that the average online consumer contract value 
is USD 60, whereas an exemplary UK provider of ODR services charges 
between GBP 25 and GBP 850 for a resolution of consumer disputes. Accord-
ing to Tang (2015, p. 333) even the lowest charge of GBP 25 will be dispro-
portionately expensive compared with the average value of the consumer 
disputes. Therefore, a cheap CODR procedure is recommended.
Pertaining to the slow speed of traditional dispute resolution mecha-
nisms, it should be noted that such mechanisms are usually designed to 
be deliberate and thorough, so as to enable a quality outcome for each 
case (Rule and Nagarajan, 2010, p. 5). However, in the online environment 
15 We consider the three disadvantages to be the major disadvantages of traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms. However, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms may have 
other disadvantages. For example, providers of traditional dispute resolution mecha-
nisms usually do not provide the disputants with the opportunity to choose third neutral 
parties speaking less-common languages. This may have a negative impact on the quali-
ty of the dispute resolution services as an interpreter may not be able to correctly trans-
late the statements of the disputants and the supporting evidence. To illustrate, as of 31st 
of December 2016, 52 arbitrators registered at the UDRP section of the Czech Arbitration 
Court offer arbitration services in English, whereas no arbitrator registered at the Czech 
Arbitration court offers arbitration services in Bulgarian. See http://udrp.adr.eu/adr/
panelists/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
16 There are exceptions from this general trend. For example, some non-governmental 
organisations provide free and timely dispute resolution. Below, we discuss two such 
examples, namely, the Better Business Bureau (BBB) and the Centre for Volunteering.
 BBB, a nonprofi t organization established in 1912, facilitates the resolution of disputes 
between businesses and their customers. Complaints submitted to the BBB are usually 
resolved within 30 business days. See https://www.bbb.org/consumer-complaints/fi le-
a-complaint/get-started (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
 The Centre for Volunteering provides early mediation to volunteers contributing to the 
activities of the Centre. See “Voluntas program offers free dispute solutions for Austra-
lia’s volunteers”, an article published by the Australian Catholic University on 9th of 
May 2016. The article is available at http://www.acu.edu.au/staff/our_university/news-
room/staff_news_item/voluntas_program_offers_free_dispute_solutions_for_australias
_volunteers (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). For more information on the Centre, see https://
www.volunteering.com.au/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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people often would like to have a quick dispute resolution. As Rule and 
Nagarajan noted, people expect online services, including online dispute 
resolution services, to be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week (cf. 
Rule and Nagarajan, 2010, p. 5). Furthermore, disputed online content (e.g., 
copyrighted materials and negative reviews) can be propagated through 
the Internet within a matter of hours, thus making regular ODR procedures 
ineffective (cf. Pearson, Roux-Dufort, Clair, 2007, pp. 88-89). Hence, the chal-
lenge for CODR procedures is to resolve disputes faster than the current 
ODR procedures.
In relation to the incapability of the traditional dispute resolution to 
resolve a large number of online disputes, it should be pointed out that, 
when the number of disputes runs into millions, human-powered dispute 
resolution cannot handle the scale of disputes. If the disputes have pre-
dominantly small monetary value, their resolution will be even more dif-
ficult because of the limited budgets which disputants usually are willing 
to spend for the resolution of such disputes (cf. Benyekhlef and Gelinas, 
2005, p. 14). To illustrate the high number of online disputes, it is sufficient 
to note that eBay has to resolve about 60 million online disputes concerning 
transactions of goods every year (see Rule and Nagarajan, 2010, p. 5). If all 
15,000 employees working at eBay were to resolve 10 disputes a day, and if 
every employee spent every workday just resolving disputes, the employees 
could satisfactory complete two-thirds of the volume in one year. Here, too, 
the challenge is whether CODR is a solution to the large number of online 
disputes.
The three disadvantages of the traditional dispute resolution with 
regard to the resolution of online disputes urged eBay to create the ECRF, to 
which we turn in the next section (See also Rule and Nagarajan, 2010, p. 5).
1.2 eBay’s Community Review Forum
While the first web platforms providing CODR were launched in the end of 
the 1990s, CODR became better known with the launch of the eBay’s Com-
munity Review Forum (ECRF) in 2008. The ECRF was started by eBay Inc. 
as a reaction to the increased number of online disputes.
A brief introduction to eBay reads as follows. eBay Inc. is a private com-
pany based in San Jose, California, USA. It manages eBay.com, an online 
auction and shopping website in which people and companies buy and sell 
a wide variety of goods and services. As of the second quarter of 2011, eBay 
had 100 million active users globally. In 2015, eBay’s revenue amounted to 
USD 8.59 billion.17
17 See “eBay Inc. Financial Statement Results” provided by Google Finance available at 
http://www.google.com/fi nance?q=NASDAQ%3AEBAY&fstype=ii&ei=H9T4UPiZFM
rqkAWb5QE (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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Until 2012, the ECRF allowed sellers to appeal non-positive feedback 
on matters, which they believed to be unfair. The claims were sent to 21 
randomly selected members of eBay’s Community for a proper judgement. 
The 21 members acted as a jury. Their selection will be discussed later. The 
decisions of the jury were enforced by the eBay Customer Service Repre-
sentative, who, if appropriate, removed the feedback. The CODR procedure 
offered by the ECRF was capable of resolving a large number of disputes, 
free of charge, and in a short time. The ECRF was capable to handle so many 
disputes because there were more than sufficient applications of potential 
jury members to support the case volume (see Rule and Nagarajan, 2010, 
p. 6). In relation to the timing of ECRF’s procedure, it should be noted that 
the maximum time of the procedure was 22 days.
However, on January 31, 2012, the ECRF was stopped. According to 
eBay, the reason for closing the ECRF was the reduced impact of negative 
feedback on a seller’s performance evaluation. Also, according to eBay, the 
impact was reduced because eBay began evaluating seller performance on 
the basis of Detailed Seller Ratings (DSRs). The DSRs rate specific aspects of 
the transaction between a seller and a buyer.18 According to eBay, DSRs will 
allow the buyers “to be honest and open about their buying experience so 
sellers can get a more complete picture of their performance.”19
It should be noted that, following the example of the ECRF, Marktplaats.
nl and Taobao.com launched their own CODR procedures in 2010 and 2012, 
respectively.20 The procedure operated by Marktplaats.nl is called Gebrui-
kersJury, whereas the procedure operated by Taobao.com is called Taobao 
User Dispute Resolution Center (Ericson and Wang, 2014).21 While Gebrui-
kersJury resolves feedback disputes only, Taobao User Dispute Resolution 
Center resolves all kinds of e-commerce disputes arising out of the use of 
Taobao.com (Ericson and Wang, 2014). 22
Taking into account the success of Taobao User Dispute Resolution 
Center which (1) resolved 238,000 online-shopping disputes in 2013 and (2) 
attracted more than 575,000 crowd jurors within the period December 2012 
– July 2014, it can be argued that CODR has a potential to become a widely 
used mechanism for resolving online disputes (Erickson and Wang, 2014).23 
18 A section of eBay’s Help Page containing information on Detailed Seller Ratings can be 
accessed at http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/detailed-seller-ratings.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 3, 2017).
19 See the section eBay’s Help Page containing information on Detailed Seller Ratings.
20 A Google search indicates that the webpage of Marktplaats Gebruikersjury (https://
gebruikersjury-marktplaats.modria.com, last visited Jan. 3, 2017) appeared in Google 
Search Engine on 25th of July 2010. For information on the year of creation of Taobao 
User Dispute Resolution Center, see Ericson and Wang (2014).
21 See the terms and conditions of GebruikersJury available at https://gebruikersjury-
marktplaats.modria.com/mp/jsp/TermsAndConditions.jsp (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
22 See the terms and conditions of GebruikersJury available at https://gebruikersjury-
marktplaats.modria.com/mp/jsp/TermsAndConditions.jsp (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
23 Taobao is a Chinese online shopping website. See http://www2.alizila.com/how-tao-
bao-crowdsourcing-justice-online-shopping-disputes (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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CODR, being a type of ODR, may be the technology envisaged by Susskind 
(2013, p. 102) in the following paragraph:
“I predict that ODR will prove to be a disruptive technology that fundamen-
tally challenges the work of traditional litigators (and of judges). In the long 
run, I expect it to become the dominant way to resolve all but the most complex 
and high-value disputes.”
I believe that the potential of CODR can be realised if we manage to arrive 
at a fair dispute resolution via CODR, which is acknowledged by the whole 
online community (and even by the offline community, i.e., the people who 
do not use Internet for their communication, contacts, and living).
1.3 Problem statement
There are two types of procedural fairness, namely, objective procedural 
fairness and subjective procedural fairness. Objective procedural fairness 
relates to the compliance of a procedure with a standard whereby the pro-
cedure is assessed by an individual or an organisation as just or unjust, 
whereas subjective procedural fairness refers to an individual’s subjective 
perception of fairness of a procedure (cf. Mansbridge, 1990, p. 327).
Procedural fairness is one of the most essential concepts of dispute res-
olution. The concepts of procedural fairness in dispute resolution, includ-
ing ODR, have been discussed by a number of scholars (Lind and Tyler, 
1988; Röhl and Machura, 1997, pp. 3-4; Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz, 2004, 
pp. 118-120; Coteanu, 2005, pp. 157-160; Schiavetta, 2008; Hörnle, 2009; Cor-
tés, 2010, pp. 79-82). In our study, we build on these publications.
Although procedural fairness in ODR procedures has been already 
extensively discussed, there is a lack of literature on procedural fairness 
in CODR. Hence, it is not clear whether CODR procedures comply with 
the requirements of procedural fairness. It is also not clear what procedural 
safeguards should be implemented in CODR procedures in order to prevent 
instances of procedural unfairness. Since the procedural fairness affects (a) 
the attractiveness of dispute resolution procedures and (b) the acceptance of 
decisions of dispute resolution procedures, the unclarity whether or to what 
extent CODR procedures comply with the requirements of procedural fair-
ness may hamper the future development of CODR (cf. Grey, 1977, p. 182; 
Adler, Hensler, and Nelson 1983; McEwen and Maiman, 1984; Lind and 
Tyler, 1988, p. 93; Kaplow and Shawell 2009, p. 264).
Concerning the relationship between procedural fairness and the attrac-
tiveness of dispute resolution procedures, it should be noted that the attrac-
tiveness of fair procedures comes from the fact that the procedural fairness 
is manifested in the conventional morality (cf. Grey, 1977, p. 182; Kaplow 
and Shawell 2009, p. 264). Typical examples of the manifestation of proce-
dural fairness in the conventional morality include the unwillingness of the 
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disputants to ask for costly punishments, such as cutting off future rela-
tionships, unless real misbehaviour has occurred, and the unwillingness of 
disputants to allow actual wrongdoers to avoid punishment (Kaplow and 
Shawell 2009, p. 264).
Three studies indicate that subjective procedural fairness is linked to the 
acceptance of the decisions.24 First, McEwen and Maiman (1984) examined 
the compliance with adjudicated and mediated settlements of disputes in 
small claims courts. They found that disputants are more likely to comply 
with settlements that they perceive to be fair. Second, Adler, Hensler, and 
Nelson (1983) conducted a study in the context of nonbinding arbitration 
administered by the courts. They found that the satisfaction of the dispu-
tants was linked to the perceived fairness of the procedure used to resolve 
the dispute. We will assess the extent to which CODR procedures meet the 
requirements of procedural fairness. This leads us to the following Problem 
Statement (PS).
PS: To what extent is it possible for CODR procedures to resolve disputes in a way 
that complies with the requirements of procedural fairness?
For answering the problem statement, we will investigate whether CODR 
procedures can be designed in such a way as to ensure fair dispute resolu-
tion. If this is possible, CODR procedures will have the potential to become 
attractive, trusted, and widely accepted dispute resolution procedures.
1.4 Three research questions
To guide our research and to answer the problem statement, we formulate 
three research questions (RQs). For a proper assessment of a new CODR 
procedure, we will compare its working with the working of other dispute 
resolution mechanisms. This leads us to the first research question, which 
reads as follows.
RQ1: In what way does CODR differ from other dispute resolution schemes?
The answer to this research question will allow us to acquire a clear under-
standing of the essence of CODR. The understanding is a necessary part of 
answering the problem statement. In particular, there is a need for establish-
ing whether or not the only difference between CODR and other dispute 
resolution mechanisms, including ODR, lies in replacing judges, arbitrators, 
or mediators by a group of people, which is called “crowd”. If this is not 
so, then there are other differences that need to be investigated. As a conse-
24 It should be noted that subjective procedural fairness may not be the most important fac-
tor affecting the attractiveness of a procedure. For example, the users of the ODR proce-
dure provided by PayPal give more importance to the procedural speed than the fairness 
of the procedure (Lodder and Zelewikow, 2012, p. 21).
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quence, they have to be analysed in the context of RQ1. Moreover, it is then 
necessary to obtain an understanding of crowdsourcing and its relation to 
dispute resolution processes in general.
Our PS requires us to acquire understanding about two concepts, name-
ly, (1) CODR and (2) procedural fairness in the context of dispute resolution. 
While RQ1 will provide us with understanding about CODR, we will need 
to formulate a second research question in order to get understanding about 
procedural fairness. Our question will be focused on procedural fairness in 
the field of adjudicative dispute resolution because all, but one CODR pro-
cedures, resolve disputes through adjudication.25 Consequently, the second 
research question reads as follows.
RQ2: What is procedural fairness in the context of adjudicative dispute resolution?
The answer to RQ2 will be provided by using standards of fairness and 
supplementing them in accordance with the findings of empirical studies 
examining individuals’ perceptions of procedural fairness. Thus, our inter-
pretation of procedural fairness will reflect not only standards of fairness, 
but also disputants’ perceptions of procedural fairness. It should be pointed 
out that definitions of fairness created for the purposes of this research are 
necessary for answering the problem statement.
RQ3: Are the past and present CODR procedures fair?
In order to answer RQ3, we will examine whether representative past and 
present CODR procedures comply with the requirements of procedural fair-
ness. More specifically, we will focus our research on three procedures, viz. 
iCourthouse, JuryTest, and the ECRF.26 These three procedures were chosen 
because they represent different stages of the history of CODR as well as 
different approaches.27 We prefer to examine three, and not more, CODR 
procedures due to readability, space limitations, and focus of the thesis.
1.5 Research goal and research methodology
The research goal of this study is to propose a model of a CODR procedure 
that would guarantee a fair dispute resolution. The model can be used for 
the creation of new procedurally fair CODR procedures and may become 
a basis for an academic debate on fairness of CODR procedures. To reach 
the research goal, we will be guided by the PS and the three research ques-
tions. For answering the PS and the three questions accurately, we follow the 
methodology described below.
25 For more information on the dispute resolution mechanisms used by past and present 
CODR procedures, see Section 6.1.
26 iCourthouse and the ECRF have already been briefl y described above. For more informa-
tion on JuryTest, please visit Section 3.2.B.
27 For an overview of the history of CODR, see Section 3.
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For RQ1 (In what way does CODR differ from other dispute resolution 
schemes?), we will conduct a thorough literature review on CODR and oth-
er dispute resolution schemes. Moreover, we will examine the past and pres-
ent CODR procedures and identify the precise characteristics of CODR. For 
a proper comparison, we will analyse the differences and analogies between 
CODR and other dispute resolution schemes.
It should be pointed out that the literature review of ADR, ODR, and 
CODR includes (1) a review of academic literature, (2) documents con-
cerning ADR and ODR published by national public authorities and inter-
national organisations, and (3) documents published by ADR, ODR, and 
CODR providers. The documents published by national authorities and 
international organisations include mainly non-binding legal instruments, 
such as Communications, Recommendations, and Reports. The documents 
published by CODR providers include Rules of Procedures and Frequently 
Asked Questions (FAQs).
For RQ2 (What is procedural fairness in the context of adjudicative 
dispute resolution?), we will initially examine the EU Directive on ADR.28 
The Directive is a normative standard of procedural fairness of ADR pro-
cedures. We have chosen to base our interpretation of objective procedural 
fairness on the EU Directive on ADR for two reasons. First, the Directive 
establishes a standard of fairness applying to ADR procedures. This makes 
it an appropriate standard for examining CODR procedures, all of which 
are ADR procedures.29 Second, we aim to make our model of a fair CODR 
procedure compliant with a widely used standard of procedural fairness. 
This will increase the practical applicability of the model. The Directive is a 
widely used standard of procedural fairness of ADR procedures. It applies 
in the entire European Union, which has a population of about 500 million 
people.30 Next, we will examine empirical studies related to subjective pro-
cedural fairness and formulate an interpretation of subjective procedural 
fairness. Afterwards, we will supplement our interpretation of objective pro-
cedural fairness with our interpretation of subjective procedural fairness. 
Thus, we will formulate our interpretation of procedural fairness.
For answering the PS (To what extent is it possible for CODR procedures 
to resolve disputes in a way that is consistent with the requirements of pro-
cedural fairness), we analyse whether and to what extent the current CODR 
procedures comply with our interpretation of procedural fairness.
In this regard, it should be noted that we analyse three CODR proce-
dures, namely iCourthouse, JuryTest, and the ECRF. They were chosen 
28 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on 
alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC.
29 An overview of past and present CODR procedures is provided in Chapter 3.
30 See a statistic provided by Eurostat at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=
table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels
&plugin=1 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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because they represent different types of CODR procedures. iCourthouse 
falls into the group of online opinion polls. JuryTest is an online mock jury 
system. ECRF is a typical example of an arbitration tribunal rendering self-
enforceable decisions (see Chapter 3). The three differences between the 
three CODR procedures are as follows. Online opinion polls only extract 
and aggregate information (cf. Jurca and Faltings, 2008, p. 119). Online mock 
jury systems allow lawyers who have actual cases to gain insight into how 
prospective jurors view those cases. The decisions of the arbitration tribu-
nals rendering self-enforceable decisions are enforced by private organisa-
tions.
1.6 Structure of the thesis
In Chapter 1, we provide an introduction to CODR. Then, we formulate 
our problem statement, three research questions, a research goal, and our 
research methodology. At the end, the structure of the thesis is described.
In Chapter 2, we examine literature on crowdsourcing, ODR, and CODR. 
The literature review provides us with a degree of understanding that is 
necessary for answering the research questions.
In Chapter 3, we examine the past and present CODR procedures. This 
will be done by examining various CODR procedures.
In Chapter 4, we provide a framework describing the building blocks of 
CODR and analyse the differences between CODR and other dispute resolu-
tion schemes. Thus, we answer RQ1 (In what way does CODR differ from 
other dispute resolution schemes?).
In Chapter 5, we intend to answer RQ2 (What is procedural fairness in 
the context of adjudicative dispute resolution?) by providing: (1) a suit-
able interpretation of objective procedural fairness based on the Directive 
on ADR; and (2) a suitable interpretation of subjective procedural fairness 
on the basis of empirical studies measuring perceptions of procedural fair-
ness. At the end of the chapter, we establish our interpretation of fairness by 
supplementing our interpretation of objective procedural fairness with our 
interpretation of subjective procedural fairness.
Chapter 6 provides an answer to RQ3 (Are the past and present CODR 
procedures fair?) by investigating whether three of the current CODR plat-
forms comply with our interpretation of procedural fairness. We identify the 
obstacles that prevent them from being called fair CODR procedures.
In Chapter 7, we design and construct a model of a CODR procedure that 
complies with our interpretation of procedural fairness. Thus, we answer 
the PS (To what extent is it possible for CODR procedures to resolve dis-
putes in a way that complies with the requirements of procedural fairness) 
and accomplish our research goal (proposing a model of a CODR procedure 
that would guarantee a fair dispute resolution).
In Chapter 8, we provide the conclusions of the thesis and formulate 
directions for further research.

This chapter reviews the literature on crowdsourcing, online dispute resolu-
tion (ODR), and crowdsourced online dispute resolution (CODR). Crowd-
sourcing refers to a business model. In Section 2.1, we review the existing 
literature on crowdsourcing in general and crowdsourcing in the field of 
law. The concept of ODR refers to a mechanism used for dispute resolution. 
In Section 2.2, we review the literature of online dispute resolution. Section 
2.3 contains a literature review on crowdsourced online dispute resolution 
CODR. In Section 2.4, we provide concluding remarks.
2.1 Literature review on crowdsourcing
For the purpose of this research, the articles and books on crowdsourcing 
are divided into two categories, namely, works discussing crowdsourcing in 
general (Subsection 2.1.1) and works discussing the use of crowdsourcing in 
the field of law (Subsection 2.1.2). In both subsections, academic literature 
related to these two categories is examined.
2.1.1 Crowdsourcing in general
From the works on crowdsourcing in general, we select six relevant topics 
for a closer inspection. They are: (A) relevant definitions, (B) typologies of 
crowdsourcing, (C) the relation of crowdsourcing to advanced concepts, (D) 
crowdsourcing as a business model, (E) the benefits of crowdsourcing, and 
(F) the drawbacks of crowdsourcing. These topics were identified on the 
basis of our literature review of crowdsourcing.
A: Relevant definitions
The use of crowdsourcing is an essential characteristic of CODR. That is why 
a clear understanding of CODR requires a discussion of crowdsourcing in 
general. For the purpose of this research, we will use the definition of crowd-
sourcing provided by Howe (2006) (See definition 2.1).
Definition 2.1 (Crowdsourcing): Crowdsourcing is “the act of a company or 
institution taking a function once performed by employees and outsourcing it 




In order to clarify the definition, we need to understand the term “open 
call.” As far as we know, this term has not been defined or clarified in the 
literature on crowdsourcing in general. In our view, two requirements must 
be met to classify a call as “open.” The first requirement as dedicated to 
CODR is that everyone from the online community where the call is pub-
lished should be entitled to participate in CODR, provided that the candi-
date meets certain conditions.1 One such a condition can be that only users 
of a website who have been registered for a certain time can participate in 
CODR (this is the case at the ECRF). A second condition can be that only the 
first n members of the crowd (e.g., n=30) can participate in CODR (cf. Van 
den Herik and Dimov, 2011a, p. 245).2 We note that theoretically an open 
call may not require the members of the crowd to meet any conditions.3 The 
second requirement for classification of a call as “open” is that it should be 
published or made available in such a way that every member of the online 
community where the open call is published should be able to find informa-
tion about it (see Van den Herik and Dimov, 2011a, pp. 245-246).
The reason for using Howe’s (2006) definition for the purposes of this 
research is twofold. First, this definition is widely accepted and used in other
definitions of crowdsourcing (see, e.g., the definitions below by Geerts, 
2009, p. 2; Nachira, Dini, and Nicolai, 2009, p. 11).4 Second, the definition 
provides a clear and precise description of crowdsourcing. As can be seen, 
other definitions of crowdsourcing examined below lack clarity or do not 
describe all features of crowdsourcing.
We divide the set of other definitions of crowdsourcing into two groups, 
namely, (A1) definitions based on the definition by Howe and (A2) other 
definitions of crowdsourcing. Below, we show the definitions of both 
groups.
1 The members of the crowd can participate in CODR as jurors, arbitrators, mediators, and 
facilitators of negotiations.
2 The First File First Serve principle is often used in the fi eld of law. For instance, the principle 
is used in Article 12 of the Industrial Design Law No.31 of 2000 of Indonesia which states: 
“The party who fi rst fi les an application shall be deemed as the holder of the Right of Indus-
trial Design, unless proven otherwise.” The Industrial Design Law No.31 of 2000 of Indone-
sia is available at https://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/s_sonota_e/fi ps_e/pdf/indonesia_
e/e_ishou.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
3 However, crowdsourcing platforms usually have legal documents, which should be 
accepted by crowdsourcing workers before participating in an open call. For example, 
users of Wikipedia must accept Wikipedia’s Terms of Use. See https://wikimediafoun-
dation.org/wiki/Terms_of_Use#Our_Terms_of_Use (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). Users of 
the crowdsourcing platform “Innocentive” (a platform allowing its users to resolve 
research and innovation problems) must accept the Terms of Use of Innocentive. See 
https://www.innocentive.com/ar/contract/view (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). The users of 
Amazon Mechanical Turk must accept Amazon Mechanical Turk Participation Agree-
ment. See https://www.mturk.com/mturk/conditionsofuse (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
4 The defi nitions of crowdsourcing by Geerts (2009, p. 2), Nachira, Dini, and Nicolai (2009, 
p. 11) can be found in Subsection 2.1.1.A1.
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A1: Definitions based on the definition by Howe
Below, we present two different definitions of crowdsourcing which are 
based on the definition by Howe (2006). They emphasise accomplishing a 
task and using a new business model, respectively.
• Geerts (2009, p. 2): crowdsourcing is “the online outsourcing of a task to 
(a group of) private individuals in the form of an open call.” The concept 
of open call is discussed in Subsection 2.1.1.A.
• Nachira, Dini, and Nicolai (2007, p. 11): crowdsourcing is a “new busi-
ness model in which a company or institution takes a job traditionally 
performed by a designated agent (usually an employee) and outsources 
it to an undefined, generally large group of people in the form of an 
open call over the Internet.”
These two definitions and the definition by Howe (2006) have three similari-
ties, namely, they all define crowdsourcing as (1) outsourcing of activities, 
(2) to a number of people, (3) and in the form of an open call. The similarities 
clearly indicate that the definitions by Geerts (2009, p. 2) and Nachira, Dini, 
and Nicolai (2007, p. 11) are based on the definition by Howe (2006).
A2: Other definitions of crowdsourcing
Below, we present three definitions of crowdsourcing which are not based 
on the definition by Howe (2006) and do not share any similar elements with 
it. For example, in comparison with the definition by Howe (2006), the three 
definitions do not define crowdsourcing as an act of outsourcing, which 
takes place in the form of an open call. The first of these three definitions is 
as follows.
• Souza, Ramos, and Esteves (2011): crowdsourcing is “a set of methods 
and technologies of reaching external contributions from a large number 
of individuals through Internet tools.”
This definition does not reflect one of the important features of crowdsourc-
ing, namely, that crowdsourcing is a business model that allows the pro-
viders of crowdsourcing applications to utilise the labor of the members of 
the crowd for the completion of certain tasks that are previously done by 
employees. A clear indication that the term crowdsourcing should be under-
stood as a business model, and not as a mere set of methods and technolo-
gies of reaching contributions, can be found in the article by Howe in which 
he coined the term crowdsourcing (Howe, 2006(b)). In that article, Howe 
states it is as follows:
“Hobbyists, part-timers, and dabblers suddenly have a market for their 
efforts, as smart companies in industries as disparate as pharmaceuti-
cals and television discover ways to tap the latent talent of the crowd. 
The labor isn’t always free, but it costs a lot less than paying traditional 
employees. It’s not outsourcing; it’s crowdsourcing.”
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The second of the three definitions follows below.
• Gerber, Hui, Kuo (2012, p. 2): crowdsourcing is “a way to harness the 
creative solutions of a distributed network of individuals.”
The definition states that crowdsourcing is a way to harness creative solu-
tions. However, the solutions provided by the members of the crowd may 
not be creative at all. For example, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a crowd-
sourcing application where requesters post tasks and workers choose which 
tasks to do for payment, allows the requesters to post tasks that include 
simple data entry operations.5 Figure 1 is a screenshot of a task published on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk that requires the completion of straightforward 
data entry operations.6
The third of the three definitions reads as follows.
• Kolb (2013, p. 124): crowdsourcing is “taking a large job, which might be 
too difficult or time consuming for one person, dividing it into smaller 
actions, and then getting many people to be involved by doing a portion 
of that larger job.”
The use of the following five adjectives deprives the aforementioned defini-
tion from clarity: “large”, “too difficult”, “smaller”, “many”, and “larger”.
Figure 1. A screenshot of a task published on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
B: Typologies of crowdsourcing
In our literature review, we found many typologies of crowdsourcing. These 
typologies are relevant and allow us to understand the great variety and 
complexity of CODR procedures. Below, we will mention the typologies of 
crowdsourcing based on (B1) the complexity of the tasks, (B2) the nature of 
the tasks, and (B3) the platforms of crowdsourcing.
B1: Complexity of the task
Schenk and Guittard (2011) distinguish between crowdsourcing of simple 
tasks and crowdsourcing of complex tasks. These two types of crowdsourc-
ing are examined below.
5 See Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Available on https://www.mturk.com (last visited Jan. 3,
2017).
6 For more information on global online job marketplaces, see Section 4.4.1B.
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B1a: Crowdsourcing of simple tasks
The crowdsourcing of simple tasks is suitable for the completion of such 
tasks on a large scale requiring substantial resources. Examples are tasks 
requiring the identification of a large number of photos. Two examples of 
crowdsourcing applications which use crowdsourcing of simple tasks are 
(1) NASA’s Clickworkers and (2) Galaxy Zoo.7 We briefly describe both of 
them below.
Operating between November 2000 and September 2001, NASA’s Click-
workers, a project run by the US National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration (NASA), relied on Internet volunteers to identify craters on photos of 
Mars to support the NASA research. The volunteers did not need any previ-
ous expertise. The project attracted more than 80,000 people who marked 
nearly 2 million craters for measurement and classified the relative age of 
another 300,000 craters. The quality of the work by the crowdsourced work-
ers was the same as the quality achieved by expert crater raters (cf. Szpir, 
2002).
Galaxy Zoo is an interactive project that allows the users to classify mil-
lions of galaxies found in the Sloan Digital Sky Survey. It was an astronomi-
cal survey using a dedicated 2.5-m wide-angle optical telescope at Apache 
Point Observatory in New Mexico, United States. The survey resulted in 
multi-color images covering more than a quarter of the sky and created 
3-dimensional maps containing more than 930,000 galaxies and more than 
120,000 quasars.8
In the future, crowdsourcing of small tasks may be successfully applied 
in the field of CODR. For example, crowdsourcing of small tasks can be used 
for electronic discovery of information related to disputes. Electronic dis-
covery refers to the discovery of electronically stored information, including 
e-mail, web pages, word processing files, computer databases, and other 
information stored on a computer device (cf. Jaishankar and Ronel, 2013, 
p. 86).
The use of crowdsourcing in the field of electronic discovery is a rela-
tively new method of electronic discovery, but it is not unprecedented. On 
18th of June 2009, the lower house of the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
published 700,000 receipts indicating the expenses of the members of the 
parliament. The UK’s newspaper The Guardian published the receipts in 
a special crowdsourcing system allowing any Internet user to comment on 
individual expenses and highlight ones of interest (cf. Rogers, 2009). Within 
90 minutes of its launch, 1700 users had audited the MPs’ expenses using 
The Guardian’s new crowdsourcing tool (see Townend, 2009). 170,000 docu-
ments were reviewed by the members of the crowd in the first 80 hours 
7 See the offi cial website of NASA’s Clickworkers at http://nasaclickworkers.com (last vis-
ited Jan. 3, 2017) and the ofi cial website of Galaxy Zoo available at http://www.galaxy-
zoo.org (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
8 See the offi cial website of The Sloan Digital SkySurvey at http://www.sdss.org (last vis-
ited Jan. 3, 2017).
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(Vehkoo, 2013, p. 6). Although no major misconduct was found, the experi-
ment allowed The Guardian to build its reader community (Vehkoo, 2013, 
p. 6).
B1b: Crowdsourcing of complex tasks
Crowdsourcing can be used for the completion of simple tasks as well as for 
complicated tasks that require a high level of expertise (cf. Schenk and Guit-
tard; 2011). InnoCentive is a typical example of a crowdsourcing application 
utilising crowdsourcing of complex tasks.9 InnoCentive connects organ-
isations with innovators. When an organisation chooses a solution to the 
problem, the winning innovator receives a premium. The premium is usu-
ally higher than USD 10,000 (see Schenk and Guittard 2011). The tasks are 
within various scientific domains, including, but not limited to, chemistry, 
computer science, engineering, mathematics, and physical science. Figure 2 
displays a task published on InnoCentive.
The example of InnoCentive shows that crowdsourcing has the poten-
tial to be used in the field of dispute resolution not only for simple tasks 
that do not require previous expertise, but also for tasks that require a high 
level of expertise, such as providing legal and scientific advice to disputants. 
For instance, crowdsourcing of tasks that require a high level of expertise 
may be used to ensure the impartiality of the third neutral party in proceed-
ings related to professional malpractice or unauthorized practice of law. If 
the third neutral parties in such proceedings are professionals, they may be 
biased towards their colleagues. A CODR procedure in which the crowd is 
composed of an equal number or professionals and clients may decrease the 
risk of such a bias.
Figure 2. A task published on InnoCentive
B2: The nature of the tasks
Below, we compare three characterisations that are based on the nature of 
the tasks. We combine them in Table 1 and distinguish four interrelations.
9 See http://www.innocentive.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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Depending on the nature of the tasks that can be accomplished through 
crowdsourcing, Howe (2009) distinguishes four types of crowdsourcing, 
namely, collective intelligence, crowd creation, crowd voting, and crowdfunding. 
The first type is used for problem solving, the second for content creation, 
the third for rating content, and the fourth for gathering funds.
Grefen (2010) distinguishes three types of crowdsourcing, namely, (1) 
crowdcasting, (2) crowdproduction, and (3) crowdfunding. Crowdcasting is a 
business model in which the crowd is used to generate ideas by answering 
specific questions. Here, crowdstorming is a variation of crowdcasting; it 
allows the crowd to generate new ideas without very clear questions as a 
basis. Crowdproduction is a business model in which the crowd is used to 
produce a product, which can be of a digital nature. Crowdfunding is aimed 
at having a crowd fund a venture.
Schenk and Guittard (2011) distinguish two types of crowdsourcing, 
namely: (1) integrative crowdsourcing and (2) selective crowdsourcing. The 
integrative crowdsourcing is used for accomplishing large tasks by inte-
grating complementary contributions from the crowd. A typical example 
of integrative crowdsourcing is Wikipedia. By integrating millions of small 
contributions, including text and photos, Wikipedia offers an encyclopedia 
containing a wide array of detailed articles. The selective crowdsourcing is 
used for accomplishing tasks by harnessing the problem solving skills of 
the members of the crowd. As Schenk and Guittard (2011) noted, selective 
crowdsourcing implies a winner-takes-all mechanism where only the finder 
of the “winning” solution receives an award. A typical example of selective 
crowdsourcing is InnoCentive.
Interrelation 
between the types 
of crowdsourcing
Taxonomy provided by 
Howe (2009)
Taxonomy provided by 
Grefen (2010)
Taxonomy provided by 
Schenk and Guittard 
(2011))
(1) Collective intelligence Crowdcasting Selective crowdsourcing
(2) Crowd creation Crowdproduction Integrative crowdsourcing
(3) Crowd voting Crowdcasting Selective crowdsourcing
(4) Crowdfunding Crowdfunding N/A
Table 1. Four interrelations between three taxonomies
Below, we discuss the four interrelationships between the three taxonomies 
on the basis of their concepts.
(1) Collective intelligence, crowdcasting, and selective crowdsourcing are 
interrelated because all of them refer to crowdsourcing processes in 
which the tasks assigned to the crowd may include problem solving.
(2) Crowd creation, crowdproduction, and integrative crowdsourcing are in-
terrelated because all of them refer to crowdsourcing processes in which 
the tasks assigned to the crowd may include production of content.
(3) Crowd voting, crowdcasting, and selective crowdsourcing are interre-
lated because all of them refer to crowdsourcing processes in which the 
tasks assigned to the crowd may include rating content.
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(4) The concepts of crowdfunding used by Howe (2010) and Greven (2010) 
are the same because both of them refer to crowdsourcing in which the 
crowd submits funds to a crowdsourcing provider.
In summary, Table 1 indicates that the different typologies of crowdsourcing 
have common elements, which can be used for understanding crowdsourc-
ing. Finally, we remind that the taxonomy provided by Howe (2009) again 
serves as an umbrella for the other taxonomies.
B3: The platforms of crowdsourcing
The platform of crowdsourcing can be considered as the basis from where 
the venue originates. Stanoevska-Slabeva (2011) distinguishes the following 
five crowdsourcing platforms: (1) intermediary platforms, (2) user-initiated 
crowdsourcing platforms, (3) company initiated platforms, (4) idea market 
places and platforms, and (5) public crowdsourcing-initiative platforms. 
Below, we describe them briefly.
The intermediary platforms are created by intermediaries, which pro-
vide a venue where crowdsourcing workers and seekers of crowdsourcing 
services can meet and work together. InnoCentive is an example of an inter-
mediary platform.
In user-initiated crowdsourcing platforms, the term “user-initiated 
crowdsourcing” refers to a crowdsourcing process where the crowdsourcing 
is initiated by an individual user. Thus, a blog of an individual user allow-
ing the visitors to rate the articles published by that user is an example of a 
crowdsourcing platform using user-initiated crowdsourcing.
Company initiated platforms are created by companies which outsource 
certain tasks to crowdsourced workers. Company initiated platforms may, 
for instance, allow a company to collect and examine the opinions of the 
consumers in relation to the products or services offered by that company. 
The global online job marketplaces using crowdsourcing, which allow com-
panies to find and work with freelancers, are typical examples of company-
initiated platforms.10
The term “idea market places” refers to crowdsourcing platforms col-
lecting ideas from the users and selling those ideas to the public. A typical 
example of an idea marketplace is Threadless.11 Threadless allows anyone 
to submit images for t-shirts, bags, and other products. The images are put 
to a public vote. The top-scoring images are printed on products and sold 
worldwide through the website of Threadless and their retail store in Chi-
cago, USA. Since its establishment in 2000 up to 2010, Threadless sold more 
than four million T-shirts (cf. Nickel and Kalmikoff, 2010).
10 The global online job marketplaces include, without limitation, http://www.freelancer.
com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017) and http://www.upwork.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
11 See http://threadless.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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Public crowdsourcing-initiative platforms contain initiatives initiated by 
public authorities. For example, in 2010, the Irish government launched a 
crowdsourcing platform which aimed to collect ideas from the population 
regarding the question how to achieve higher economic growth. The top 
two ideas were awarded with EUR 100,00 (cf. Foremski, 2010).
The typology of crowdsourcing platforms indicates that a great variety 
of crowdsourcing platforms have been developed up to the present time. In 
Chapter 3, we will focus on the different crowdsourcing platforms.
C: The relation of crowdsourcing to the advanced concepts
The concept of crowdsourcing may overlap or sometimes even be used 
interchangeably with other concepts, such as (C1) collaborative systems, 
(C2) user-generated content, (C3) collective intelligence, and (C4) Web 2.0. 
Below, we will explain the four concepts. We give their meaning and show 
the relation to the term crowdsourcing.
C1: Collaborative systems
In the field of the information technology, collaborative systems are soft-
ware applications that are used by individuals to help them coordinate their 
work with others, whether designed for that purpose or not (cf. Khosrow-
pour, 2002, p. 86). The term “collaborative system” is a broad concept that 
includes crowdsourcing applications allowing the members of the crowd to 
coordinate their work. Wikipedia is an example of a crowdsourcing applica-
tion allowing the members of the crowd to coordinate their work in order to 
build an encyclopedia of use to a larger community.
C2: User-generated content
Casoto, Dattolo, Omero, Pudota, and Tasso (2010, p. 16) define the user-
generated content as “any kind of published content, result of a non-pro-
fessional activity with creative effort.” In most cases, the content published 
on the Internet by the users of crowdsourcing applications is user-generated 
content. The reason is that such content is often a result of non-professional 
activities with creative efforts. Examples of user-generated content created 
by the users of crowdsourcing applications include the articles of Wikipedia 
and the content published by the users of online social networks.
C3: Collective intelligence
Below, we provide a definition (C3a) of collective intelligence by Sulis (1997) 
as well as an explanation of collective intelligence by Lévy (C3b).
C3a: Sulis (1997) defines collective intelligence as “consisting of a large 
number of quasi-independent, stochastic agents, interacting locally both 
among themselves as well as with an active environment, in the absence of 
hierarchical organisation, and yet which is capable of adaptive behaviour.”
In this context, it should be noted that the behaviour of large groups of 
people who gather and act individually, but also share some common com-
munity goals is not per se a collective intelligence. To be collectively intel-
22 Chapter 2
ligent, the people should be aware that they act as a collective organism 
and intentionally act as members of such an organism (cf. Lykourentzou, 
Vergados, Kapetanious, and Loumos, 2011, p. 219). Collective intelligent 
behaviour is, for example, the behaviour of the contributors in Wikipedia 
who create encyclopedic articles by collaborating and building on the con-
tributions of each other.
C3b: Lévy (1999, p. 13) explains, that “the collective intelligence is con-
tinuously enhanced, coordinated in real time, and resulting in the effective 
mobilization of skills.” In this regard, Lévy points out that intelligence that 
is “frequently ridiculed, ignored, unused, and humiliated is obviously not 
enhanced (Lévy, 1999, p. 13).” As an example of ignored intelligence, Lévy 
refers to the social exclusion through unemployment. By not being able to 
involve all of its members in the economic life, the society does not act in a 
collectively intelligent way. According to Lévy, the result is a “terrifying waste 
of experience, skill, and human wealth.”
A good example is Wikipedia. The collective intelligence of the editors 
of Wikipedia is continuously enhanced because the editors have the oppor-
tunity to contribute to various topics and by various ways. We mention the 
editor’s contributions (1) by writing articles, (2) by merely proofreading the 
articles of the other wikipedians, and (3) by checking whether the articles 
comply with the strict requirements of Wikipedia concerning the sources of 
information used in the articles.
C4: Web 2.0
Web 2.0 can be defined as “all Internet services and tools which are based 
on a database which Internet users can modify, whether in terms of con-
tent (adding, deleting or editing information or relating information with 
existing information), its presentation, or both” (Ribes, 2007). The most-
ly used Web 2.0 applications include online social networks, blogs, and 
wikis. Online social networks are services that encourage their members to 
exchange their ideas, interest, music, and videos (cf. Varmaat, Sebok, Freund, 
Frydenberg, Campbell, 2016, p. 23). A blog is a web page that contains a 
series of chronological entries by its author (cf. Laudo and Traver, 2012,
p. 159). A Wiki is a web application that allows users to add and edit content 
on a webpage.
Web 2.0 provides the technological foundations upon which the crowd-
sourcing applications operate, enabling the members of the crowd to com-
plete tasks that were previously assigned to employees (cf. Vukovic and Bar-
tolini, 2010, p. 425). For instance, Wikipedia (a crowdsourcing application) is 
based on a Wiki (a Web 2.0 application).
D: Crowdsourcing as a business model
Crowdsourcing is a new business model allowing providers of crowdsourc-
ing applications to obtain information from large groups of people that was 
previously provided by employees. This business model proved to be so 
viable that several crowdsourcing applications became serious competitors 
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of applications based on the traditional business model. Below, we provide 
two different examples.
A first example is the competition between Wikipedia and Microsoft 
Encarta. Microsoft Encarta was a digital multimedia encyclopedia published 
by Microsoft Corporation from 1993 to 2009. However, Wikipedia became 
a very strong competitor of Microsoft Encarta and forced Microsoft to shut 
down Encarta (Cohen, 2009). Thus, Wikipedia challenged the validity of tra-
ditional business models based on individual and explicit relationships (cf. 
RAND Europe, 2010, p. 11; Lee Eden, 2015, p. 179).12
A second example is the open-source operating system Linux. Linux is 
the result of the programming efforts of thousands of people around the 
world contributing to a free code base. The contributors submit their con-
tributions to persons, also known as maintainers, who are responsible for 
the development of the particular area of Linux (cf. Timberg, 2015). While 
many maintainers are employed by various Linux vendors, others still work 
in their free time without remuneration (cf. Mauerer, 2010). The maintain-
ers collect the contributions and send them to Linus Torvalds, the top-level 
maintainer. Linus Torvalds uses the contributions to create a new version of 
Linux (see Sally, 2009, p. 252; Timberg, 2015). The business value to organisa-
tions that have adopted Linux is huge. For example, by adopting the Linux 
platform, IBM alone has estimated savings in the hundreds of millions of 
dollars (cf. Ekins, Williams, Pikas, 2011, p. 89).
The business model introduced by crowdsourcing can be either decen-
tralised or centralised. In the decentralised business model, the relationship 
between the organisation that crowdsources tasks and the crowdsourcing 
workers is not hierarchical. The organisation crowdsourcing tasks does not 
exercise direct control on the crowdsourcing workers.
Wikipedia is an example of a decentralised crowdsourcing application. 
The control on the articles published on Wikipedia is exercised only by other 
users of Wikipedia. There are some users of Wikipedia who even volunteer 
as Wikipedia cops (cf. Brafman and Beckstrom, 2007, p. 76). Some authors 
(Brafman and Beckstrom, 2007, p. 76; Godet, 2015, p. 189) compare an organ-
isation having a decentralised business model to a starfish. A starfish does 
not have a head, but it can still live and grow.
In the centralised business model, the relationship between the organ-
isation crowdsourcing tasks and the crowdsourcing workers is hierarchical. 
A typical example is InnoCentive where the organisation crowdsourcing 
the tasks chooses one of the solutions proposed by the innovators. Thus, 
the organisation crowdsourcing the tasks has complete control over which 
crowdsourcing worker will receive a financial remuneration. Brafman and 
Beckstrom (2007) and Godet (2015, p. 189) compare an organsation with a 
12 It should be noted that Wikipedia became world’s largest online encyclopedia. The suc-
cess of Wikipedia led to the shutting down of Microsoft Encarta, and also to the end of 
the printed Encyclopedia Britannica. In 2012, after 244 years of existence, the printed ver-
sion of Encyclopedia Britannica was discontinued (Zhao, Zhang, Lei, Qiu, 2015).
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centralised business model to a spider. The head of the spider controls its 
body. Linux is also an example of a crowdsourcing application having a 
centralised business model. The reason is that Linus Torvalds has complete 
control on whether or not to accept the contributions of the crowdsourced 
workers.
In order to implement a successful decentralised or centralised business 
model, organisations need to meet three criteria, namely, (1) the subject of 
the task being crowdsourced must consist of elements which can be changed 
without compromising the integrity of the whole subject, (2) a community 
of interest must be engaged, and (3) the organisation willing to introduce 
crowdsourcing must have a structural capability to engage the crowd and 
process the contributions of the crowd (Rowe, Poblet, Thomson, 2015).
E: Benefits of crowdsourcing
The benefits of all kinds of crowdsourcing are threefold, viz. (1) the diversi-
ty, (2) the high speed of decisions, and (3) the low cost of the crowdsourcing 
solutions (cf. Whitla, 2009, p. 25; Ericson, 2011; Schenk and Guittard, 2011). 
Below, we examine these three benefits (E1, E2, and E3).
E1: Diversity
The first benefit concerns the diversity of the crowd. It should be noted that, 
if everyone is entitled to participate in the open call, the crowd will most 
likely be composed from Internet users differing in age, gender, nationality, 
location, etc. A diverse crowd will propose different solutions to a problem, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that a solution will be found (cf. Page, 2008).
However, some studies indicate that Internet users cannot be regarded 
as a diverse crowd. The reason is that a typical Internet user is likely to be 
educated and under the age of 65. According to the Pew Research Center 
Internet Project Survey conducted between 9 and 12 of January 2014, 87% 
of American adults use the Internet. However, only 57% of the American 
adults aged 65 and older use the Internet.13 A statistic covering the year 2016 
provided by Eurostat reveals that, while 97% of the individuals in the EU 
in the age group 16-24 use the Internet, only 51% of the individuals in the 
EU in the age group 65-74 use the Internet.14 Another statistic provided by 
Eurostat also revealed that, in 2013, only 48% of the individuals in the EU 
having a low education use the Internet, compared to 93% of the individuals 
in the EU having a high education.15
13 For more information on the Pew Research Center Internet Project Survey conducted 
between 9 and 12 January 2014, please visit http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/
internet-use/latest-stats/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
14 See the statistics “Individuals – internet use” provided by Eurostat (last checked on 20th 
of December 2016).
15 ‘Internet use statistics - individuals’, Eurostat. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/euro-
stat/statistics-explained/index.php/Archive:Internet_use_statistics_-_individuals (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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While we confirm the findings that a typical Internet user is likely to be 
educated and under the age of 65, the fact is that Internet users cannot be 
treated as representing any single country or profession. So, while the mem-
bers of the crowd may have some common characteristics, their diversity 
may also be significant.16
E2: High speed of decisions
Because crowdsourcing utilises the resources of a large group of people, 
crowdsourcing solutions are typically characterised by a high speed. For 
example, the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
found that it is ten times faster to use online crowds to measure craters on 
images of Mars than to use regular workers (Sheehan, 2010, p. 105). A sec-
ond example illustrating the high speed of crowdsourcing applications is the 
ECRF. The ECRF was capable to resolve disputes within 22 days as counted 
from the submission of the complaint (cf. Van den Herik and Dimov, 2011b, 
p. 268). In comparison, UDRP disputes are resolved through ODR in as little 
as 60 days of filing (cf. Partridge, 2012).
E3: Low cost of the crowdsourcing solutions
Crowdsourcing offers low cost solutions (cf. Sheehan, 2010, p. 105; Murray-
Rust, Scekic, Lin, 2015, p. 41). The reason is straightforward: the contribu-
tions by the crowd are unpaid or, in some cases, the company/organisation 
that crowdsourced the task has to pay only for the best solution(s). All in all, 
the organisation’s cost of crowdsourcing is likely to be lower than that of 
internal development or cooperation with a specific firm or individual (cf. 
Afuah, 2009, p. 108; Sfetcu, 2015). The ECRF is an example of a crowdsourc-
ing application capable to complete complex tasks without providing remu-
neration to the members of the crowd (cf. Van den Herik and Dimov, 2011a).
F: Drawbacks of crowdsourcing
There are seven drawbacks associated with using crowdsourcing, namely, 
(F1) the vast amount of information that may be of little relevance, (F2) legal 
issues regarding ownership of ideas/works submitted, (F3) the very low 
piece-rates that are paid to crowdsourced workers, (F4) lack of transparency 
of crowdsourcing processes, (F5) lack of trust in crowdsourcing processes, 
(F6) risk of too few participants, (F7) information overload, and (F8) lack of 
representativeness. We discuss them briefly below.
16 This conclusion is based on studies examining the demographics of Internet users in gen-
eral, which may differ from the demographics of users of crowdsourcing applications. 
We note that the conclusion must be supported by research on the demographics of users 
of crowdsourcing applications.
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F1: Information of little relevance
The first drawback is that crowdsourcing applications may collect a vast 
amount of information of little relevance, i.e., poor quality and entries irrele-
vant for the company and the project. Such irrelevant information may make 
crowdsourcing applications an unreliable source of information (cf. Qvist, 
2011, p. 76). The irrelevant information can be filtered with filtering mech-
anisms (see Neskovic, Pavicevic, Dadic, 2012, p. 1155; Greffen, 2010). One 
quite promising way to filter information obtained through crowdsourcing 
is to allow the members of the crowd to rate that information. RANKER is 
an example of a website using this kind of filtering.17 After a user has posted 
a question in RANKER, the other users can add answers to this question 
and/or vote for the already existing answers. The answers that received the 
higher number of votes are displayed on the top of the list of answers.
F2: Legal issues
The second drawback concerns the fact that crowdsourced workers do not 
sign written contracts or nondisclosure agreements. Therefore, it is difficult 
to protect the intellectual property of the organisation collecting the ideas 
(cf. Afuah, 2014, p. 68). In the context of CODR, this is not an issue (and has 
not been an issue so far) because the CODR platforms generally do not claim 
intellectual property rights on the content published by the parties.18
F3: Low piece-rates
The third drawback concerns the low wages of the crowdsourced workers. 
Profit-based companies that pay low wages to crowdsourced workers may 
be accused of unethically exploiting crowdsourced workers. A company 
offering crowdsourced jobs often may gain a big profit from its crowdsourc-
ing activities because of the low expenses for salaries, whereas the workers 
do not have any social rights, such as the right to leave, the right to regu-
lated labor, and the right to a minimum salary (cf. Whitla, 2009, p. 26; Mur-
ray-Rust, Scekic, Lin, 2015, p. 41). In this regard, Whitla proposes that firms 
engaged in crowdsourcing activities need to be required to justify the social 
responsibility of their actions (Whitla, 2009, p. 26).
As a further argument, we would like to mention that providing a low 
remuneration to the members of the crowd participating as mediators or 
arbitrators in a CODR procedure may encourage them to resolve the dispute 
without paying much attention to the facts of the case. Such a behaviour 
17 See RANKER, www.ranker.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
18 For example, the user agreement provided by iCourthouse, a CODR provider, states that 
“iCourthouse does not own Content you submit, unless we tell you otherwise before you 
submit it.” See http://www.i-courthouse.com/main.taf?area1_id=front&area2_
id=useragreement (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). The terms of use of another CODR provider, 
PeopleClaim, states that “You understand that all Content on PeopleClaim.com is the 
sole responsibility of the person from whom the Content originated.” See http://www.
peopleclaim.com/Terms.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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of the members of the crowd will be a form of retaliation for the unethical 
treatment with regard to the remuneration or mere indifference.
It is worth mentioning that, up until the present moment, only CODR 
functioning as online mock juries provide the members of the crowd with 
remuneration for their services.19 The other CODR procedures provide non-
monetary incentives to the members of the crowd.
F4: Lack of transparency of crowdsourcing processes
The fourth drawback relates to the transparency of crowdsourcing appli-
cations. Those applications often do not use transparent processes allow-
ing the members of the crowd to know how their contributors are used by 
the initiator of the crowdsourcing process. For example, the organisation 
crowdsourcing the task in InnoCentive may decide to use ideas proposed by 
the innovators without providing them with a financial remuneration. This 
is because the organisation has a complete discretion in deciding whether 
some of the proposed ideas deserve financial remuneration. Sloane (2011, 
p. 135) states that the lack of transparency is one of the common mistakes 
that companies make when undertaking a collaborative process. Sloane 
points out that the lack of transparency will decrease the participation rates 
because “people react to the lack of communicated progress on collected 
input, by having less motivation to take part in future innovation efforts” 
(Sloane, 2011, p. 135).
F5: Lack of trust in crowdsourcing processes
The fifth drawback concerns trust in crowdsourcing processes. In this 
regard, Goodman and Dingli (2013) and Afuah (2009) argue that the lack 
of trust is caused by the lack of contracts or non-disclosure agreements 
between the crowdsourcing workers and the initiators of the crowdsourc-
ing applications. The lack of such documents makes the crowdsourcing 
processes non-transparent and deprives the parties in crowdsourcing pro-
cesses from legal protection (see Gibons, 2009, pp. 167-168). Because the 
information exchange includes a power-balancing and trust-building func-
tion, transparency is a precondition and a mediator for trust (DiPiazza and 
Eccles, 2002).
Consequently, the use of legal documents establishing the rights and 
the obligations of the parties in crowdsourcing processes is of utmost 
importance for the success of the crowdsourcing applications. In this con-
text, Brabham (2013) notes that the most successful crowdsourcing applica-
19 eJury pays to each juror between USD 5 and USD 10 depending on the length of the case. 
See http://www.ejury.com/jurors_learn_about.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). A juror 
participating in JuryTest gets between USD 5 and USD 50 per case. See http://www.jury-
test.net/index.cfm?action=howjur (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). OnlineVerdict pays each of its 
jurors between USD 20 and USD 60 depending on the amount of time required to review 
the case. See https://www.onlineverdict.com/jurors/juror-faqs/ (last visited Jan. 3,
2017).
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tions have policies protecting both parties in crowdsourcing processes. For 
instance, the members of the crowd who attempt to perform tasks posted by 
companies on InnoCentive have to sign a non-disclosure agreement and an 
intellectual property agreement. The intellectual property agreement grants 
the company after receiving the submission a temporary ninety-day license 
to use the intellectual property in the submission (cf. Babham, 2013).
F6: Risk of too few participants
The sixth drawback is the risk of too few participants (cf. Goodman and 
Dingli, 2013). Crowdsourcing applications will be not effective if there are 
too few participants. As Cooke, Barker, and Lecumberri (2013) note in the 
context of crowdsourcing speech and hearing experiments, “simply placing 
an experiment online does not guarantee a large number of participants, 
regardless of how well designed the web interface is.” The recruitment of 
participants requires some form of advertising (cf. Cooke, Barker, Lecum-
berri, 2013). 20
F7: Information overload
Crowdsourcing applications may generate a huge amount of information, 
which can be difficult to analyse. For instance, in 2009, the White House 
began to allow Internet users to post comments on WhiteHouse.gov and 
registered MySpace, Twitter, and Facebook accounts. As a result, the White 
House Staff received so much information that it was physically impossible 
to read all the data obtained through crowdsourcing applications (cf. Cara-
fano, 2012, p. 200; Van den Herik and Kok, 2013).
F8: Lack of representativeness
The crowd participating in crowdsourcing applications may not always meet 
the standard for statistical representativeness. The term “statistical represen-
tativeness” is defined by Macmillan as: “a sample-to-population relationship 
such that what was true about frequencies in the sample will be true also 
about frequencies in the population from which sample was drawn” (Gomm, 
2008, p. 130). To illustrate the lack of statistical representativeness of crowd-
sourcing applications, it is worth referring to the predictions of the opinion 
polls about the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in 2016. Many opin-
ion polls forecasted that the Democratic candidate (Hillary Clinton) would 
win with a modest lead (Barnes, 2016). However, the Republican candidate 
(Donald Trump) won, according to the election rules, with a significant lead.
20 Apart from advertising, providers of CODR services willing attract a large number of 
members of the crowd need to offer diverse incentives. For example, a CODR that incen-
tivise the members of the crowd to participate in the procedure by providing them with 
fi nancial remuneration and entertainment may attract more members of the crowd than a 
CODR procedure that rewards members of the crowd merely with fi nancial remunera-
tion. This is because the former will attract not only people looking for fi nancial remu-
neration, but also people looking for entertainment.
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2.1.2 Crowdsourcing in the field of law
Crowdsourcing is already used in the field of law. In particular, crowdsourc-
ing is used (A) for legal research support and (B) for the provision of legal 
advice. We discuss both issues below.
A: The use of crowdsourcing for legal research support
With respect to the use of crowdsourcing for legal research support, Arm-
strong (2010) explores whether some of the challenges related to the open 
access to legal source materials, such as the lack of links between the materi-
als, might be alleviated by the use of crowdsourced workers. His findings 
are that there is no reason why a crowdsourced production process might 
not be employed to extend access to legal materials and scholarship. 
In the context of CODR, the work by Armstrong (2010) is particular-
ly useful because it shows a way of implementing crowdsourcing in an 
ODR procedure, namely, using crowdsourcing for linking legal materials 
published by an ODR platform. In particular, crowdsourcing can be used 
to classify already decided cases. For instance, the members of the crowd 
can categorize CODR decisions by clicking through a category tree. Because 
such a classification will allow the disputants and the third neutral parties 
to easily find the decisions, which are relevant to their cases, it will facilitate 
the consistency of the decisions.
Bueno, Roggia, and Hoeschil (2014, pp. 201-202) implemented the ideas 
of Armstrong (2010) by developing a model of a crowdsourcing game, 
which allows the crowd to classify legal documents. Such a classification 
allows knowledge management applications to recognize the context of the 
search documents.
B: The use of crowdsourcing for the provision of legal advice
Concerning the use of crowdsourcing for the provision of legal advice, 
Robertson (2012, p. 26) predicts that, in the future, middle – class litigants 
will increasingly rely on crowdsourced legal advice. This would happen, 
she argues, because crowdsourcing applications allow litigants to quickly 
obtain reliable information (cf. Robertson, 2012, p. 10). For example, if a per-
son going through a difficult divorce posts his concerns on Facebook, a large 
body of social connections will provide him with an opinion on whether his 
concerns are warranted. Thus, the individual will access the opinions of his 
social connections on Facebook through a process that would be difficult to 
replicate in person because it would require numerous conversations in an 
effort to determine who in his social circle may have relevant information 
(see Robertson, 2012, p. 11).
It should be noted that there is an existing crowdsourcing platform, 
which provides the users with the opportunity to receive low-cost, crowd-
sourced legal answers from a group of participating lawyers. The platform 
called LawPivot allows the users to enter a confidential legal question and 
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assign it to a category, e.g., “intellectual property”, “tax”.21 Then, the plat-
form suggests lawyers to whom the users can send their legal questions 
(Miller and Meinzinger, 2013, p. 245).
Robertson’s predictions illustrate the potential of a CODR procedure 
allowing the crowd to post legal advice. PeopleClaim is an example of such 
a procedure.22 It is a CODR procedure using negotiation as a mechanism 
for resolving disputes. Unresolved claims can be posted publicly for review 
at the claimant’s option. In this case, any Internet user is entitled to post a 
resolution suggestion.23
Due to the low cost of crowdsourcing solutions (see Subsection 2.1.1.E3), 
CODR procedures allowing the crowd to post legal advice can offer afford-
able legal guidance to self-represented litigants24 who do not have financial 
resources necessary to retain counsel.25
2.2 Literature review on Online Dispute Resolution (ODR)
The purpose of this section is to provide an understanding of ODR by ana-
lysing relevant literature. The understanding of ODR is essential for build-
ing a theoretical framework of CODR. The reason is the similarity between 
ODR and CODR, which stems from the fact that both types of dispute reso-
lution use Internet as a part of the dispute resolution process. In the next 
subsections, we examine literature on the definitions of ODR (Subsection 
2.2.1), the typologies of ODR (Subsection 2.2.2), the benefits of ODR (Subsec-
tion 2.2.3), and the drawbacks of ODR (Subsection 2.2.4).
2.2.1 Definitions of ODR
Below, we discuss (A) the role of the Internet versus the role of ICT with 
respect to the definition of ODR. Subsequently, we examine (B) the concept 
of ADR and analyse whether (C) ODR is a form of ADR. Then, we present 
(D) a working definition of ODR.
21 See www.lawpivot.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
22 See www.peopleclaim.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
23 See www.peopleclaim.com/WhatToExpect.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
24 Self-represented litigants may be a considerable number. To illustrate, 17% of the parties 
in the Australian Federal Courts are self-represented (Richardson, Sourdin, Wallance, 
2012, p. 25). During the fi scal year ending on 30th of September 2014, appeals submitted 
to U.S. Courts of Appeals by self-represented litigants amounted to 51% of all fi lings. See 
the article “Judicial Business 2014” published by the Administrative Offi ce of the U.S. 
Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary on http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/judicial-business-2014 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
25 A Canadian study (Macfarlane, 2013) and an Australian study (Dewar, Smith, Banks, 
2000) revealed that between 75 and 80 per cent of self-represented litigants choose to be 
self-represented due to inability to pay for legal representation.
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A: The role of the Internet versus the role of ICT with respect to the definition of ODR
The boundaries of ODR are and probably will remain a debatable concept 
(cf. Cortés, 2010, p. 54; Ebner and Zeleznikow, 2016, p. 29). One side of the 
debate stresses that the use of the Internet should be the criterion for defin-
ing ODR processes (see Schiavetta, 2004; Farah, 2005; Mann, 2009). The other 
side of the debate argues that the criterion for defining ODR processes is the 
use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) (see Katsh, Rifkin, 
2001, p. 117; Hörnle, 2004, p. 2; Cho, 2009, p. 11).26
The difficulties in defining ODR stem from the variances in the lin-
guistic interpretation of the term “online”. For example, according to the 
Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, the term “online” means “controlled 
by or connected to a computer or to the Internet”.27 Such interpretation of 
the term “online” supports the use of ICT as a criterion for defining ODR. 
However, Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines “online” as 
“connected to other computers through the Internet, or available through 
the Internet”.28 This interpretation is in accordance with the use of the Inter-
net as a criterion for defining ODR.
The use of the term “the Internet” as a criterion for defining ODR will 
exclude dispute resolution procedures using a Local Area Network (LAN) 
from the scope of the definition. LAN is a communication network that 
interconnects a variety of data communications devices within a small geo-
graphic area and transmits data at high data transfer rates (cf. White, 2010, 
p. 196). The Internet is an interconnection of multiple LANs, i.e., a network 
of networks (cf. Bordone, 1998).
Because a narrow criterion will exclude dispute resolution procedures 
using LAN from the scope of ODR, the use of this criterion would make the 
application of the definition of ODR more complex. The reason is that the 
same dispute resolution procedure, depending on whether it uses LAN or 
the Internet, may be defined as both “online” and “offline” dispute resolu-
tion. For the sake of clarity, we prefer using the broader criterion of ODR.
26 ICT consists of hardware, software, networks, and media for collection, storage, process-
ing, transmission, and presentation of information (voice, data, text, images). See Infor-
mation & Communication Technology sector Strategy Paper of the World Bank Group 
published in 2002, p. 3. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINFOR-
MATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONANDTECHNOLOGIES/Resources/SSPwithAn-
nexes.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). This broad defi nition of ICT allows for the inclusion 
of any technology that facilitates by electronic means the creation, storage management 
and dissemination of information.
27 The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary available at http://oald8.oxfordlearnersdic-
tionaries.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
28 See Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English available at http://www.ldoceonline.
com/dictionary/online (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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B: The concept of ADR
There are two ways for defining Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). In 
particular, ADR can be defined either narrowly as encompassing non-litiga-
tion processes to resolve agreements to the satisfaction of all parties (cf. Bre-
ger, Schatz, and Laufer, 2001, p. 35) or broadly as encompassing out-of-court 
dispute resolution proceedings (cf. Emerson, 2009, p. 66).
The word “alternative” in the narrow definition has the meaning of 
alternative to litigation. The word “alternative” in the broad definition of 
ADR means alternative to court proceedings. The difference in the defini-
tions is important because the same procedure may be regarded as ADR 
under the broad definition and not regarded as ADR under the narrow defi-
nition. For example, this is the case for the Alberta’s Judicial Dispute Reso-
lution (AJDR) provided by the Provincial Court and the Court of Queen’s 
Bench in the Canadian Province Alberta.29 AJDR is a confidential pre-trial 
settlement conference led by a judge.30 Disputants must voluntarily agree 
to participate in AJDR. The objective of AJDR is “to resolve the dispute so a 
trial will be either unnecessary, or at most limited to those issues on which 
the parties do not agree.”31 If the disputants do not reach an agreement, the 
judge may give a non-binding opinion of what decision the judge would 
make if the same case was presented at a trial. Although AJDR is a court pro-
ceeding, it is not a litigation proceeding because litigation involves a third 
party making a decision binding on the disputants (cf. Hörnle, 2009, p. 47).
ADR mechanisms can be divided into two groups, namely, (1) facilita-
tive mechanisms and (2) adjudicative mechanisms (see Atlas, Huber, and 
Trachte-Huber, 2000, p. 18).32 While the facilitative mechanisms have no 
binding force on the parties, the adjudicative mechanisms involve decisions 
by third parties that legally bind the parties. The third party in facilitative 
mechanisms assist the disputants to (1) identify the issues of the dispute, (2) 
develop strategies for addressing those issues, and (3) reach an agreement 
about particular issues or the entire dispute (cf. NADRAC, 2003, p. 4)
Because ADR is often defined as what it is not, it tends to encompass a 
variety of procedures through which disputants may resolve their disputes 
(see Avruch and Black, 1996, p. 47). Such procedures include, but are not 
limited to (B1) negotiation, (B2) mediation, (B3) arbitration, or a combina-
tion of them (Greenwood, 2008). The three main types of ADR processes 
mentioned above are briefly discussed below.
29 See Guidelines for Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDC) available at http://www.alberta-
courts.ab.ca/ca/practicenotes/l.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
30 See the offi cial webpage of the Judicial Dispute Resolution (Alberta) accessible at http://
www.justice.gc.ca/eng/fl -df/fjs-sjf/view-affi c.asp?uid=88 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
31 See the offi cial webpage of the Judicial Dispute Resolution (Alberta) accessible at http://
www.justice.gc.ca/eng/fl -df/fjs-sjf/view-affi c.asp?uid=88 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).




Negotiation can be defined as a deliberative process in which two or more 
parties enter into discussion for the purpose of achieving an agreement that 
is advantageous to all participants (cf. Anderson, 2011). It should be noted 
that negotiation is not always voluntary. Disputants involved in grievances, 
civil suits, and divorces are sometimes required to negotiate (see Mayer, 
2012, p. 214).
Negotiators can use two approaches to meet their needs, namely, a 
distributive approach and an integrative approach (Mayer, 2012, p. 218). 
The distributive approach to negotiation is about gaining as large a share 
of the available benefits as possible (cf. Mayer, 2012, p. 218). The integra-
tive approach is about increasing what is available for all and making sure 
everyone’s needs are adequately addressed (cf. Mayer, 2012, p. 219).
B2: Mediation
Mediation can be defined as the intervention of a third party to help dispu-
tants communicate with each other about how to deal in the best way with 
a conflict (cf. Mayer, 2012, p. 271). An important characteristic of media-
tion is that the mediator does not decide the outcome of the dispute.33 The 
mediator merely assists the disputants to find a solution for the dispute. The 
assistance includes listening to all of the parties and allowing them with 
the opportunity to present their most powerful arguments in an effective 
way. Mediation is most often voluntary (Lodder and Zeleznikow, 2010, p. 3). 
However, there are exceptions in several U.S. states, Belgium, and a number 
of Australian jurisdictions (Lodder and Zeleznikow, 2010, p. 4).
B3: Arbitration
Arbitration can be defined as a process in which one or both of the parties 
involved have agreed by contract to submit unresolved issues to a neutral 
third party of which the decision shall be binding on all parties involved 
(cf. Carrell, M., Heavrin, C. 2008, p. 180). While some jurisdictions require 
arbiters to have legal background (e.g., India and France), other jurisdictions 
do not require arbiters to be legally qualified (see Lodder and Zeleznikow, 
2010, p. 4). Disputants may select an arbiter on the basis of his/her expertise, 
e.g., accountant or an engineer (see Lodder and Zeleznikow, 2010, p. 4).
It should be noted that the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbi-
tral awards is relatively easy because of the New York Convention, which 
allows arbitral awards made in one Convention country to be recognised 
33 The mediator may evaluate the content of the dispute (Lodder and Zeleznikow, 2010, 
p. 3).
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and enforced in any of the other Convention countries.34 At present, 156 
countries are parties to the New York Convention.35
It is worth mentioning that, because the New York Convention is con-
sidered to have a pro-enforcement bias, the courts interpret the permis-
sible grounds for non-enforcement quite narrowly (see Moses, 2012, p. 3). 
This leads to the enforcement of the vast majority of awards. However, the 
enforcement of ODR arbitration awards has not been tested yet (Wrbka, 
2014, p. 101). Many scholars argue that the New York Convention may, in 
principle, apply to binding ODR arbitration awards (Kaufmann-Kohler and 
Schultz, 2004, pp. 216-223; Edwards and Wilson, 2007; Cortés, 2010, pp. 111-
112).
C: ODR as a form of ADR
It is debatable whether ODR is a form of ADR. On one side of the debate, 
Farah (2005), Zondag and Lodder (2007), and Cortés (2010) define ODR as a 
form of ADR. On the other side of the debate, Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz 
(2004, p. 7) define ODR as a process including not only ADR, but also court 
proceedings.
If we define ODR as a form of ADR, we will bring ourselves outside the 
scope of ODR court proceedings that use ICT to a large extent.36 An example 
of such a court proceeding is the European Small Claims Procedure.
The European Small Claims Procedure was established by Regula-
tion (EC) No 861/2007.37 The Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 defines “Small 
claims” as cases concerning sums under EUR 2000, excluding interest, 
expenses, and disbursements. The cases are resolved by national courts of 
the EU Member States. Judgements delivered under the European Small 
Claims Procedure are recognised and enforceable in the other Member 
States without the need for a declaration of enforceability.
Pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Regulation (EC) No 861/2007, the claim-
ant shall commence the procedure by filling in a standard claim and lodg-
ing it with the court or tribunal with jurisdiction directly, by post or by any 
other means of communication, such as fax or email, acceptable to the Mem-
ber State in which the procedure is commenced. Article 8 of Regulation (EC) 
No 861/2007 states that the court or tribunal may hold an oral hearing 
34 See the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also 
known as the New York Convention, adopted by a United Nations diplomatic conference 
on 10 June 1958 and entered into force on 7 June 1959. The text of the New York Conven-
tion is available on http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/
NYConvention.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
35 See the Status of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards provided by the website of United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) available on http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/
arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
36 There is an increasing interest in implementing ODR in court proceedings (Lodder, 2016).
37 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 establishing a European small claims procedure.
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through a videoconference or another communication technology if the 
technical means are available. Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 
states that the court or tribunal may also admit the taking of evidence through 
videoconference or other communication technology if the technical means 
are available.
If we accept that ODR is a form of ADR, we will need to exclude dispute 
resolution procedures, such as the European Small Claims Procedure, from 
residing under the scope of ODR. However, it is not feasible to exclude any 
procedure that may be entirely conducted through the Internet from resid-
ing under the scope of ODR. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, we 
will use a definition of ODR that encompasses ADR as well as court pro-
ceedings.
D: Working definition of ODR
As a working definition, we will use the aforementioned definition provid-
ed by Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz (2004, p. 7). The reason is that it is the 
only definition of ODR that encompasses (1) ADR processes, and also (2) 
court proceedings. In order to take into account our preferences with regard 
to the use of the term “ICT” as a criterion for defining ODR, we modify the 
definition provided by Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz as follows.
Definition 2.2 (ODR): ODR is a broad term that encompasses forms of ADR 
and court proceedings, which use ICT as a part of the dispute resolution pro-
cess.
Here, it should be noted that ODR encompasses processes in which the use 
of ICT comprises a substantial portion of the dispute resolution (cf. Fox, 
2009, p. 401). Otherwise, any ADR or court procedure using ICT will be 
regarded as an ODR procedure. ODR procedures in which the use of ICT 
comprises a substantial portion of the dispute resolution include, for exam-
ple, procedures where the parties communicate mainly through ICT tools, 
such as email messages, voice through IP, and videoconferences.
2.2.2 Typologies
A review of ODR literature reveals that the following five categories of ODR 
methods have been used to describe the state of play in ODR: (A) technol-
ogy assisted negotiation; (B) online mediation; (C) online customer com-
plaint management; (D) online ombudsman; (E) online arbitration; and (F) 
early neutral evaluation. Below, each of these methods is explained in some 
details.
A: Technology assisted negotiation
Technology assisted negotiation is a negotiation process enhanced by tech-
nological tools. The tools perform actions that are normally performed by a 
mediator (cf. Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz, 2004, p. 14). The dispute reso-
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lution systems used by eBay38 and Squaretrade39 are forms of technology-
assisted negotiation (cf. Katsh, 2009, p. 237). On these two cases, the com-
munication between parties takes place via password-protected websites. 
Most of the communication is controlled and shaped through web forms 
allowing the parties to select among various choices. The use of web forms, 
instead of email messages, provides fewer opportunities for uncontrolled 
communication, which, in turn, focuses the attention of the disputants on 
possible options for settlement (see Katsh, 2009, p. 237).
Technology assisted negotiation includes blind bidding systems. Dis-
puting parties using blind bidding systems are allowed to submit settlement 
offers to a computer. If the settlement offers are within a certain range, the 
computer automatically splits the difference. Blind bidding is particularly 
attractive to the disputants, because the offers are never revealed if the par-
ties do not reach a settlement (Moffitt and Bordonne, 2012, p. 430). Up until 
the present moment, blind bidding has been employed mainly in claims 
against insurance companies because such claims are normally settled 
through negotiation (see Moffitt and Bordonne, 2012, p. 430).
B: Online mediation
Online mediation is the online form of traditional mediation (cf. Tang, 2009, 
p. 154). Online mediators are humans who use various technological means, 
such as instant messaging/chat room, email, and video conferencing, to 
replicate the traditional mediation process (Kaplan, 2009, p. 139). Online 
mediators employ techniques similar to their offline counterparts, such as 
establishment of ground rules framing the boundaries of mediation, identi-
fication of issues, clarifying and detailing respective interests and objectives, 
searching for objective criteria, identifying options, discussing and analys-
ing solutions, adjusting and refining proposed solutions, and summarizing 
the agreement in writing (cf. Bidgoli, 2003, p. 752).
C: Online customer complaint management
In an online customer complaint management system, the procedures for 
submitting, recording, evaluating, and taking action on customer com-
plaints are conducted partially or entirely online. Usually, such systems 
allow the complainant to check online the status of the complaint at any 
time (cf. Sundberg and Huggins, 1997, p. 182).
At present, both private companies and public organisations use online 
complaint management systems. For example, many companies in the 
United Kingdom use the online consumer complaint management system 
provided by mycustomerfeedback.com.40 The system allows the companies 
to capture customer complaints and feedback easily by using a web-based 
38 For more information on the ODR provided by eBay, please visit http://pages.ebay.
com/help/buy/resolving-problems.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
39 See http://www.squaretrade.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
40 See http://www.mycustomerfeedback.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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interface. The online customer complaint management system used by the 
Stoke-on-Trent City Council is an example of a system used by a public 
organisation.41 The system allows the customers to submit an online com-
plaint to the Council (cf. Cook, 2012, p. 61). In order to submit the complaint, 
the customer would need to fill out an online form available on the website 
of the Council. The Council will try to respond to the complaint within 10 
working days. If the complainant is not satisfied with the response of the 
Council, he may request an investigation by an independent investigator 
within the Council. The request can be made by email. The investigation 
will be conducted by a Complaint Investigation Officer together with a 
senior manager not involved in the original complaint.42
D: Online ombudsman
The function of the ombudsman is to protect individuals from unlawful 
acts committed by the public administration (cf. Reif, 2004, p. 79). In order 
to perform that function, the ombudsman is entitled to take complaints, 
investigate conflicts, and help to resolve these conflicts (see Ziegenfuss and 
Orourke, 2010, p. 19). The online ombudsman allows the complainant to 
submit the complaint through the Internet and/or manage its complaint 
online. For example, the Dutch National Ombudsman allows the complain-
ant to submit an online complaint and to further communicate with the 
Ombudsman through email.43
E: Online arbitration
Arbitration can be defined as the resolution of a dispute between two or 
more parties by a third person (arbitrator) who derives his powers from an 
agreement of the parties, and whose decision is binding on them (cf. Van 
den Berg, 1981, p. 44).44 In comparison with traditional arbitration, online 
arbitration proceedings are conducted entirely by email or other means for 
electronic communication (see Coteanu, 2004a, p. 92). The online arbitration 
can be non-binding, self-enforceable, or legally binding.
41 See a section of the website of Stoke-on-Trent City Council entitled “Customer Feed-
back.” Available on http://www.stoke.gov.uk/ccm/content/council-and-democracy/
customer-feedback/customer-feedback.en (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
42 See a section of the website of Stoke-on-Trent City Council entitled “Customer Feed-
back.” Available on http://www.stoke.gov.uk/ccm/content/council-and-democracy/
customer-feedback/customer-feedback.en (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
43 See the section of the offi cial website of the Dutch National Ombudsman entitled “How 
can you complain to the National Ombudsman?” Available at http://www.nationaleom-
budsman.nl/how-can-you-complain-national-ombudsman (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
44 Sample arbitration provisions requiring parties of a contract to have recourse on online 
arbitration already appeared in the legal literature. An example of such a provision reads 
as follows: “The parties agree that the parties and the arbitration panel shall conduct the 
proceedings, document exchanges, and the issuance of the decision, via a secure Internet 
connection. Evidence, if any, shall be submitted in a digital writing, signed with an 
authenticated digital signature, under oath and subject to the laws of perjury” (Hill Bro, 
2004, p. 137).
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Non-binding online arbitration is a settlement-oriented online dispute-
resolution process that produces a non-binding decision. The entire pro-
cedure, including the submission of the facts and the delivery of the non-
binding decision, is conducted through the Internet. Online non-binding 
arbitration aims to provide the parties with an expert assessment of the 
strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions. The non-binding 
arbitration may provide the last opportunity for an out-of-court resolution 
of the dispute (cf. Townsend, 2011, p. 37).
Self-enforceable online arbitration is an arbitration procedure of which 
the decisions are enforced by a private authority. The first well known 
online dispute resolution procedure of which the decisions are enforced by 
a private authority is the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
(UDRP). The enforcement of the decisions rendered by UDRP panels is per-
formed by cancelation, transfer, or other changes to domain name registra-
tions (cf. Van den Herik and Dimov, 2011a, p. 247). The private authority 
enforcing the UDRP decisions is ICANN’s accredited registrar that regis-
tered the disputed domain name. ICANN-accredited registrars are organisa-
tions or commercial entities registered with the ICANN to administer and 
sell domain names (cf. Uys, 2010, p. 59). Every entity willing to become an 
ICANN-accredited registrar must sign a “Registrar Accreditation Agree-
ment” obliging that entity to comply with UDRP decisions.
Legally binding arbitration renders decisions that are binding to the dis-
putants. An example of legally binding arbitration conducted through the 
Internet is Net-Arb (http://www.net-arb.com/). Net-Arb works as follows. 
At the beginning, the complainant fills out an online form and submits it 
to the provider of the online arbitration services. The online form contains 
information about the parties and their dispute. When the two parties agree 
to arbitrate, the provider notifies the parties by sending them an email. 
Then, the provider reviews the description of the dispute provided by the 
complainant. Based on expert knowledge, the provider assigns arbitrators 
who understand the subject matter of the dispute. Once the arbitrators are 
appointed, the parties receive an email with instructions for their hearing. 
During the hearing phase, all of the testimony and evidence is exchanged 
by email. Afterwards, the arbitrator will render a written legally binding 
arbitral award.45
It should be noted that the arbitral awards rendered through online arbi-
tration may not be recognized and enforced under the New York Conven-
tion because, pursuant to Article 2 of the New York Convention, it applies 
only to agreements “in writing” (cf. Wang, 2010, p. 157). However, online 
arbitral agreements would appear to satisfy the writing requirements of the 
convention. The reason is that, under most national legislation, electronic 
writings are considered equivalent to traditional writings (cf. Cortés, 2010, 
p. 112).
45 See section “How net-ARBitration Works” of the website http://www.net-arb.com avail-
able at http://www.net-arb.com/how_arbitration_works.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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F: Early neutral evaluation
Early neutral evaluation is a dispute resolution process that aims to facili-
tate negotiations, and not to decide the case (cf. Carper and McKinsey, 2011, 
p. 178). The process is conducted by a third-party neutral who conducts a 
hearing and issues an opinion regarding the strength and weakness of evi-
dence and the outcome of the case (cf. Carper and McKinsey, 2011, p. 178). 
Oral presentations and written submission are usually limited in length. 
Early neutral evaluation is appropriate for cases in which disputants have 
unrealistic expectations about the outcome of the case (Carper and McKin-
sey, 2011, p. 178).
2.2.3 Benefits of ODR
Compared to the offline forms of dispute resolution, ODR has six benefits, 
viz. (1) saving transportation costs, (2) fast speed, (3) access to external exper-
tise, (4) avoidance of violent conflicts, (5) enabling parties located in different 
countries to participate in real-time hearings, and (6) increased access to jus-
tice (cf. Anttiroiko and Mälkiä, 2007, p. 1270; cf. Lodder and Zelezikow, 2010, 
p. 13). They are briefly described below.
The first benefit of ODR is that it saves transportation costs (cf. Ant-
tiroiko and Mälkiä, 2007, p. 1270). This is because the parties, even if they 
are located in different countries, can participate in a real-time hearing with-
out the need to spend time and financial resources for traveling to the place 
of the hearing (cf. Lodder and Zelezikow, 2010, p. 13).
The second benefit of ODR is that it is faster than the usual offline pro-
cedures. This is because the parties do not need to attend the venue of the 
meetings physically. The high speed of ODR procedures makes them par-
ticularly appropriate in the current business environment where consumers 
and business companies expect that any service they need should be avail-
able online, twenty four hours a day (cf. Gopasalmy, 2009, p. 74).
The third benefit of ODR is that it allows the parties to access exper-
tise outside their local area (cf. Anttiroiko and Mälkiä, 2007, p. 1270). Thus, 
through ODR, parties may find a third neutral party located thousands of 
miles from them that has extensive experience in dealing with the issues 
concerned. For example, the ODR platform eQuibbly allows disputants 
to invite one or more arbitrators from a list of arbitrators published on the 
website of eQuibbly.46 The list of the arbitrators contains the names of the 
arbitrators, their hourly fee, and a brief summary of their professional expe-
rience.
The fourth benefit of ODR is that it allows disputants who have a his-
tory of violence to resolve their disputes without physical meetings, which 
may evolve in violent conflicts (cf. Lodder and Zelezikow, 2010, p. 13).
46 The list of the arbitrators is published on https://www.equibbly.com/professionals (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2014).
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The fifth benefit is that it provides a real time venue, which may facili-
tate the resolution of cross-border disputes (cf. Lodder and Zelezikow, 2010, 
p. 13).
The sixth benefit of ODR is that it improves justice for people who are 
isolated or disabled, but have access to ICT and know how to use it (cf. 
Anttiroiko and Mälkiä, 2007, p. 1270). Often, such people have to put much 
effort in physically attending the court or the place where the dispute reso-
lution takes place.
2.2.4 Drawbacks of ODR
Below, we mention five drawbacks of ODR, viz. (1) lack of face-to-face com-
munication, (2) inequality between users who are familiar with ICT and 
those who are not, (3) information security vulnerabilities of ODR platforms, 
(4) the lack of transparency, and (5) the lack of trust in ODR procedures (cf. 
Rule, 2003, p. 98-99; Anttiroiko and Mälkiä, 2007, p. 1270; Cortés, 2010, p. 58; 
cf. Bird, Reder, Darrow, Lichtenstein, Aresty, and Klosek, 2011, p. 256).
The first drawback of ODR is that the text-based methods, which are 
the main communication method used in ODR, may lead to misinterpreta-
tions (cf. Anttiroiko and Mälkiä, 2007, p. 1270). The reason is that they do 
not allow distinguishing of tones, inflections, and facial expressions (see 
Epstein, 2012, p. 423). However, the use of high-quality video technologies 
may remove this drawback.
The second drawback of ODR is that it puts parties who are not familiar 
and comfortable with the relevant technology and tools in a disadvanta-
geous situation (cf. Cortés, 2010, p. 58). Yet, this problem may be addressed 
by providing the disputants with training related to the use of IT and user 
manuals. Moreover, as increasingly more people use computers on a regular 
basis, the importance of this drawback will decrease.
The third drawback is that criminals may exploit the information secu-
rity vulnerabilities of the ODR platform in order to obtain unauthorized 
access to information related to the dispute and the disputants. That is why 
the ODR provider should use information security practices (cf. Lodder and 
Zeleznikow, 2010, p. 38). However, in order to gain the trust of the dispu-
tants, the ODR provider should not only use such information security prac-
tices, but also publicly disclose those practices. In this regard, it should be 
noted that, in Section VII of the Best Practices for Online Dispute Resolution 
Service Providers, the American Bar Association Task Force on e-Commerce 
and ADR recommends that ODR providers disclose what kinds of security 
mechanisms have been put in place to safeguard participant information.47
47 See Recommended Best Practices for Online Dispute Resolution Service Providers pub-
lished by the American Bar Association Task Force on e-Commerce and ADR in 2002. The 
online version of the Recommended Best Practices for Online Dispute Resolution Service 
Providers is available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrat-
ed/2011_build/dispute_resolution/best_practices_fi nal_102802.authcheckdam.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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The fourth drawback is the lack of transparency. The charges of a lack 
of transparency stem from the fact that, similarly to ADR procedures, most 
ODR procedures are private (cf. Bird, Reder, Darrow, Lichtenstein, Aresty, 
and Klosek, 2011, p. 256). Such private procedures often do not allow the 
public to receive sufficient information about the procedures. It should be 
noted that transparency may relate to three different aspects of an ODR sys-
tem, namely, (1) to the governance structure, (2) the dispute resolution per-
sonnel, and (3) the dispute resolution process itself (cf. Kaufmann-Kohler, 
Schultz, 2004, p. 110). In order to ensure a transparent governance structure, 
the provider of online dispute resolution services should disclose the con-
tact details of the provider, the location of the provider, and the sources of 
funding. In order to ensure a transparent dispute resolution personnel, a 
provider of online dispute resolution services should disclose the names of 
the neutrals, the neutral’s qualifications, and the experience. Such a disclo-
sure will allow the parties to find out if there is a conflict of interest between 
them and the neutrals. In order to ensure a transparent dispute resolution, 
the provider of online dispute resolution services should publish a clear 
description of the procedure, including, but not limited to, the costs, the 
character of the outcome (e.g., binding decision or non-binding decision), 
and substantive rules or principles governing the procedure.
The fifth drawback of ODR procedures is the lack of trust in these pro-
cedures caused by the non-face-to-face communication used in such proce-
dures (cf. Rule, 2003, p. 98-99). People who do not trust each other may act 
tentatively and keep important information to themselves (cf. Van Veenen, 
2012, p. 102). As a result, disputants participating in ODR processes may not 
disclose all the relevant information to online mediators and online arbitra-
tors.
2.3 Literature review on CODR
As can be seen from our analysis in sections 2.1 and 2.2, there is a plethora of 
literature on crowdsourcing and ODR. However, the literature on the rela-
tionship between these two concepts is rather scarce. To our knowledge, 
CODR has been examined only by Rule and Nagarajan (2010), Van den 
Herik and Dimov (2011a, b, 2012a, b), Matic (2014), and Luz, Poblet, Silva 
(2016). This thesis is partly based on the articles written by Van den Herik 
and Dimov (2011a, b). Below, we briefly examine the works by Rule and 
Nagarajan (2010), Matic (2014), and Luz, Poblet, Silva (2016).
Rule and Nagarajan (2010) emphasise the need for innovative dispute 
resolution mechanisms by stating that the traditional dispute resolution pro-
viders are not able to cope with the huge number of online disputes. The 
reason is that the traditional dispute resolution services, including ODR, (1) 
have a high price, (2) do not meet the increased expectations of the inter-
net users in relation to the speed of online services, and (3) require human 
resources (see Section 1.1). After stressing the need for an innovative dispute 
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resolution, Rule and Nagarajan discuss the operation of the ECRF and con-
clude that the use of crowdsourcing in a dispute resolution process can be a 
solution to the problems that traditional dispute resolution encounters. The 
reasons are that CODR requires (1) less financial resources, (2) less human 
resources than ODR and (3) provides a quicker dispute resolution.
Matic (2014) proposes a model of crowdsourced online arbitration, 
which ensures the confidentiality of the information submitted to the crowd. 
As part of the procedure, any materials delivered to the crowd should not 
contain confidential information. For example, pictures of persons should 
be scrambled or obfuscated (cf. Matic, 2014). The purpose of the procedure 
proposed by Matic is to use the advantages of crowdsourcing while keeping 
the confidential information about the parties in secrecy (Matic, 2014).
Luz, Poblet, Silva (2016, p. 285) identify three manifestations of the rela-
tionship between crowdsourcing and ODR, namely, (1) the use of ODR to 
aggregate micro-task output data, (2) the use of crowdsourcing to retrieve 
relevant information for ODR, and (3) the use of crowdsourcing to model 
an ODR through workflows of micro-tasks. In the first manifestation, ODR 
is used as a tool, which facilitates the aggregation of information gathered 
through crowdsourcing. For example, ODR can be used to distinguish 
between correct and incorrect information provided by crowdsourcing 
workers. In the second manifestation, the parties of ODR procedures receive 
crowdsourcing information which can be helpful for the resolution of the dis-
pute. For instance, the crowd may provide the parties with suggestions on 
how to resolve the dispute. In the third manifestation, a part of or an entire 
ODR procedure is conducted by crowdsourced workers who act as computa-
tional units and their efforts are integrated with the ODR process. In the first 
manifestation, crowdsourcing exploits ODR. In the second and the third man-
ifestations, ODR exploits crowdsourcing (cf. Luz, Poblet, Silva, 2016, p. 285).
While Rule and Nagarajan (2010) provide a general discussion on 
CODR, they did not define it and analyse it in details. In order to fill this gap 
in the literature, Van den Herik and Dimov (2011a) defined this new type of 
dispute resolution, described the present state of play, and built a theoretical 
framework by investigating CODR building blocks. The definition of CODR 
provided by Van den Herik and Dimov is based on the definition of ODR 
provided by Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz (cf. Van den Herik and Dimov, 
2011a, p. 245; Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz, 2004, p. 7).48 The definition of 
CODR provided by Van den Herik and Dimov reads as follows.
Definition 2.3 (CODR): CODR is a term that encompasses some forms of 
ADR and court proceedings using the Internet and crowdsourcing as parts of 
the dispute resolution process.49
48 The defi nition on ODR provided by Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz is mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.2.1.
49 The concept of ADR was discussed in Subsection 2.2.1.B. The term “crowdsourcing” was 
defi ned in Subsection 2.1.1.A.
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The definition is particularly important because it clearly differentiates 
CODR from other dispute resolution procedures, including ADR/ODR 
schemes in which the third neutral party is a collegial body. 50
2.4 Chapter summary
In the beginning of this chapter, we provided a literature overview of the 
two concepts that are at the center of CODR, namely, crowdsourcing and 
ODR. The literature review of crowdsourcing indicated that crowdsourc-
ing can be an effective and powerful business model that is used in some 
popular websites, such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, InnoCentive, and 
Wikipedia. Because of its popularity, crowdsourcing has been the object of 
many academic studies. Those studies provided us with a knowledge base 
for constructing a working definition of crowdsourcing and made us famil-
iar with the benefits and drawbacks of crowdsourcing.
After defining crowdsourcing, we found out that the concept of crowd-
sourcing overlaps with other existing concepts, such as collaborative sys-
tems, user-generated content, collective intelligence, and Web 2.0. However, 
those concepts cannot be used interchangeably with crowdsourcing. The 
reason is that the concept of crowdsourcing refers to a business model while 
the aforementioned concepts do not explicitly refer to a business model. The 
terms collaborative systems, user-generated content, and Web 2.0 refer to 
technological developments. The term collective intelligence refers to the 
intelligence of a group of living organisms that arises from the interactions 
between those organisms.
Having obtained an understanding of crowdsourcing, we started 
reviewing the literature on ODR. Our first finding in relation to ODR was 
that, in comparison to the definition of crowdsourcing, the definition of 
ODR is debatable. In particular, the opinions differ on whether the use of 
Internet or the use of ICT should be the criterion for defining ODR as well 
as on whether or not ODR includes court proceedings. We analysed the dif-
ferent positions of the debate, expressed our preferences, and proposed our 
working definition of ODR.
We also examined the typology of ODR. In this regard, we found out 
that various types of ODR exist. The typologies of ODR, similarly to the 
typologies of ADR, are based on the different mechanisms for resolving dis-
putes, e.g., negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. However, ODR gives 
rise to suis generis forms of dispute resolution, which do not have an offline 
50 In an email dated 21st of December 2016, Pablo Cortés, an ODR expert, explained to us 
the need for differentiating between CODR, on one side, and other dispute resolution 
schemes in which the third neutral party is a collegial body, on the other side. Our defi ni-
tion clearly shows that the difference between CODR and other dispute resolution 
schemes in which the third neutral party is a collegial body is that the former use crowd-
sourcing for resolving disputes, whereas the latter do not do so.
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counterpart. An example of such a suis generis form is technology assisted 
negotiation. Technology assisted negotiation is neither mediation nor pure 
negotiation. The reason is that, in technology assisted negotiation, the tech-
nology performs actions that are normally performed by a human media-
tor. However, because the procedure is conducted without the assistance of 
human mediators, it cannot be regarded as a form of mediation.
Next, we examined the benefits and drawbacks of ODR. We found six 
benefits of ODR, namely, (1) transportation costs, (2) fast speed, (3) access 
to external expertise, (4) avoidance of violent conflicts, (5) enabling parties 
located in different countries to participate in real-time hearings, and (6) 
increased access to justice.
The use of ICT in ODR brings not only benefits but also the follow-
ing five drawbacks: (1) lack of face-to-face communication; (2) inequality 
between users who are familiar with ICT and those who are not; (3) infor-
mation security vulnerabilities of ODR platforms; (4) the lack of transparen-
cy; and (5) the lack of trust in ODR procedures. Despite its drawbacks, ODR 
has been florishing since the mid 1990s (Poblet, Casanovas, López-Cobo, 
Cabrerizo, Prieto, 2009, p. 206).
Having discussed the concepts of crowdsourcing and ODR, we proceed-
ed with a discussion of CODR. In this regard, we found out that, despite a 
few articles on the topic, CODR is still a new and unexplored area. The exist-
ing contributions contain only partial explorations of the topic. The present 
thesis aims to shed more light into this field.
By providing a literature review of crowdsourcing, ODR, and CODR, 
we completed the first part of our research. The literature review provided 
us with the knowledge base that is necessary for answering the research 
questions.
In this chapter, we examine the past and the present CODR procedures. For 
the sake of systematic classification, we will divide the past and present 
CODR procedures into three groups, namely, CODR procedures functioning 
as (1) online opinion polls, (2) online mock jury systems, and (3) arbitration 
tribunals rendering self-enforceable decisions.1 The functions of the online 
opinion polls are extraction and aggregation of information from the general 
public that may facilitate the resolution of disputes (see Jurca and Faltings, 
2008, p. 119). The function of online mock jury systems is testing real cases 
before a mock jury (see Marder, 2006, p. 249). The function of arbitration tri-
bunals rendering self-enforceable decisions is to resolve a dispute through 
a decision enforced by a private authority (see Van den Herik and Dimov 
2011a).
Historically, CODR procedures that function as online opinion polls 
(see Section 3.1) and online mock jury systems (see Section 3.2) appeared in 
November 1999.2 CODR procedures that function as arbitration tribunals 
rendering self-enforceable decisions (see Section 3.3) appeared in 2008 (Rule 
and Nagarajan, 2011, p. 99). In Section 3.4, we give our chapter conclusions.
3.1 Online opinion polls
Most CODR procedures are online opinion polls (cf. Marder, 2006, p. 240). 
Online opinion polls allow anyone to post his comment in relation to certain 
issues.3 Online opinion polls are a form of public opinion polls. The latter 
can be defined as the measurement of attitudes, feelings, needs, and inten-
tions of a large body of people on important social, political, and economic 
issues (cf. Ugwuegbu, 2011, p. 186). The difference between the online opin-
1 It should be noted that the fi rst two types have been distinguished by Marder (2006). 
Because there is a lack of literature on these two types of CODR, we will describe them 
mainly on the basis of the works by Marder. The third type of CODR was added by us.
2 The starting date of eJury can be found at http://www.ejury.com/about_co_bio.html 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2017). The starting date of iCourthouse can be found at http://www.
icourthouse.com/main.taf?area1_id=about&area2_id=pressreleases&redir=0 (last visit-
ed Jan. 3, 2017).
3 It should be noted that many public opinion polls are conducted online (cf. Renka, 2010). 
The difference between CODR procedures functioning as online opinion polls and online 
public opinion polls is that the former aim to facilitate the resolution of disputes, whereas 
the latter aim to measure the public opinion regarding certain matters.
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ion polls and public opinion polls (cf. Friend and Singer, 2007) is that the 
online opinion polls are conducted through the Internet.
An analysis of the cases published on the online opinion poll called 
iCourthouse indicated that online opinion polls can be used to provide the 
parties involved with the public opinion about various kinds of disputes, 
including but not limited to family disputes, contract disputes, and personal 
injuries disputes.4
Because of their type of sampling (e.g., self-selected participants), online 
opinion polls are not representative. Moreover, it is possible for multiple 
voters to manipulate rating results (see Hong and Park, 2011, p. 3). Below, 
we partition this section into four parts. We examine (A) iCourthouse as an 
example of an online opinion poll. iCourthouse is the first CODR procedure 
functioning as an online opinion poll.5 Then, for comparison, we will pro-
vide brief descriptions of (B) two more opinion polls, viz. SideTaker and 
PeopleClaim. Subsequently, we discuss (C) the benefits of online opinion 
polls and (D) the drawbacks of online opinion polls.
A: iCourthouse
iCourthouse was founded in 1999 by Clyde Long and Claudia Hagadus 
Long, two lawyers from Lafayette, California, to provide a venue where the 
general online public can express its opinion about disputes posted by visi-
tors of the website.6 Up until the present moment, 984 cases were published 
for resolution in iCourthouse.7 It should be noted that many of those cases 
contain meaningless messages.8 This clearly indicates the need for human 
moderation of the cases published on iCourthouse. Such moderation can be 
done by crowdsourcing workers or by the staff of iCourthouse.9
The dispute resolution procedure provided by iCourthouse is conduct-
ed entirely online. In order to participate in the procedure, the plaintiffs, the 
defendants, and the jurors should register at the website and accept iCourt-
house’s user agreement.10 The user agreement has a provision stating that 
(1) the users agree that iCourthouse, in its sole discretion, with or without 
4 See the databases of cases published on iCourthouse - http://www.i-courthouse.com/
main.taf?area1_id=cases (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
5 http://www.i-courthouse.com/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
6 See http://www.i-courthouse.com/main.taf?area1_id=about&area2_id=pressreleases&
redir=0 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
7 See http://www.i-courthouse.com/main.taf?area1_id=cases&area2_id=&start=0&
page=1 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
8 For example, the complaint in case number 2016-11665 states: “fi fe fe f tea fe qef”. The 
complaint in case number 016-11664 states “ka”. The complaint in case number 2016-
11663 states: “testtr”.
9 For example, crowdsourcing workers can moderate the cases by enforcing quality control 
standards similar to the quality control standards enforced by Wikipedia contributors. 
For more information on these standards, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Wikipedia:Quality_control (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
10 The user agreement of iCourthouse is available at http://www.i-courthouse.com/main.
taf?area1_id=front&area2_id=useragreement (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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notice, may terminate their use of the website and remove and discard any 
content within the website for any reason, and that (2) iCourthouse shall not 
be liable to the users or any third party in such an event.
Plaintiffs join iCourthouse, file their claim, and subsequently receive a 
case number and password. Then, plaintiffs and defendants submit their 
arguments and evidence to iCourthouse. The jurors select the cases they 
would like to decide from a list of all cases, i.e., the jurors are self-selected. 
Jurors review the contents of the submissions and are entitled to post ques-
tions to the litigants. Every juror is entitled to post his “verdict” and thus 
help the parties to reach an agreement. As it can be seen in Figure 3, the 
number of verdicts for the plantiff (4) and for the defendant (1) are posted 
under the summary of the case. This is all that is made public. iCourthouse 
does not render aggregate decisions.
In case number 2005-11320, the plaintiff stated that the defendant 
did not perform his contractual obligation to pay the sum of USD 4500 in 
exchange for receiving an online character in a game. Five jurors posted ver-
dicts in the case. Four of the verdicts were in favour of the plaintiff and one 
in favour of the defendant. 11
Figure 3. Case Number 2005-11320 published on iCourthouse.com
The procedure offered by iCourthouse is a form of CODR because it falls 
within the scope of our definition of CODR.12 Based on our definition, 
iCourthouse has to comply with the following three elements: (1) being an 
ADR or court procedure; (2) using the Internet as a part of the dispute reso-
lution process; and (3) using crowdsourcing as a part of the dispute resolu-
tion process.
As regards to the first element (ADR or court proceedings), it should 
be noted that ADR procedures do not need actually to resolve the disputes. 
11 Since iCourthouse does not specify how many jurors should vote in a case for a fi nal deci-
sion to be rendered, it is not clear whether the plaintiff won case number 2005-11320. 
According to a “Frequently Asked Questions” document published by iCourthouse, if 
disputants want to get a fi nal decision, they have to agree that “only the verdicts given 
before a specifi c date and time will count, or that only the fi rst given number of verdicts 
will count.” See http://www.i-courthouse.com/main.taf?area1_id=front&area2_id=faqs 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
12 We defi ned CODR in Section 2.3.
48 Chapter 3
ADR procedures may simply provide the parties with an evaluation of their 
cases (Bansal, 2009, p. 7). This form of ADR procedures is called early neu-
tral evaluation. The early neutral evaluation is an “ADR process which is 
preventive in nature, the object of which is to settle the dispute amicably at 
the earliest stage” (Bansal, 2009, p. 7). The early neutral evaluation aims to 
facilitate negotiations, not to decide the case (Carper and McKinsey, 2011, 
p. 178).
iCourthouse provides the parties with an evaluation report indicating 
the number of verdicts for the plaintiff and for the defendant. While the 
evaluation report is not binding, it may facilitate the negotiations between 
the parties. Consequently, the procedure provided by iCourthose is a form 
of early neutral evaluation and, therefore, meets the first requirement for 
qualifying as a CODR procedure.
Concerning the second element (using the Internet), it should be noted 
that the early neutral evaluation procedure provided by iCourthouse is con-
ducted entirely online. The parties submit their statements and evidences 
online. The jurors post their verdicts online. No part of the procedure can be 
conducted offline. Therefore, iCourthouse complies with the second element 
of our definition of CODR.
As for the third element (using crowdsourcing), we need to examine 
whether the procedure provided by iCourthose uses crowdsourcing. In 
order to do so, we will assess whether the procedure falls within the scope 
of the definition of crowdsourcing provided by Howe (2006).13
The early neutral evaluation is usually performed by a judge, lawyer, 
arbitrator, or expert in a discipline relevant to the nature of the dispute 
(Ramsey and Telford, 2007, p. 885). iCourthouse outsources the function 
to be performed by a judge, lawyer, arbitrator, and expert. It does so to an 
undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form of an open 
call. The network is undefined (and generally large) because any Internet 
user can become a juror in iCourthouse.
Because (1) iCourthouse allows any Internet user to participate in the 
early neutral evaluation procedure and (2) the call is made publicly avail-
able on the website of iCourthouse, the call used by iCourthouse to out-
source the function of evaluator falls within the scope of our definition of 
“open call”.14
On the basis of the foregoing observations, we may conclude that 
iCourthouse falls within the scope of the definition of crowdsourcing pro-
vided by Howe (2006). Therefore, the procedure offered by iCourthose 
meets the third requirement for qualifying as a CODR procedure.
B: Two more online opinion polls
Below, we briefly discuss two additional examples of online opinion polls, 
namely, (B1) SideTaker and (B2) PeopleClaim.
13 The defi nition of crowdsourcing provided by Howe (2006) is examined in Section 2.1.
14 The term “open call” was defi ned in Section 2.1.
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B1: SideTaker (www.sidetaker.com).
SideTaker allows U.S. residents complying with the Terms of Use of Side-
Taker to submit a claim by using the Internet and tell their part of the story.15 
Then, SideTaker will send an email to the defendant to an email address 
provided by the claimant and invite the defendant to submit his response 
to SideTaker by using the Internet. In comparison to iCourthouse, SideTaker 
does not display the number of the decisions for and against the disputants, 
but instead displays the percentage reflecting the votes for and against the 
disputants (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. A screenshot of SideTaker
Figure 4 displays the percentage reflecting the votes for and against the dis-
putants in three disputes, namely, “Letting Kids Sleep On Hotel Comforter”, 
“Interns are Ruining the Workplace”, “Wanting a Keurig But Getting a Mr. 
Coffee”. The first dispute relates to whether hotel comforters are sufficiently 
clean so as to ensure that the children sleeping on them will not become sick. 
The second dispute concerns the advantages and disadvantages of hiring
interns (also known as trainees). The third dispute relates to whether the 
beverage brewing system “Keurig” is better than the beverage brewing sys-
tem “Mr. Coffee”.
Furthermore, the procedure offered by SideTaker does not allow the par-
ties to submit multiple files containing evidence. The parties can only sub-
mit textual information and a photo. The disputes in Sidetaker are grouped 
in fifteen categories, namely, (1) Bitter ex, (2) Dating, (3) Entertainment, (4) 
Family, (5) Friends, (6) General, (7) Marriage, (8) Money, (9) Neighbours, 
(10) Parent/Child, (11) Parenting, (12) Politics, (13) Roommates, (14) Tech-
nology, and (15) Workplace/Co-workers.
The procedure provided by SideTaker qualifies as a CODR procedure 
within the meaning of our definition of CODR because it: (1) is a form of early
neutral evaluation; (2) is conducted entirely online; and (3) uses crowd-
15 Pursuant to the Terms of Use of SideTaker, the users of SideTaker have to comply with the 
following requirements:  (1) the registration information submitted by them should be 
truthful and accurate; (2) the users should maintain the accuracy of registration informa-
tion; (3) the users should be 13 years of age or older; (4) the users should be residents of 
the United States of America; and (5) by using SideTaker, the users should not violate any 
applicable law or regulation. See the Terms of Use of SideTaker available on http://
www.sidetaker.com/terms.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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sourcing. More particularly, the procedure provided by SideTaker uses 
crowdsourcing because it takes the function of evaluator once performed by 
a judge, lawyer, arbitrator, or expert, and outsources it to an undefined (and 
generally large) network of people in the form of an open call.
B2: PeopleClaim (www.peopleclaim.com)
PeopleClaim provides the disputants with a web-based negotiation plat-
form.16 In order to use the platform, the disputants need to register an 
account on PeopleClaim. The negotiation platform allows the claimant to 
submit a claim of up to 20,000 characters. After the claimant finishes writing 
the claim, PeopleClaim requests him to mention what kind of resolution he 
seeks, e.g., money or non-cash settlement. The next step of filing the com-
plaint is the insertion of the contact details of the respondent. Afterwards, 
the claimant can send the complaint to the respondent. An important char-
acteristic of PeopleClaim is that, by ticking a box before sending the com-
plaint, the claimant will send the claim not only to the respondent, but also 
to regulators, watchdogs, and media as well as to lawyers and mediators 
who are willing to provide a free legal consultation.
Having received the claim, the respondent can use the platform provid-
ed by PeopleClaim to negotiate a settlement of the dispute. The negotiations 
between the disputants are private, i.e., the communications between the 
disputants are not made publicly available. If the disputants do not resolve 
their dispute through negotiation, the claimant can make his claim public. 
Then, any Internet user will be able to comment on the claim and propose 
suggestions for the resolution of the dispute. The comments are visible in 
a section titled “Suggestions from the public.” For example, in case 47048 
posted on PeopleClaim, an Internet user suggested to the victim of a fraudu-
lent act to send letters describing his complaint to the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission, the Attorney General of Arizona, and the U.S. General Attor-
ney (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. A screenshot of a comment of an Internet visitor in relation to case 47048 
posted on PeopleClaim
16 As of 30th of December 2016, more than 50,000 businesses and consumers have used Peo-
pleClaim.com. See http://www.peopleclaim.com/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). People-
Claim has a particular signifi cance in the fi eld of CODR as it demonstrates that CODR 
can effectively use not only adjudicative processes, but also facilitative processes.
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PeopleClaim qualifies as a CODR procedure within the meaning of our defi-
nition of CODR because PeopleClaim complies with the three elements of 
the definition.
In relation to the first element (ADR or court proceedings), PeopleClaim 
uses a procedure known as expert opinion. The expert opinion refers to an 
ADR procedure allowing the parties to request an expert opinion concern-
ing one or more aspects of the case at any stage of a dispute (See Paulsson, 
1999, p. 111). For example, the International Chamber of Commerce offers 
“expert advice in settling business disputes.”17 The procedure provided 
by PeopleClaim allows the parties to request the opinion of Internet users 
having expertise related to the resolution of the dispute at stake. Therefore, 
being an ADR procedure, the procedure provided by PeopleClaim meets the 
first element of our definition of CODR.
Pertaining to the second element (using the Internet), the expert opin-
ion procedure provided by People Claim is conducted entirely online. More 
particularly, the negotiations between the parties are conducted online and 
the third parties provide their opinion online. Therefore, PeopleClaim meets 
the second requirement for qualifying as a CODR procedure.
Pertaining to the third element (using crowdsourcing), the expert opin-
ion in ADR is usually provided by an independent expert on the basis of 
an independent contractor agreement (see Paulsson, 1999, p. 111). People-
Claim outsources the function once performed by an independent expert 
and outsources it to an undefined (and generally large) network of people 
in the form of an open call. The network is undefined (and generally large) 
because any Internet user may provide his opinion in relation to a dispute 
published on PeopleClaim. Therefore, PeopleClaim meets the third element 
of our definition of CODR.
C: Benefits of online opinion polls
An online opinion poll brings five benefits to the parties participating in the 
dispute (cf. Marder, 2006, pp. 242-247). They are stated below.
(1) A party who feels wronged has a place to give an expression to its feel-
ing. In some cases, the defendant can be swayed by the number of sup-
porters on behalf of the plaintiff. The public opinion may be all that is 
needed to persuade the defendant to change his mind.
(2) Some parties might feel uncomfortable to uncover their personal stories 
in their own communities. Since the parties in the online opinion polls 
are anonymous, they will not be afraid to post their disputes.
(3) The parties use plain language. Since the jury is composed of layper-
sons, there is no need to use a legalistic language.
17 See the webpage of the International Chamber of Commerce concerning expert advice in 
settling business disputes available on http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/
arbitration-and-adr/expertise/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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(4) Online opinion polls may facilitate the resolution of disputes in a very 
short time. The reason is that the jurors can provide their feedback with-
in hours from the posting of the dispute by the claimant.
(5) Online opinion polls are freely accessible. For example, anyone can reg-
ister to become a juror in iCourthouse.18
D: Drawbacks of online opinion polls
The online opinion polls have seven limitations, which we consider as draw-
backs. The limitations are described below.
(1) Because online opinion polls allow anyone to participate in the dispute 
resolution procedure and do not charge any fee, they are often full of 
trivial and often silly claims (Marder, 2006, p. 245).
(2) Because online opinion polls do not verify the identity of the voters, the 
plaintiff and the defendant do not have any knowledge about who is 
participating and cannot be sure that the poll is representative (Marder, 
2006, p. 246). For instance, a single person can make numerous registra-
tions and may influence the outcome of the decision. This problem can 
be resolved by allowing the system to verify that each vote is made by a 
different person. However, it may decrease the attractiveness of the pro-
cedure because certain users would prefer not to disclose their identity 
when participating in online opinion polls.
(3) A major drawback of some online opinion polls, such as iCourthouse 
and SideTaker, is that every juror is introduced to the case by viewing 
the responses of the other jurors. It puts impartiality of such a procedure 
in doubt (Marder, 2006, p. 247). The reason of the doubt is that showing 
the responses of the other jurors often lead to informational cybercas-
cade. The concept of informational cybercascade was introduced by Sun-
stein (2009). According to him, in an informational cybercascade, people 
cease relying, at a certain point, on their private information or opinions. 
They decide on the basis of the signals conveyed by others. Consequent-
ly, the behaviour of the first few people can, in theory, produce similar 
behaviour from a large number of followers (Sunstein, 2009, pp. 83-86).
(4) At least in iCourthouse, it is unclear at what point the vote becomes final, 
how many votes are necessary for a “win” (Marder, 2006, p. 248). While 
the parties can agree amongst them what proportion of the verdicts will 
constitute a decision, iCourthouse neither aggregates the votes nor ren-
ders a decision. After a check in iCourthouse, it has been established that 
one can still become a jury member in a case from 2003.19
18 iCourthouse’s User Agreement does not not require the users of iCourthouse to meet cer-
tain requirements in order to use iCourthouse. See iCourthouse’s User Agreement available 
at http://www.i-courthouse.com/main.taf?area1_id=front&area2_id=useragreement
(last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
19 See Case No 2003-10954 in the iCourthouse.
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(5) Because anyone can post a claim on the online opinion polls, online 
opinion polls may be used by anonymous users for defamation of peo-
ple. In some cases, the victims of defamation may not be able to remove 
the defamatory content because the providers of the online opinion polls 
may not be legally obliged to remove defamatory content. For example, 
Section 230(c)(1) of the US Communications Decency Act of 1996 pro-
vides immunity from liability for providers and users of websites which 
publish information provided by others.20 Therefore, the providers of 
the online opinion polls based in the United States are not obliged to in-
vestigate and remove any defamatory content.
(6) Since online opinion polls allow the participation of anonymous users, 
participants in such procedures may abuse, harass, and bully other par-
ticipants, without allowing the latter to identify and bring to justice the 
former. This may have a negative impact on the subjective procedural 
fairness of online opinion polls as this type of fairness may vary depend-
ing on the extent the procedures conform to personal ethical standards 
(Lind and Tyler, 1988, p. 132).21
(7) The anonymity of the members of the crowd participating in online 
opinion polls decreases their transparency. This, in turn, can have a neg-
ative impact on the objective and subjective procedural fairness of such 
procedures because transparency affects these two types of fairness.22
3.2 Online mock jury systems
Online mock jury systems are used by lawyers who have actual cases to gain 
insight into how prospective jurors view those cases.23 Traditionally, only 
the lawyers dealing with big cases use offline mock juries or the so-called 
“focus groups” because the price of such juries is huge. However, with the 
appearance of the Internet, even lawyers dealing with low monetary value 
cases can test their case before an online mock jury (Marder, 2006, p. 249). 
20 See the Communications Decency Act of 1996 available at http://transition.fcc.gov/
Reports/tcom1996.txt (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
21 For more information on the relationship between ethicality of dispute resolution proce-
dures and perceptions of procedural fairness, see Subsection 5.2.6.
22 For more information on the relation between transparency and objective procedural 
fairness, see 5.1.4. For more information on the relation between transparency and sub-
jective procedural fairness, see 5.2.
23 Online mock jury systems differ from online jury systems because the former are used 
mainly by lawyers who would like to test actual cases, whereas the latter are used mainly 
by disputants who attempt to facilitate the resolution of their disputes. More specifi cally, 
the members of the crowd participating in online opinion polls facilitate the resolution of 
disputes in two ways. First, the members of the crowd provide the disputants with sug-
gestions on how to resolve their disputes. Second, the members of the crowd participat-
ing in online opinion polls serve as a container for any escalating confl ict (cf. Ury, 2000, 
p. 7). According to Ury, in the absence of such a container, serious confl ict between two 
parties may easily turn into a destructive confl ict (Ury, 2000, p. 7).
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In the typical online mock jury systems, such as eJury24 and Virtual Jury25, 
the lawyers submit summarised versions of their cases to online juries. In 
particular, they submit a factual summary of the case, including claims and 
possible defences, exhibits, and jury instructions. After the submissions 
are made by the lawyers, the providers of the online mock juries, taking 
into account the demographics of the potential jury members, select juries 
from a special list of jury members. The online mock jury systems generate 
a vast amount of data which can be used to find strengths and weaknesses 
in evidence, establish a settlement value, learn “public” attitudes, discover 
the most effective arguments, and improve jury selection (Starr and McCor-
mick, 2009, pp. 5-6).
Below, we examine (A) eJury as an example of the online mock jury sys-
tem. Then, for comparison, we will provide brief descriptions of (B) three 
more online mock jury systems. Subsequently, we discuss (C) the benefits 
of online mock jury systems, and (D) the drawbacks of online mock jury 
systems.
A: eJury
eJury (www.ejury.com, last visited Jan. 3, 2017) provides attorneys with the 
opportunity to learn what jurors may think about their cases.26 eJury func-
tions similarly to a traditional mock jury with the exception that the jurors 
participate via the Internet. Because jurors participate remotely, attorneys can 
test their cases at a cost, which is lower than the cost of traditional jurors. 
According to the founder of eJury, some attorneys post their cases to as many 
as 500 mock jurors (cf. Rutkin, 2015). Attorneys can use the large amount of 
data to see how the jury verdicts differ according to the jurors’ race, gender, 
or age (Rutkin, 2015). A screenshot of eJury is given in Figure 6. The informa-
tion given is self-explanatory. Below, we describe the eJury process.
Figure 6. A screenshot of eJury
24 http://www.ejury.com/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
25 http://virtualjury.com/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
26 It should be noted that the jurors participating in eJury should not be confused with tra-
ditional jurors. The former provide attorneys who test their cases with feedback which 
can be used by the attorneys to evaluate the strength and weakness of their cases, where-
as the latter determine facts in litigation proceedings.
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An eJury process consists of three stages, namely, (1) preparation, (2) 
notification, and (3) submission of verdicts. These three stages are briefly 
described below.
Ad (1) Preparation
In the preparation stage, the attorney prepares a case which consists of (a) 
facts from the perspectives of each party, (b) jury questions which would be 
used at trial, and (c) personal questions to the jurors.
Ad (2) Notification
In the notification stage, eJury publishes the attorney’s case into a secure 
section on its website where only eJurors in the geographical area of selec-
tion can access the case. Subsequently, the eJurors in that area are notified 
electronically that a new case has been published.
Ad (3) Submission of verdicts
In the submission of verdicts stage, the eJurors review the facts and answer 
the questions. Thereafter, they submit their verdicts. Once the minimum num-
ber of verdicts has been rendered (typically fifty), eJury automatically closes 
the case. The verdicts are summarised and printed. The final report includes 
statistics of the damages awarded by the jurors as well as the fifty (or more) 
verdicts containing the demographic profile of each participating eJuror.
The procedure offered by eJury meets the three elements of our defini-
tion of CODR. Concerning the first element (ADR or court proceedings), 
it has been already pointed out that ADR procedures do not need actually 
to resolve disputes. ADR procedures may simply provide one of the par-
ties with the opportunity to test its case in front of mock juries (Statsky, 
2008, p. 422). This form of ADR procedures is called summary jury trial, 
also known as mock trial or a minitrial (Statsky, 2008, p. 422). The jury in 
a summary jury trial “deliberates and renders a non-binding advisory ver-
dict” (Statsky, 2008, p. 422). The parties may use the information collected 
through a summary jury trial in order to know the Best Alternative to a 
Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). Knowing the BATNA is an important 
step for the success of negotiation (Lodder and Zeleznikow, 2010, pp. 41-43). 
Consequently, being a form of ADR, eJury meets the first element of our 
definition of CODR.
Pertaining to the second element (using the Internet), it should be not-
ed that the summary jury trial procedure provided by eJury is conducted 
entirely online. eJury converts the case submitted by the parties into a web-
page and makes it accessible only to eJurors in the county of selection.27 
Afterwards, the eJurors in that county are then notified by email that a new 
case has been posted. Therefore, eJury meets the second requirement for 
qualifying as a CODR procedure.
27 See the webpage entitled “Learn about eJury and eJurors” available at http://www.ejury.
com/jurors_learn_about.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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As for the third element (using crowdsourcing), we need to examine 
whether the summary jury trial procedure provided by eJury falls within the 
scope of the definition of crowdsourcing provided by Howe (2006). The jurors 
in the summary jury trial procedures usually come from the regular pool of 
jurors in the county (Statsky, 2008, p. 422). In most U.S. States, the jury pool is 
drawn from lists of registered voters (Smith and Cole, 2007, p. 247). The eJury 
outsources the function once performed by regular juries and outsources it to 
an undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form of an open 
call. The network is undefined (and generally large) because any Internet user 
residing in the county of selection can become a juror in eJury. Because (1) any 
Internet user complying with certain requirements can participate in the sum-
mary jury trial procedure and (2) the call is made publicly available on the 
website of eJury, the call used by eJury to outsource the function of a regular 
juror falls within the scope of our definition of “open call”.
Figure 7. A notice of open call published by eJury
Figure 7 displays the notice of open call published by eJury. The notice 
informs any potential jurors that: (1) there are no charges or costs for sign-
ing up to be an eJuror; (2) there is no guarantee that there will be cases for 
the jurors; (3) they need to meet certain requirements in order to become 
jurors; and (4) they need to read two documents (a “Learn About” page and 
a Terms and Conditions statement) before signing up as jurors. Comply-
ing with the three elements of our definition of CODR, eJury qualifies as a 
CODR procedure.
B: Three more examples of online mock jury systems
Below, we briefly discuss three additional examples of online mock jury sys-
tems, namely, (B1) JuryTest, (B2) OnlineVerdict, and (B3) TrialJuries.
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B1: JuryTest (www.jurytest.net)
Jurytest.net allows an attorney to record a case summary or argument on 
a toll-free telephone line, 1.888.JURYTEST. Then, a geographically selected 
group of “jurors” listens to the recording and reviews the exhibits attached 
to the case. Attorneys can read the feedback of the jurors on a secure section 
of the JuryTest website.28 The feedback can help attorneys to choose the cor-
rect trial strategies. For example, a large insurance firm used the services 
of JuryTest in order to find out whether, according to JuryTest jurors, flood 
damage caused by the Hurricane Katrina will fall within the scope of insur-
ance policies covering wind-only damage.29 Since the jurors answered posi-
tively, the insurance firm decided not to base its defence on the difference 
between flood and wind damage.30
The procedure offered by JuryTest falls within the scope of our defini-
tion of CODR. Below, we provide reasons to support this statement.
Concerning the first element (ADR or court proceedings), JuryTest pro-
vides a summary jury trial procedure similar to eJury. Therefore, JuryTest 
meets the first element of our definition of CODR.
As for the second element (using the Internet), it should be noted that, 
while the lawyers of the parties may submit the summons to the jurors by 
calling on a toll-free telephone, the jurors may review the summons and 
provide their opinion through the Internet only.31 Therefore, the summary 
jury trial procedure meets the second element of the definition of CODR.
In relation to the third element (using crowdsourcing), eJury outsourc-
es the function once performed by regular juries and outsources it to an 
undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form of an open 
call. The network is undefined (and generally large) because any Internet 
user complying with certain requirements can become a juror in JuryTest.32 
Because (1) any internet user complying with certain requirements can par-
ticipate in the summary jury trial procedure and (2) the call is made publicly 
available on the website of eJury, the call used by eJury to outsource the 
function of a regular juror falls within the scope of our definition of “open 
call”. Figure 8 displays the notice of open call published by JuryTest.
The notice of open call published by JuryTest informs the jurors of the 
three steps related to their participation in JuryTest. The first step is the 
reviewing of cases published by lawyers. The second step is the provision 
of feedback on each case. The third step is receiving a payment for their 
contribution to JuryTest.
28 See https://www.jurytest.net/index.cfm?action=aboutus (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
29 See https://www.jurytest.net/index.cfm?action=stories (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
30 See https://www.jurytest.net/index.cfm?action=stories (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
31 See http://www.jurytest.net/index.cfm?action=howjur (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
32 In order to register as jurors at JuryTest, the jurors must attest to the fact that they are not 
lawyers or insurance company representatives.  Further, they must agree that they are 
participating as consultants to the lawyers who will utilise the services offered by Jury-
Test and will not disclose the names of any parties on cases that they review. See http://
www.juryTest.net/index.cfm?action=signupjur (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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Figure 8. A notice of open call published by JuryTest
B2: OnlineVerdict (http://www.onlineverdict.com)
OnlineVerdict allows attorneys to post a case summary on the website 
through a password-protected account. The case summaries relate to civil, 
criminal, and patent disputes (cf. Rutkin, 2015). A case summary includes 
up to 5 double-spaced pages for each side and two graphic images or exhib-
its for each side. The attorney posting the case can choose to receive feed-
back from 25 to 50 jurors. All jurors are pre-screened to ensure that they do 
not have any conflicts with the parties. The feedback provided to the attor-
neys testing their cases include (1) statistically compiled results of all juror 
responses to questions on the verdict and the case as well as (2) detailed 
demographic information about each juror including age, gender, ethnicity, 
education, marital status, occupation, household income, and political party 
affiliation.33 An excerpt of a verdict published by OnlineVerdict is given in 
Figure 9.
The excerpt shows three questions and the answers of the jurors to those 
questions. The first question is “Do you find that the Defendant, Dairy Prod-
ucts, Inc., was negligent in hiring Defendant, Gary Clausen, as a driver?” 
76% of the jurors voted “yes” to this quetion, whereas the remaining 24% 
voted “no”. The second question is “Was the negligence of Defendant, Dairy 
Products, Inc., a substantial factor in bringing about Plaintiff’s harm?” Simi-
larly to the first question, 76% of the jurors voted “yes” and 24% voted “no”. 
The third question is “State the amount of damages, if any, sustained by 
Plaintiff as a result of the occurrence, for the following damages: Pain and 
suffering by Joseph Smith, Lost earning capacity of Joseph Smith, Loss of 
consortium for Marie Smith”.
The mean damages voted by jurors for the “Pain and suffering by Joseph 
Smith” amount to USD 32,200, whereas the median damages for the pain 
and suffering by the same person amount to USD 25,000. The mean dam-
ages voted for the loss of earning capacity of Josepth Smith amount to USD 
608,000. The median damages for the loss of earning capacity by the same 
person amount to USD 500,000. The mean damages for the loss of consor-
tium for Marie Smith amount to USD 33,000. The median damages for the 
same loss of consortium amount to USD 10,000.
33 See http://onlineverdict.com/attorneyshowitworks.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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Figure 9. An excerpt of a verdict published by OnlineVerdict.com
The procedure provided by OnlineVerdict falls within the scope of our defi-
nition of CODR. Below, we give reasons to support this statement.
With regard to the first element (ADR or court proceedings), OnlineV-
erdict provides a summary jury trial procedure similar to eJury. Therefore, 
JuryTest meets the first element of our definition of CODR.
In connection with the second element (using the Internet), it should 
be noted that lawyers willing to test their cases may submit the summons 
only by using the website of OnlineVerdict.34 The jurors can also review the 
summons only by accessing the website of OnlineVerdict.35 Therefore, the 
summary jury trial procedure offered by OnlineVerdict meets the second 
element of our definition of CODR.
Pertaining to the third element (using crowdsourcing), OnlineVerdict 
outsources the function once performed by regular juries and outsources it 
to an undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form of an 
open call. The network is undefined (and generally large) because any Inter-
net user complying with the Terms of Use and the Privacy Policy of Online
34 See a webpage entitled “How it works” published on https://www.onlineverdict.com/
attorneys/attorney-how-it-works/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
35 See a webpage entitled “How it works” published on https://www.onlineverdict.com/
attorneys/attorney-how-it-works/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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Verdict can become a juror in OnlineVerdict.36 Because (1) any Internet user 
complying with certain requirements can participate in the summary jury 
trial procedure and (2) the call is made publicly available on the website of 
OnlineVerdict, the call used by OnlineVerdict to outsource the function of a 
regular juror falls within the scope of our definition of “open call”.
B3: TrialJuries (http://trialjuries.com)
TrialJuries is an entirely web-based “mock jury” system. TrialJuries allows 
attorneys to log onto the website and submit a case. The submission can be 
in the form of a text, audio, or video file.37After the submission, the case is 
sent to a panel of jurors for review. The jurors are selected through an open 
call. There are three requirements for being a TrialJuries juror, namely, (1) 
the jurors should be at least 18 years of age, (2) the jurors should be Unit-
ed States citizens, and (3) the jurors should not have been convicted of a 
felony. The jurors review the case and render a verdict. The verdict is sent 
to the attorneys by email. A screenshot of TrialJuries is given in Figure 10. 
The screenshot indicates the three steps of operation of TrialJuries, namely, 
(1) presenting the case to the jury, (2) asking questions to the jurors, and (3) 
receiving the results of the jury vote.
The procedure provided by TrialJuries falls within the scope of our defi-
nition of CODR. Concerning the first element (ADR or court proceedings), 
TrialJuries provides a summary jury trial procedure similar to eJury and 
OnlineVerdict. Therefore, JuryTest meets the first element of our definition 
of CODR.
As for the second element (using the Internet), it should be noted that 
the procedure provided by TrialJuries is entirely web-based.38. Therefore, 
the procedure meets the second element of the definition of CODR.
In relation to the third element (using crowdsourcing), TrialJuries out-
sources the function once performed by regular juries and outsources it to 
an undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form of an open 
call. The network is undefined (and generally large) because any Internet 
user meeting the aforementioned requirements can become a juror in Trial-
Juries.39 Since (1) any Internet user complying with the requirements can 
participate in the summary jury trial procedure and (2) the call is made pub-
licly available on the website of TrialJuries, the call used by TrialJuries to 
36 The Terms of Use of OnlineVerdict is available on https://www.onlineverdict.com/
terms-conditions/.  The Privacy Policy of OnlineVerdict is available at https://www.
onlineverdict.com/privacy-policy (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
37 See a webpage entitled “Our Pricing Options” published on https://www.tlextranet.
com/trialjuries/thecost.html (last visited Apr. . 4, 2016).
38 See a webpage “How it works” available at http://trialjuries.com/trialjuries/howit-
works.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
39 The Terms of Use of OnlineVerdict is available on https://www.onlineverdict.com/
terms-conditions/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).  The Privacy Policy of OnlineVerdict is avail-
able on https://www.onlineverdict.com/privacy-policy/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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outsource the function of a regular juror falls within the scope of our defini-
tion of “open call”.
Figure 10. A screenshot of TrialJuries
C: Benefits of online mock jury systems
Below, we describe four benefits that online mock juries provide to the law-
yers who use them.
The online mock juries offer four benefits for the attorneys who will use 
them to test their cases (see Marder, 2006, pp. 249-251). In particular, the 
online mock juries are quick, inexpensive, convenient, and provide impor-
tant feedback to lawyers.
(1) Quick. Because online mock jury systems do not require jurors to travel 
to offline premises, such systems can collect feedback from jurors quick-
er than offline mock juries. For example, according to OnlineVerdict, 
feedback from 25 to 50 jurors can be gathered within a few days, com-
pared to several weeks for an offline mock jury.40
(2) Inexpensive. According to OnlineVerdict, traditional face-to-face offline 
mock juries cost between USD 20,000 and USD 50,000. The costs include 
recruiting of jurors, participant pay, facility rental, audio-visual support, 
and catering. Because the providers of online mock jury systems do not 
have to pay for the facilities rental, catering, and transport, they can 
offer their services at a lower price compared to the price of the offline 
mock jurors. For example, attorneys willing to use the services of 
OnlineVerdict have to pay USD 2000 for receiving a feedback from 25 
jurors.41
(3) Convenient. The online mock juries provide lawyers with the conve-
nience to post their cases from their own computer at a time convenient 
to them. In comparison, lawyers using offline mock juries should attend 
physical premises in which the mock cases will be presented.
40 See http://onlineverdict.com/attorneys.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
41 http://onlineverdict.com/attorneys.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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(4) Provide important feedback to lawyers.42 The feedback can be used to 
determine the case value, develop the case themes, find the facts to em-
phasizing, and learn the “public” attitudes.
D: Drawbacks of online mock jury systems
The online mock juries have three drawbacks, which affect lawyers who 
would like to present their cases, namely, (1) lack of deliberations, (2) lack of 
face-to-face communication, and (3) deciding cases on the basis of the feed-
back provided by only one of the parties.
D1: Online mock juries lack deliberations (cf. Marder, 2006, pp. 254-256). 
In comparison to the offline mock juries, online mock juries do not require 
jurors to deliberate the cases presented to them. The jury deliberations are the 
most informative part of the offline mock trial. By observing deliberations, an 
attorney familiar with the case can learn which issues or questions need to be 
thoroughly addressed. Later, the attorney can make sure that those questions 
are answered in the case presentation for the real trial. In addition to raising 
questions, jurors may show images, metaphors, analogies, and themes that 
help the attorneys to prepare for the real trial (cf. King, 2008, p. 52).
A common belief is that jury deliberation is a reliable way of establish-
ing the truth in a contentious matter (cf. Kapardis, 2010, p. 180). The reason 
is that the deliberation encourages the correction of mistaken conclusions, 
because it provides a juror with the opportunity to take into account dif-
ferent opinions that may be more plausible than the opinion of the juror 
before participating in the deliberations. However, a study conducted by 
Schkade, Sunstein, and Kahneman (1999) found that deliberating juries did 
not produce less erratic and more predictable judgements than decisions 
taken by individuals without deliberation. In contrast, Schkade, Sunstein, 
and Kahneman (1999) found that a key effect of deliberation is a polarisation 
of individual judgements. Group polarisation is the tendency for individu-
al’s opinions to become more extreme (in whatever direction they originally 
favoured) after discussion than before (see also Moscovici and Zavalonni, 
1969; Lindzey, Gilbert, Fiske, 2003, p. 439). The reason for the group polari-
sation is that, during deliberation, the members of the group often follow 
the opinions of other members of the group. 
Consequently, we may conclude that both the lack of jury deliberations 
and the presence of jury deliberations have negative sides. The lack of jury 
deliberations does not allow the jurors to see the mistakes in their conclu-
42 It should be noted that online mock juries provide more feedback to lawyers than tradi-
tional juries. This is because usually they take into account the opinions of more jurors. 
For instance, at eJury each cases is submitted to a minimum of 50 people. See http://
www.ejury.com/jurors_learn_about.html#how (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). The number of 
traditional mock jurors is ocassionally the same as the court jurors. The number of jurors 
varies in every country but is rarely more than 12 persons. See http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Jury#Composition (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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sions. The presence of jury deliberations may lead to judgements that are 
not based on rational assessments of the facts, but on the basis of the opinion 
of others. The designers of CODR platforms are advised to create their plat-
forms in such a way so as to ensure that people are exposed to reasonable 
alternatives and not to the echoes of their own opinions.
D2: Since there is not a mock trial taking place in a room emulating a court 
room, the attorney cannot present his case in the same manner in which he 
will be able to present it in an offline mock court (cf. Marder, 2006, p. 258).43 
Moreover, the real juries evaluate the presentations of attorneys and wit-
nesses not only on the basis of the verbal communication, but also on the 
basis of non-verbal communication, such as appearance, general demean-
our, voice pitch, response style (cf. Posey and Wrightsman, 2005, p. 40). 
Missing the element of non-verbal communication is a severe drawback. 
However this drawback can be overcome by using the modern technology 
for online video transfer. In this regard, it should be noted that the tech-
nologies for face recognition carefully develop at a fast pace (Li and Jain, 
2011; Postma, 2014). The face recognition technologies may allow attorneys 
to analyse the non-verbal communication of participants in mock jury pro-
ceedings. Facial expressions play an important role in non-verbal commu-
nication. People use facial gestures to convey their moods and express their 
feelings (King and Li, 1999, p. 399).
D3: Online mock juries are designed in such a way as to allow one of the 
parties in a dispute to test its case. Thus, online mock juries do not allow the 
other party to: (1) present evidence and law; and (2) affect the outcome of 
the dispute resolution process. This may have a negative impact on the com-
pliance of online mock juries with elements of both subjective and objective 
procedural fairness.44
3.3 Arbitration tribunals rendering self-enforceable decisions
In this section, we discuss CODR procedures functioning as arbitration tri-
bunals that deliver self-enforceable decisions. In the context of CODR, the 
term “self-enforceable decision” means that the decision is enforced by the 
43 It should be noted that this problem can be solved to some extent by using virtual worlds.
44 For example, online mock juries may not comply with the element of subjective proce-
dural fairness called process control. It relates to disputants’ control over the develop-
ment and selection of information that will constitute the basis for making a decision (see 
Thibaut and Walker, 1975). Also, online mock juries may not comply with fair hearing, an 
element of both subjective and objective procedural fairness. Fair hearing refers to the 
opportunity of each party to present evidence and law (Hörnle, 2009, p. 13). For more 
information on process control, see Subsection 5.2.1. For more information on fair hear-
ing, see Subsection 5.1.5 and Section 5.2.
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organisation providing the procedure, not by the coercive power of a state.45 
Below, we discuss (A) the eBay’s Community Review Forum (ECRF), which 
is a typical example of a CODR procedure functioning as arbitration tri-
bunal that used to render self-enforceable decisions but has now been dis-
continued. Afterwards, we examine Marktplaats Gebruikersjury, a CODR 
procedure, which is continuation of the ECRF. Finally, (C) the benefits and 
(D) the drawbacks of CODR procedures functioning as arbitration tribunals 
rendering self-enforceable decisions are given.
A: eBay’s Community Review Forum
In 2008, eBay launched the ECRF, a website offering a CODR procedure 
of which the decisions were enforced by a private authority (eBay). ECRF 
transformed in reality the futuristic idea that a dispute can be effectively 
resolved at no cost by a large group of people located in many different 
countries in less than twenty two days after submitting the claim (cf. Van 
den Herik and Dimov, 2011a, p. 247). Below, we give a brief description of 
the ECRF and its operation. Many details will be discussed later. The current 
desciption also serves as an introduction to the concept of CODR and the 
operation of the ECRF.
The ECRF allowed any seller to appeal non-positive feedback given by 
a buyer which the seller believed to be unfair or unjustified. The appealed 
feedback consists of a rating of the transaction along with a short comment 
by the buyer. For example, a buyer may leave a negative feedback if (1) the 
seller does not ship the item or (2) the item does not match the description. 
Then, the seller was given an opportunity to file a claim against the feedback. 
If a seller’s claim against the feedback was successful, eBay was obliged to 
remove the disputed feedback otherwise the feedback would become pub-
licly visible at the website of eBay. The claims by the sellers were judged by 
21 randomly selected members of the eBay’s Community. The 21 jurors were 
selected from a large group of candidates who had expressed their willing-
ness to participate in the ECRF through an open call procedure. We take an 
example of a candidate juror from eBay India.
A seller using eBay India was allowed to participate in the open call if 
he met commulatively the following conditions: (1) the user should be reg-
istered on eBay India for six months; (2) the seller should have 20 feedback 
scores as a seller with an overall rating of 97% positive feedback; (3) the 
seller should have completed at least one transaction on eBay as a buyer and 
one as a seller. A buyer was allowed to participate in the open call if he met 
cumulatively the following conditions: (1) the buyer should be registered 
on eBay India for six months; (2) the buyer should have 10 feedback scores 
45 Arbitration tribunals rendering self-enforceable decisions have a particular importance 
in the fi eld of CODR because they are the only CODR procedures rendering decisions 
that can be imposed on a disputant, without his consent. The solutions proposed by all 
other CODR procedures can become binding on a disputant only if the disputant agrees 
to be bound by them.
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with overall rating of 97%; and (3) the buyer should have completed at least 
10 buyer transactions. These conditions were set in order to ensure that only 
trustworthy and experienced eBay users served as jurors.
The information to be sent to the jury by the claimant included: dates of 
bidding, buying and paying; dates of receiving an item; a proof of paid and 
received items; information about the condition of the item that was sent; 
and other information intended for supporting the case. The claimant was 
asked to write a statement of up to 5000 characters, and to include up to 3 
photos to support his statement.
After the seller had submitted a claim to appeal the feedback, the buyer 
was emailed so that he knew what he should do next. Ten days were given 
to the buyer from the time when the appeal was written and received by the 
jury to write his statement in response. If he chose not to justify his feedback 
within 10 days, the case would automatically progress to the jury voting 
stage where the jury would vote based on the claimant’s feedback and pho-
tos. However, if the buyer chose to justify his feedback, he needed to review 
the statement and the photos that the seller had put together as his appeal. 
The buyer could write a statement of up to 5,000 characters explaining why 
he believed his feedback was justified and why the seller’s appeal was not 
justified as such. He could also upload up to three additional photos to sup-
port his case.
After the buyer submitted his written statement and up to three addi-
tional photos, the seller had two days to review the buyer’s statement and 
to write a brief final response.
Subsequently, the case was put active and was served to the random-
ly allocated 21 jury members to vote upon. In order to be informed about 
the status of the case, the claimant and the respondent were emailed. They 
could also log into the ECRF at any time to see the status of the case.
As regards the jury, anonymity of jurors was maintained and any 
attempt to trace and contact a juror led to being barred from using the ECRF. 
Also, the jury was never pre-selected. When a jury member logged into the 
ECRF, he was randomly allocated to a case. Jury members would not be 
allocated to a case for at least one of the following two reasons: (1) if they 
had had a transaction with either the buyer or the seller; (2) if they had once 
voted on a case in which the buyer or the seller was/were already involved. 
At least 11 out of the 21 jury members must agree that the feedback should 
be removed in order for it to be removed. If the first 11 people opined that 
the feedback should be removed, the case was closed at that point and the 
feedback was removed. If the first 11 people voted not to remove the feed-
back, the case was also closed and the feedback was not removed.
The final decision of the jury was enforced by an eBay Customer Service 
Representative, who, if appropriate, removed the feedback. A screenshot of 
eBay’s Community Court (an early version of the ECRF) is given in Figure 11.
The screenshot of the eBay’s Community Court demonstrates the four 
steps of operation of the eBay’s Community Court, namely, (1) starting the 
appeal of feedback posted in eBay, (2) collecting the view of the person who 
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posted the appealed feedback, (3) jury voting, and (4) rendering the final 
decision.
The procedure offered by the ECRF is a form of CODR because it falls 
within the scope of our definition of CODR.
Figure 11. A screenshot of the eBay’s Community Court (an early version of the ECRF)
As regards to the first element (ADR or court proceedings), the ECRF pro-
vides a non-binding arbitration procedure. The non-binding arbitration is 
one of the most widely known forms of ADR (Paulsson, 1999, p. 108). The 
non-binding arbitration is more used in ODR than the legally binding arbi-
tration (Harkiolakis and Halkias, 2016, p. 170). One of the reasons for the 
success of the non-binding arbitration is that such arbitration is not an object 
of “the stringent procedural requirements that prevail in binding arbitra-
tion” (Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz, 2004, p. 33). Nevertheless, the non-
binding arbitration may be more formal and lengthy than the early neutral 
evaluation (Murray, 2011, p. 158).
In order to find out whether the ECRF provides a non-binding arbitra-
tion procedure, we will examine whether the procedure offered by the ECRF 
falls within the scope of a definition of binding arbitration. If we find out 
that the only difference between the procedure offered by the ECRF and the 
binding arbitration procedures is the lack of a legally binding decision, then 
the procedure provided by the ECRF should be regarded as a non-binding 
arbitration.
The binding arbitration can be defined as a process in which one or both 
of the parties involved have agreed by contract to submit unresolved issues 
to a neutral third party of which the decision shall be final and binding on 
all parties involved (cf. Carrell and Heavrin, 2008, p. 180). In order to use 
the website of eBay, the disputants using the ECRF had to accept the User 
Agreement of eBay which allowed for the resolution of disputes through 
the ECRF. The procedure provided by the ECRF is initiated by one of the 
parties involved in a transaction concerning goods sold through eBay. The 
dispute was resolved through a group of neutral third parties. As it has been 
mentioned before, eBay imposed certain procedural safeguards in order to 
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ensure the impartiality of the parties. The decision rendered by eBay was 
final because the disputants were not able to appeal it before any institution. 
Hence, the only difference between the procedure offered by the ECRF and 
the binding arbitration is that the former does not result in legally binding 
decision. Being a form of non-binding arbitration, the ECRF qualifies as a 
form of ADR and, therefore, complies with the first element of our definition 
of CODR (ADR or court proceedings).
Pertaining to the second element (using the Internet), it should be not-
ed that the procedure provided by the ECRF is conducted entirely online. 
Therefore, the procedure complies with the second element of our definition 
of CODR.
In relation to the third element (using crowdsourcing), the disputants in 
traditional arbitration appoint an arbitrator by concluding a contract known 
as Arbitrator’s contract (Onyema, 2010, p. 86). The ECRF outsources the 
function once performed by appointed arbitrators and outsources it to an 
undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form of an open 
call. The network is undefined (and generally large) because any Internet 
user complying with the aforementioned requirements was able to become 
a juror in the ECRF. The call used by the ECRF to outsource the function of 
an arbitrator falls within the scope of our definition of “open call” because 
(1) any Internet user complying with the aforementioned requirements was 
able to participate in the ECRF and (2) the call was made publicly available 
on the website of the ECRF.
B: Marktplaats Gebruikersjury
Marktplaats.nl is an online action website providing a venue for buyers 
and sellers of products to meet and make transactions. It is owned by eBay 
(cf. Neysen, 2009, p. 17). Marktplaats Gebruikersjury is a CODR platform 
developed by eBay.46 Colin Rule, the person who led the development of the 
ECRF, has contributed significantly to the creation of Marktplaats Gebrui-
kersjury.47
Marktplaats Gebruikersjury allows sellers of products on Marktplaats.
nl to appeal negative feedback posted by buyers.48 A seller may submit a 
complaint. It will be submitted to 11 jurors who will resolve the complaint. 
The jury is composed from randomly selected users who have expressed 
their interest to participate as jurors in Marktplaats Gebruikersjury.49 If the 
complaint is accepted by the jury, Marktplaats’ staff will report the disputed 
feedback from marktplaats.nl.
46 See https://gebruikersjury-marktplaats.modria.com/mp/jsp/ccHome.jsp (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2017).
47 See the offi cial profi le of Colin Rule at the website of the Consensus Building Institute. 
Available at http://www.cbuilding.org/about/bio/colin-rule (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
48 The Dutch word gebruikersjury can be translated in English as the jury of the users.
49 See Algemene Voorwaarden Marktplaats Gebruikersjury (Terms and Conditions of 
Marktplaats Gebrikersjury). Available at https://gebruikersjury-marktplaats.modria.
com/mp/jsp/TermsAndConditions.jsp (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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The procedure offered by Marktplaats Gebruikersjury is a form of 
CODR because it falls within the scope of our definition of CODR.
Marktplaats Gebruikersjury meets the first element (ADR or court pro-
ceedings) because it is an online non-legally binding arbitration procedure 
organised by a private company (i.e., eBay). As dicussed in Subsection 2.2.1, 
online arbitration is form of ADR.
Marktplaats Gebruikersjury meets the second element (using the Inter-
net) because the procedure provided by it is conducted entirely online.
Marktplaats Gebruikersjury meets the third element (using crowdsourc-
ing) because Marktplaats Gebruikersjury outsources the function once per-
formed by appointed aribtrations and outsources it to an undefined (and 
generally) large network of people in the form of an open call. The network 
is undefined (and generally large) because any Internet user complying with 
the terms and conditions of Marktplaats Gebruikersjury is able to become a 
juror in Marktplaats Gebruikersjury.50 The call used by Marktplaats Gebrui-
kersjury to outsource the function of an arbitrator falls within the scope of 
our definition of “open call” because (1) any Internet user complying with 
the terms and conditions of Marktplaats Gebruikersjury is able to partici-
pate in Marktplaats Gebruikersjury and (2) the call is made publicly avail-
able on the website of the Marktplaats Gebruikersjury.51
Figure 12 displays a screenshot from Marktplaats.nl. We reproduce the 
Dutch version of the website which consists of four stages: (1) submitting
a complaint; (2) hearing of both sides; (3) the voting procedure; and (4) 
announ cing the binding verdict. In Figure 12, each stage is described by a 
Dutch phrase.
Figure 12. A screenshot of Marktplaats Gebruikersjury
50 Algemene Voorwaarden Marktplaats Gebruikersjury (Terms and Conditions of Marktp-
laats Gebrikersjury) are available at https://gebruikersjury-marktplaats.modria.com/
mp/jsp/TermsAndConditions.jsp (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
51 The webpage containing information about the open call for jury members is available at 
https://gebruikersjury-marktplaats.modria.com/mp/jsp/login.jsp?ut=3 (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2017).
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C: Benefits of CODR procedures functioning as arbitration tribunals rendering 
self-enforceable decisions
The CODR procedures functioning as arbitration tribunals rendering self-
enforceable decisions offer two benefits to the disputants: (1) quick and (2) 
free.
(1) Quick. For example, the maximum time of the ECRF procedure is not 
more than 22 days.52 In comparison, UDRP disputes are resolved 
through ODR in as little as 60 days of filing (see Partridge, 2012).
(2) Free. The ECRF and Marktplaats Gebruikersjury allowed the disputants 
to resolve their disputes without paying any fee. In comparison, filling 
an UDRP complaint costs a minimum of EUR 500.53
D: The drawback of CODR procedures functioning as arbitration tribunals 
rendering self-enforceable decisions
The CODR procedures functioning as arbitration tribunals rendering self-
enforceable decisions have at least two drawbacks, namely, (1) lack of deci-
sion control and (2) possible procedural delays.
(1) Lack of decision control. The term decision control refers to the extent to 
which the parties are free to reject or accept a decision rendered by a 
third party (cf. Wemmers, 1996, p. 69). Since the ECRF and Marktplaats 
Gebruikersjury decisions are directly enforced by an authorised officer, 
who, if appropriate, removes the disputed feedback, the disputants do 
not have any decision control. The lack of decision control is found to 
have a negative impact on subjective procedural fairness.54
52 See Community Court’s FAQs, http://www.ebaycourt.com/cc/FAQ.jsf. The archived 
webpage is available at https://web.archive.org/web/20111213132628/http://www.
ebaycourt.com/cc/FAQ.jsf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
53 The fee for fi lling an UDRP complaint at the Czech Arbitration Court, one of ICANN’s 
accredited UDRP providers, is 500 EUR for complaints involving no more than 5 domain 
names. However, if (1) the respondent replies or (2) the arbitrator fi nds that the case is 
complex the complainant should pay an additional fee of 500 EUR. See Annex A: Fee 
Schedule of CAC‘s UDRP Supplemental Rules of the Czech Arbitration Court available 
on https://udrp.adr.eu/arbitration_platform/udrp_supplemental_rules.php#9 (last vis-
ited Jan. 3, 2017). The other ICANN’s accredited providers charge the following fees for 
resolving UDRP procedures. The fee for fi lling a complaint involving up to 5 domain 
names at the Arbitration and Mediation Center of the World Intellectual Property Orga-
nization (WIPO) is USD 1500. See http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/fees/index.
html (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). The fee for fi lling a complaint involving up to 5 domain 
names at the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Center is USD 1300 for complaints 
involving up to 2 domain names. The fee for fi lling a complaint involving up to two 
domain names at the National Arbitration Forum is USD 1300. See http://domains.
adrforum.com/main.aspx?itemID=631&hideBar=False&navID=237&news=26 (last vis-
ited Jan. 3, 2017). The aforementioned fees are for resolution of UDRP disputes by a single 
panelist.
54 For more information about the relationship between decision control and subjective pro-
cedural fairness, see Subsection 5.2.2.
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(2) Possible procedural delays. The ECRF and Marktplaats Gebruikersjury 
cannot resolve disputes if there were not sufficient jurors. In case there 
were not sufficient jurors, the case would simply remain pending until 
the required number of jurors join the case. This may have a negative 
impact on the objective fairness of the ECRF and Marktplaats Gebrui-
kersjury as procedural delays are regarded as unfair by laws and 
courts.55 However, it should be noted that the ECRF received more than 
sufficient jury applications to support the case volume (cf. Rule and 
Nagarajan, 2010, p. 4). One solution to this “imaginative” problem is to 
provide remuneration to the jurors in case that no jurors would like to 
participate without remuneration. The remuneration can be gradually 
increased until the CODR platform finds a sufficient number of jurors. 
However, the remuneration may also incentivise the jurors to focus on 
the number of decisions rendered by them, and not on the quality of the 
decisions.
3.4 Chapter summary
By examining the past and present CODR rocedures, we found that the first 
types of CODR procedures function as either online opinion polls or online 
mock juries. These kinds of CODR procedures do not provide the parties 
with an actual resolution of their cases. Instead, the online opinion polls 
provide the parties with recommendations on how to resolve their cases. 
The online mock juries allow attorneys to use the verdicts rendered by the 
online mock juries as an ADR tool, in which parties that are not inclined to 
negotiate may see how the merits of their respective cases stand.
The ECRF was created with the aim to be the first CODR procedure 
that provides temporary relief to the parties. The relief is only temporary 
because the enforced decision is not legally binding and may be challenged 
before a law court. In January 2013, the ECRF was closed down. However, 
we still may conclude that it was a groundbreaking experiment that con-
vincingly shows that the idea of solving a dispute effectively and at no cost 
by a large group of people located in many different countries in less than 22 
days after submitting the claim has become reality.
55 For more information on the relation between procedural delays and objective proce-
dural fairness, see Subsection 5.1.7.
In this chapter, we aim at constructing a framework for CODR. Such a frame-
work will be composed of building blocks. To define the appropriate build-
ing blocks for a CODR framework is our first task. Then we will focus on the 
crowd and their incentives.
In our search for appropriate building blocks we may start to have a 
look at frameworks for ODR procedures. While a framework for ODR can 
be used to describe CODR, such a framework will not allow us to focus 
on the new concept used in CODR, the crowd. Clearly, the frameworks for 
ODR are designed to describe ODR processes where the third neutral party 
is composed from one or otherwise a few dispute resolution professionals 
(cf. Katsh and Rifkin, 2001, Junqueira and Costa, 2007, pp. 69-79). As a direct 
consequence, these frameworks are not focusing on important aspects of 
CODR, such as the composition of the crowd and the incentives motivat-
ing the third neutral party to participate in the procedure. Moreover, when 
using the ODR framework provided by Katsh and Rifkin (2001) for describ-
ing CODR, we mostly need to deal with filling in a complaint, notifying the 
respondent, reaching a decision, and enforcing the decision. The framework 
cannot be used in our research to investigate the two important aspects 
mentioned above. In summary, without investigating these two aspects, we 
will not be able to formulate an adequate CODR framework.
In the literature reviewed, we found a framework of collective intelli-
gence systems described by Malone, Laubacher, and Dellarocas (2009) that 
seemed to possess some characteristics which possibly fit our framework. 
Therefore, we decided to have a close look at this framework. Inspired by 
their ideas, we will investigate the possible construction of a suitable frame-
work for CODR. To facilitate reading we henceforth call the above-men-
tioned framework the Malone framework.
In Section 4.1, we describe the Malone framework. We end that section 
by four questions that guide the contents of the remaining sections. Thus, 
these sections will deal with the crowd (Section 4.2), the incentives (Sec-
tion 4.3), two broad categories of disputes (Section 4.4), and the organisation 
structure and process (Section 4.5). Section 4.6 contains a chapter summary.
4.1 The four building blocks of the Malone framework
For the description of the three types of CODR procedures (online opinion 
polls, online mock juries, and arbitration tribunals rendering self-enforce-
4 A framework for CODR
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able decisions; see Chapter 2), we will investigate the Malone framework 
since it is designed to describe collective intelligence systems.
Collective intelligence systems can be broadly defined as systems allow-
ing “groups of individuals to do things collectively that seem intelligent” 
(cf. Malone et al., 2009, p. 1). Thus, collective intelligence systems include 
crowdsourcing systems (see Kneißl, 2014, p. 11; Quinn and Bederson, 2011). 
Obviously, both, crowdsourcing systems and collective intelligence systems, 
allow a group of individuals to do things collectively that seem intelligent 
(cf. Kneißl, 2014, p. 11). A telling example is Wikipedia. It is a crowdsourcing 
system allowing thousands of contributors from across the world to create 
collectively the world’s largest encyclopedia.1 From now on, we distinguish 
between (1) crowdsourcing systems and (2) collective intelligent systems 
that are not crowdsourcing systems by calling the latter general collective 
intelligent systems.
There are two differences between crowdsourcing systems and general 
collective intelligence systems (cf. Kneißl, 2014, p. 11). The first difference is 
that in the general collective intelligence systems, no open calls need to be 
made.2 For instance, the citizens of the virtual world Second Life have col-
lectively created all objects of the virtual world, including buildings, plants, 
landscapes and even clothes and avatars, without any open call (see Cheng, 
2013). The second difference is that in the general collective intelligence sys-
tems, no function needs to be outsourced by a company or institution (see 
Kneißl, 2014, p. 11).3 For example, Linden Research, Inc., the creator of Sec-
ond Life does not outsource tasks to the citizens of Second Life. The citizens 
of Second Life create the objects in Second Life at their own initiative and 
own the intellectual property rights of their creations (cf. Cheng, 2013).
On the basis of the aforementioned observations, we may conclude that 
frameworks of collective intelligence systems, including the Malone frame-
work, can be applied (possibly after some adaptation) to crowdsourcing 
systems, which encompass the three types of CODR procedures mentioned 
above (cf. Geiger, Rosemanm, and Fielt, 2011, p. 1).
The Malone framework consists of four building blocks. The term 
“building blocks” refers to elements that are common to any collective intel-
ligence system. Employing an analogy from biology, Malone et al. (2009) call 
these building blocks the “genes” of collective intelligence systems.
For their framework, Malone et al. (2009) examined nearly 250 exam-
ples of collective intelligence systems and developed a series of classifica-
tion frameworks. The goal of these classification frameworks was to classify 
examples of collective intelligence into categories that were (1) mutually 
exclusive, (2) collectively exhaustive, and (3) easy to understand (cf. Malone 
1 For a more detailed description of Wikipedia, see Chapter 1.
2 The open call is an element of the defi nition of crowdsourcing provided by Howe (2006).
3 The process of taking a function once performed by employees and outsourcing it to an 
undefi ned (and generally large) network of people is an element of the defi nition of 
crowdsourcing provided by Howe (2006).
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et al., 2009, p. 19). To test the degree to which the frameworks meet the 
aforementioned goal, Malone et al. (2009, p. 19) presented them to seasoned 
managers, established researchers, students, and research assistants. These 
groups of people provided their comments and opinions concerning the 
frameworks. On the basis of the collected information, Malone et al. (2009) 
developed a framework in which the building blocks of collective intelli-
gence systems have their place and are defined by function and use.
The Malone framework indicates that crowdsourcing is not merely a 
process that happens randomly, but a process that can be customised (cf. 
Shore, 2011, p. 136). The customisation of the crowdsourcing process allows 
companies to match the right crowdsourcing process to their specific organ-
isational needs (cf. Erickson, Petrick, and Trauth, 2012).
The four building blocks of the Malone framework are as follows.
(1)  Staffi ng (the people participating in the system).
(2)  The incentives that motivate the people to participate in the system.
(3)  The goal that the system aims to achieve.
(4)  The organisational structure and process of the system.
In relation to the fourth building block, an adequate description of the 
organisational structure and the according process shows how the system 
works.
The four building blocks are classified by using two pairs of related 
questions. Pair 1 is focused on staff and incentives. Pair 2 is focused on the 
goal and how it is achieved. Alternatively we may say: people and their 
drivers (pair 1) versus results and procedures (pair 2). We will aim to design 
our own CODR framework (see Sections 4.2 to 4.5) based on the example 
by Malone et al. (2009). The Malone framework in itself is too general. We 
believe that a framework adapted to CODR procedures will facilitate the 
analysis of CODR procedures more adequately. In many cases it is not nec-
essary to adapt and clarify the concepts of the framework when analysing 
CODR procedures. Still, if we use the Malone framework, we will have to 
clarify now and then the concepts and terms under investigation. For exam-
ple, the term staffing in the context of CODR refers to (a) the developers of 
the CODR platform, (b) the IT support personnel providing IT support to 
the users of the CODR platform, (c) the advertisers of the CODR platform, 
or (d) the crowd. This has to be made clear in the running context.
Let we now proceed with the identification of the four building blocks. 
According to Malone et al. (2009), the four building blocks can be identified 
by answering the following four questions. These four questions are pro-
vided below together with their answers (see Malone et al., 2009).
Question 1: Who is performing the task? The answer to the question “Who” 
is the crowd. Reliance on the crowd is a central feature of crowdsourcing 
systems (cf. Malone et al., 2009, p. 4).
Question 2: Why are they doing it? The answer of the question “Why” is 
in the incentives that encourage the members of the crowd to participate in 
crowdsourcing systems.
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Question 3: What is being accomplished? The answer of the question 
“What” refers to the goals of the crowdsourcing systems.
Question 4: How is it being done? The answer of the question “How” 
refers to the organisational structure and processes of the crowdsourcing 
systems.
In order to identify the building blocks of CODR, we will need to adapt 
these questions to the context of CODR. The adapted questions are as fol-
lows.
(1)  Who does resolve the dispute in CODR?
(2)  Why does he do it?
(3)  What is the goal of CODR, i.e., what types of disputes can be re-
solved?
(4)  How does CODR work?
The answers to these questions constitute the building blocks of CODR. In 
our terminology, the answers read as follows.
(1)  the crowd (see Section 4.2);
(2)  the incentives (see Section 4.3);
(3)  the types of disputes (see Section 4.4);
(4)  the organisation structure and process (see Section 4.5).
In the following subsections, we will provide an elaboration of the answers.
4.2 The Crowd
In this section, we provide a definition of the term crowd. We also clarify 
the term crowd by addressing the following four issues: type of entity of the 
crowd (4.2.1), diversity within the crowd (4.2.2), governance of the crowd 
(4.2.3), and temporality of the crowd (4.2.4).
Below, we provide a definition of the crowd constructed on the basis of 
Howe’s definition of crowdsourcing mentioned in Chapter 2.
Definition 4.1 (The crowd): The crowd participating in CODR is a group of 
people who participate in the dispute resolution process through an open call.4
We will use the aforementioned definition of the crowd for the purposes of 
this thesis. Although it does not describe the crowd in general, it is perfectly 
suitable in the context of CODR. Yet, in order to give the reader a somewhat 
better feeling and understanding of the notion of a crowd, we will examine 
the definitions of the crowd provided by O’Connell and Cuthbertson (2009, 
p. 148), Silva and Ramos (2012, p. 626), and Le Bon (2013).
O’Connell and Cuthbertson (2009, p. 148) describe the crowd as “a gath-
ering of people who are in the same place (usually in public) and share a 
reason for being in that place.” A central point of this definition is that the 
4 We note that the term open call has been already defi ned and clarifi ed in Chapter 3.
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crowd is not merely a gathering of people, but a gathering of people caused 
by a reason. In this regard, O’Connell and Cuthbertson (2009, p. 148) state 
that people who are at the beach on a hot summer day are not considered 
to be a crowd. However, if a company arrives at the beach on a hot sum-
mer day and starts distributing free bottles of sunscreen, the people going 
there to obtain a free bottle might be considered a crowd. A drawback of 
the definition provided by O’Connell and Cuthbertson (2009, p. 148) is that 
the criterion “sharing a reason for being in that place” cannot be used to 
distinguish clearly a crowd from a mere gathering of people. So, an argu-
mentation for the crowd definition has to be subtle since every gathering 
of people is caused by a reason. In the example provided by O’Connell and 
Cuthbertson (2009, p. 148), the people who are at the beach on a hot summer 
day are on the beach for a specific reason, namely, the recreational effect of 
the sun, the wind, and the sea. All in all, this definition cannot be used in the 
context of CODR.
Silva and Ramos (2012, p. 626) define the crowd as “a large set of anon-
ymous and heterogenous individuals, which may be composed of scien-
tists and experts in various fields, but also of novices.” A drawback of this 
definition is that the crowd is seen only as a combination of anonymous 
individuals. However, the social networks, the most popular applications 
of crowdsourcing, allow a large number of non-anonymous people to gath-
er in groups based on interests. Below, we provide two examples of Face-
book groups having a large number of members. First, the Facebook group 
“Quickly, Canadians against Proroguing Parliament (CAPP)” gathered over 
200,000 members (cf. Kozolanka, 2014, p. 83). Some of them used the group 
to organise their participation in anti-prorogation protests in Canada. Sec-
ond, the Facebook group called “Saving the Children of Africa” has over 1,2 
million members (cf. Wolfsfeld, 2014, p. 19). The group collects donations for 
the children of Africa. The two examples show why this definition does not 
fit the CODR context.
Le Bon (2013) describes the crowd as a group of people, which is domi-
nated by irrational impulses over which the members of the crowd have no 
control. The definition provided by Le Bon cannot be used in the context of 
CODR because it uses a subjective criterion to distinguish the crowd from 
other groups of people, namely, the psychological state of the members of 
the crowd. A scientific definition should be based on objective criteria.
4.2.1 Type of entity
The issue related to the type of entity of the crowd is guided by the follow-
ing question: should the crowd be viewed as a single entity or as a collec-
tion of independent individuals? For an adequate answer, we have to find 
a stable criterion for distinguishing between a collective decision and an 
aggregation of decisions. In this regard, we adopt a definition of a “collec-
tive decision” provided by Tideman (2006).
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Definition 4.2 (Collective decision): “A collective decision occurs when mem-
bers of a collectivity make individual decisions that they would not make if the 
other members of the collectivity were not making related decisions. A collective 
decision thus entails coordination of intentions” (Tideman, 2006, p. 5).
Consequently, on the basis of the above-mentioned definition, we may state 
that if the members of the crowd are influenced by the other members of 
the crowd, then there is collective decision making. By contrast, if, when 
making their decisions, the members of the crowd are not influenced by the 
other members of the crowd, there is no collective decision making, but an 
aggregation of decisions. In the context of CODR, it means that if the mem-
bers of the crowd can deliberate on their decisions or in some other way 
communicate with the other members with regard to the dispute, then they 
take a collective decision and act in their crowd behaviour as a single entity.5
4.2.2 Diversity
The issue related to the diversity within the crowd is guided by the question: 
what is the relevance of diversity for the quality of the decisions rendered 
through a CODR procedure? We claim that diversity has a high relevance for 
the quality of the jurors’ decisions. This claim is supported by three views 
adopted from the literature. First, it is argued that a reduction in the diver-
sity of jurors minimizes the chances that alternative viewpoints have to be 
expressed in the process of deliberation (cf. Fiske, Gilbert, Lindzey, 2010, 
p. 1365). Second, Sommers (2006) has concluded that the decisions of diverse 
groups have certain advantages compared to the decisions made by homoge-
neous groups. In particular, through a real trial simulation, including video 
trial presentation, jury instructions, and deliberations, he identified specific 
advantages of racial heterogenity for group decision making and demon-
strated the influence of race-relevant jury selection questions on subsequent 
trial judgements (Sommers, 2006, pp. 597-612). Moreover, he found that het-
erogeneous groups consider a wider range of information than homogenous 
groups and deliberated longer than homogenous groups. Third, according to 
some studies, the accuracy in jury assessments is improved more by increas-
ing the social diversity of jurors than by increasing the average educational 
level (Strodtbeck, James, Hawkins, 1957). Moreover, we would like to add 
that we have not found any opinion opposing our claim.
4.2.3 Governance of the crowd
The issue related to the governance of the crowd is guided by the question: 
who governs the crowd? The crowd can be either (A) self-governing or (B) 
governed by an organisation (cf. Brabham, 2013). We briefly discuss both of 
them below.
5 The advantages of CODR procedures allowing deliberations and CODR procedures not 
allowing deliberations are examined in more detail in Subsection 4.5.2.
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A: Self-governing crowd
The self-governing crowd adopts its own policies and enforces them. For 
example, Wikipedia policies and guidelines are developed by the com-
munity of Wikipedia editors to “describe best practice, clarify principles, 
resolve conflicts, and otherwise further our goal of creating a free, reliable 
encyclopedia.”6 The enforcement of the policies and guidelines is performed 
by the Wikipedia editors.7 If an editor violates the policies and guidelines, 
other editors can persuade the violating editor to adhere to the policies. In 
case of a persistent violation of the policies and guidelines, the violating 
editor may be blocked temporarily or indefinitely from editing by admin-
istrators.
Administrators are editors who have been granted the right to block oth-
er editors from editing. The administrators are appointed after a discussion 
by editors.8 The blocked editor can use the Wikipedia general dispute reso-
lution procedure or the dispute resolution procedure offered by the Wiki-
pedia Arbitration Committee to appeal the decision of the administrator.9
B: Crowd governed by an organisation
If an organisation governs the crowd by adopting policies and enforcing 
them, the crowd becomes “a mere pawn in the organisation’s overall goals” 
(Brabham, 2013). For example, the crowd participating in the crowdsourcing 
platform Threadless is governed by skinnyCorp LLC, a company based in 
the United States.10 Threadless allows anyone to submit images for t-shirts, 
bags, and other products. The top-scoring images are printed on products 
and sold worldwide through the website of Threadless and their retail store 
in Chicago, USA. In order to submit images, the users of Threadless have to 
accept three documents adopted and enforced by skinnyCorp LLC, namely, 
(1) Privacy Policy, (2) Threadless.com Community Guidelines and Terms of 
Use, and (3) Design Challenge Submission Legal Terms & Conditions.11 In 
order to vote for images, the users of Threadless have to accept only the first 
two of the aforementioned three documents.
6 See the Wikipedia article “Wikipedia: Policies and guidelines” available on http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Policies_and_guidelines (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
7 See the Wikipedia article “Wikipedia: Policies and guidelines” available on http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Policies_and_guidelines (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
8 See the Wikipedia article “Wikipedia:Administrators” available on http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Wikipedia:Administrators#Becoming_an_administrator (last visited Jan. 3, 
2017).
9 See the Wikipedia article “Wikipedia:Policies and guidelines” available on http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Policies_and_guidelines (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
10 See http://threadless.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). The website was examined in more 
detail in Chapter 2.
11 The Privacy Policy of threadless.com is available on https://www.threadless.com/info/
privacy (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). Threadless.com Community Guidelines and Terms of 
Use are available on https://www.threadless.com/info/terms (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). 
The Design Challenge Submission Legal Terms & Conditions are available on https://
www.threadless.com/threadless/legal/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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4.2.4 Temporality of the crowd
The issue related to the temporality of the crowd is guided by the ques-
tion: is the crowd a temporary group? Ohira, Masaki, and Matsumoto (2011, 
p. 252) explicitly note that the crowd is a temporal group. Thus, they dis-
tinguish between (a) a crowd composed from relatively permanent groups 
of people, such as countries, states, and provinces and (b) a crowd com-
posed from temporal groups. The temporal element of a crowd was initially 
observed by two scholars in the twentieth century. Priority goes to Thouless 
(1937, p. 258) when he noted that the crowd is “quickly created and quickly 
dissolved”. Some thirty years later Horton and Hunt (1968, p. 374) stated 
that a crowd is “a temporary collection of people reacting together to stim-
uli.” Although the perspective on what is the crowd has been changed over 
the years, the characterisation of temporality remains.
4.3 Incentives
In this section, we intend to answer the question: what are the incentives 
for people to participate as members of the crowd, through an open call, in 
a CODR procedure? At least five such incentives can be mentioned, namely, 
(A) the credit which the member will receive as a result of his contribution 
to the community, (B) entertainment, (C) the feedback received by the mem-
ber, (D) financial remuneration, and (E) a sense of service to the community. 
We discuss them briefly below. We note that, since we do not have empirical 
data indicating the degree of importance of these incentives for the mem-
bers of the crowd, we arranged the incentives in an alphabetical order.
A: Credit to the member for his contribution to the community
The first incentive is the credit, which the member will receive as a result 
of his contribution to the community (Van den Herik and Dimov, 2011(a), 
p. 250).12 For example, if the decisions of the cases are published in the 
12 Latour and Woolgar found that, for the scientifi c community, the most important part of 
the incentive system is the cycle of credit. They note that credit refers simultaneously to 
two dimensions of social status in the scientifi c community. First, it is linked with an indi-
vidual’s ability to act in the community and effect change through assertation of claims, 
i.e., the cycle of credit describes how credit becomes manifest in grants, equipment, data, 
ideas and publications. Second, credit is a reward mechanism that marks one’s past con-
tributions. See Latour and Woolgar, 1986. After conducting two round of interviews with 
9 and 13 Wikipedians in the fall of 2004 and spring of 2005, Forte and Bruckman revealed 
that in some respects, the incentive system that motivates contributions to Wikipedia 
resembles the incentive system observed in the scientifi c community. They established 
that the notion of credit exists in Wikipedia both as reward and as credibility that empow-
ers individuals in the community. However, they established also some differences 
between the incentive systems of Wikipedia and the scientifi c community because of the 
nature of encyclopedia-writing Enterprise, the technology on which Wikipedia is built 
and the values of Wikipedia. See Forte and Bruckman, 2005, p. 3.
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online communities together with the names of the people who decided the 
cases, the incentive for the members of the crowd will be similar to the incen-
tive for the contributors in Wikipedia; it is all comparable with the incentive 
system observed in the scientific community. In particular, the credit that the 
members receive motivates the members to move forward in their careers 
(cf. Benson and Morgan, 2014, p. 266). This statement is supported by a 
study of organisational control systems for university researchers conducted 
by Feist and Gorman (2012). The study found that the scientific recognition 
affects research performance positively (cf. Feist and Gorman, 2012).
B: Entertainment
The second incentive is entertainment. In this regard, we refer to a study 
conducted by Ipeirotis (2008). He asked a group of crowdsourced work-
ers (so-called turkers) why they participated in Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(AMT).13 AMT is a website using crowdsourcing that allows anyone to sub-
mit a task to be executed by crowdsourced workers. Twenty-one percent of 
the crowdsourcing workers in AMT listed as their choice “to kill time” and 
forty-two percent listed “entertainment”. The crowdsourcing workers were 
motivated by (1) their intrinstic enjoyment of participating in crowdsourc-
ing work and (2) by the opportunities it provides to socialise with others (cf. 
Malone et al., 2009, p. 5).
One way to provide entertainment to crowdsourcing workers is gami-
fication, i.e., the introduction of game elements (e.g., achievements, badges, 
and leaderboards) into activities that are not games themselves (cf. Šimko 
and Bielikován, 2014, p. 26). For example, in the crowdsourcing application 
ESP, gamification is used to label images. ESP (Extra Sensory Perception) 
game is played by two partners who are randomly assigned by a large num-
ber of pairs at once (see Von Ahn, 2005). Players are not allowed to com-
municate with their partners. The only thing that the partners can see is an 
image. When the two partners type the same word, they move on to the next 
image (see Von Ahn, 2005). Thus, while playing games, players can label a 
large number of photos. An example of ESP photo to be described is given in 
Figure 13. In the screenshot we see the photo to be labeled.14 Moreover, we 
see which words are forbidden. Then to guide the game (in this particular 
instance) six words are offered. Other gadgets are self-explaining. In sum-
mary, we may conclude that entertainment can be a stimulus to perform 
tasks.
13 See http://www.mturk.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
14 The screenshot of the crowdsourcing application ESP is obtained from the blog post 
‘Social consequences of social tagging’ written by Lawley, L. on 20 January, 2005. The 
blog post is available on http://many.corante.com/archives/2005/01/20/social_conse-
quences_of_social_tagging.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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Figure 13. A screenshot of the crowdsourcing application ESP
C: Feedback received by the member
The third incentive is the feedback received by the member. For instance, the 
members of the crowd can receive a report displaying the total number of 
votes for and against the decision.15 Thus, they will know, e.g., whether their 
view on the case corresponds with the majority of the members of the crowd 
or whether their view was a single opposition view.
It is worth mentioning that studies conducted by Göritz (2006) and 
Maniaci and Rogge (2014) reveal that providing feedback to participants in 
web surveys is a highly efficient incentive. In particular, Göritz (2006) found 
that offering a summary of the research findings to participants in web sur-
veys was a no less effective incentive than other types of incentives, includ-
ing monetary payment. Maniaci and Rogge (2014, p. 464) established that 
providing individualised feedback at the end of a web survey based on each 
participant’s responses can be an effective incentive even if the feedback 
consists merely of a calculation of total scores on a scale and a short para-
graph describing what the score means. Maniaci and Rogge (2014, p. 464) 
also revealed that adding visualisation, i.e., showing graphics indicating an 
individual’s score relative to the larger distribution, can increase the per-
ceived value of feedback.
Because CODR procedures functioning as online opinion polls are a form 
of web surveys, we may expect that the provision of feedback to the mem-
bers of the crowd in such CODR procedures will be an efficient incentive.
D: Financial remuneration
The fourth incentive is financial remuneration. Göritz (2006) established 
that material incentives significantly increased response rates of partici-
pants in crowdsourcing applications by an average of 19%. Göritz (2006) 
also established that non-monetary prizes ranging from approximately USD 
15 The members of the crowd of iCourthouse.com who vote in a case can see a report dis-
playing the total number of votes for and against the claim of the plaintiff.
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50 to USD 200 were no less effective than monetary incentives. Maniaci and 
Rogge (2014, p. 464) point out that although larger incentives are generally 
more effective, the amount of the monetary incentives is not linearly related 
to the response rates. This means that very large monetary incentives will 
lead to relatively diminishing returns (cf. Maniaci and Rogge, 2014, p. 464).
According to the earlier mentioned study of Ipeirotis (2008), thirty-four 
percent of the crowdsourced workers stated in the survey that they par-
ticipate for “Pocket Change / Extra Cash” as a motivation and forty-nine 
percent described it as “Income Purposes”. So, we may assume that a large 
part of the participants are involved in crowdsourcing for gaining financial 
profit. In this regard, it should be noted that the wages of the crowdsourced 
workers are typically rather low (cf. Felstiner, 2011, p. 24). For instance, an 
average crowdsourced worker at AMT earns approximately USD 1,25 per 
hour (see Felstiner, 2011, p. 24). At present, only the providers of online 
mock juries provide remuneration to the crowd members. TrialJuries pays 
USD 30 to each juror for his participation in a simple case.16 For more com-
plex cases, TrialJuries pays a higher amount. Depending on the complexity 
of the case, JuryTest pays each juror between USD 5 and USD 50.17
E: Sense of service to the community
The fifth incentive is a sense of service to the community (cf. Rule and Naga-
rajan, 2010, p. 5).18 For instance, eBay initially had concerns on the recruit-
ment of applicants to be jurors in eBay’s Community Court. However, eBay 
received more than sufficient applications to support the case volume (see 
Rule and Nagarajan, 2010, p. 5). Subsequently, eBay planned certain initia-
tives to be provided to the jurors as an award for their work, but no incen-
tive payouts have been needed because the jurors were willing to partici-
pate out of their sense of service to the community (see Rule and Nagarajan, 
2010, p. 5).
Serving the community for free is widely considered as an honorable 
activity (see Hein, 2009, p. 27). For example, the German word for volun-
teer work “Ehrenamt” means literary a honorific office (cf. Hein, 2009, p. 27). 
However, the performance of the members of the crowd, which are motivat-
ed merely by a sense of service to the community may be low because such 
members cannot be controlled by reducing their financial remuneration in 
case of a low-quality work (see Gagne, 2014, p. 424). In this regard, Gagne 
16 See http://www.trialjuries.com/trialjuries/signup.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
17 See http://jurytest.com/index.cfm?action=howjur (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
18 Actually, some critics warned that the online communities may not truly function as com-
munities. For instance, Carmichael (1998, p. 48) states that perhaps the eBay community 
site is scretching the defi nition of the community. Mendoza (1999, p. c6) questioned the 
truth of the eBay’s community calling it “personal trading community.”  However, we 
will not enter into a discussion of the defi nition of an online community.  For the purpose 
of this work, we will simply accept the defi nition of online community given by Kim 
(2000, p. 28), according to which, online community is “a group of people with a common 
purpose, interest, or activity, who get to know each other better over time.”
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(2014, p. 424) points out that most organisations that hire volunteers cannot 
afford to be picky in relation to the choice of workers and must accept what-
ever work they can get from them.
4.4 Two broad categories of disputes to be resolved through CODR
Currently we distinguish two broad categories of disputes to be resolved 
by CODR: online disputes and offline disputes. At this moment our focus 
is on online disputes because there is a pressing social need for a dispute 
resolution procedure addressing the growing number of online disputes. 
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that there will be one billion online 
disputes by 2017 (Grainer, Broetzmann, Beinhacker, Grainer, 2015). Yet, from 
the development in ODR we have learned that such a focus can easily shift 
from one perspective to the other and back again. Below we sketch the ODR 
development in this respect.
The very early proposals for using ODR processes targeted offline dis-
putes. The idea was to shorten the time of the procedure by electronic com-
munication. We refrain from giving examples and refer to Mommers (2005) 
for an overview. The actual history of ODR began with a major concern 
on disputes arising out of online activities, such as buyer-seller disputes 
on eBay (see Katsh, Rifkin, Gaitenby, 2000; Silkenat, Aresty, Klosek, 2009, 
p. 236; Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy, 2013, p. 52). Later, the success of ODR 
in this field encouraged the use of ODR for offline disputes (cf. Katsh and 
Rabinovich-Einy, 2013, p. 52). At present, ODR is used for resolution of both 
online and offline disputes (cf. Silkenat, Aresty, Klosek, 2009, p. 236; Katsh 
and Rabinovich-Einy, 2013). Because ODR applications efficiently and effec-
tively meet the information processing and communication needs of dis-
putants and third parties, it is expected that ODR will become increasingly 
valuable in both online and offline disputes (see Katsh, 2012).
The existing difference between online and offline disputes is commonly 
used when describing the types of disputes that can be resolved through 
ODR (see Solovay and Reed, 2003, pp. 3-30; Lodder and Zeleznikow, 2010, 
pp. 15-16). The difference is among others based on the specifics of the 
online disputes, namely, low-monetary value and cross-border character (cf. 
Rule, 2002, p. 6 and Prins, 2002, p. 299).
For our classification we have adopted the two types of disputes and 
show that both types can be resolved through CODR. We investigate the 
online disputes in Subsection 4.4.1 and the offline disputes in Subsection 
4.4.2.
4.4.1 Online Disputes
We claim that CODR in general can be designed to resolve online disputes. 
In particular, CODR is rather suitable for resolving at least the following 
four types of online disputes: (A) disputes concerning feedback; (B) disputes 
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in global online job marketplaces; (C) disputes in social networks; (D) dis-
putes in virtual worlds; (E) disputes in online games; and (F) online disputes 
submitted to jury-based litigation processes. We discuss all four briefly 
below. We remark that this categorization was not based on any existing 
categorization, but on our observations.
A: Disputes concerning feedback
Feedback on a transaction was usually seen as a present from the buyer 
for the seller. That was in the early days. Nowadays, an online feedback 
system allows buyers and sellers to publish on the Internet comments and 
ratings concerning a transaction concluded between them. In the begin-
ning, the online feedback systems were developed with the aim to serve as 
a benchmark for the seller’s reliability and promote trust between buyers 
and sellers. The consequences may vary depending on the comment given. 
For instance, a positive feedback allows the seller to charge higher prices 
(cf. Malaga, 2006, p. 822). In order to provide a better understanding of the 
online feedback systems, we explain below the operation of the online feed-
back systems of (A1) Amazon.co.uk and (A2) Elance.com.
A1: Amazon.co.uk
Amazon.co.uk is a website operated by Amazon.com, Inc., an American 
company operating in the field of e-commerce. Amazon.com, Inc. is the 
world’s largest online retailer (cf. O’Connor, 2013).
Amazon.co.uk allows small and large companies to sell their products 
directly to customers.19 The products sold through amazon.co.uk include, 
but are not limited to, apparel, books, CDs, DVDs, electronics, food, furni-
ture, jewelry, software, MP3 downloads/streaming, toys, VHSs, video, and 
video games. After each transaction with a company, customers are entitled 
to leave a feedback on amazon.co.uk. The feedback includes rating of the 
transaction ranging from 0 to 5 stars as well as a short comment about the 
customer’s satisfaction with the transaction. Figure 14 displays a screenshot 
of feedback posted by customers of a company selling books on Amazon.
co.uk. In Figure 14, we see that, within a period of twelve months, the seller 
of books was rated 35,260 times by buyers. The average rating received by 
the seller within the same time period was 4.9 stars out of 5 stars. Figure 14 
also shows the latest comments received by the seller, e.g., “A most fabulous 
book and great ideas and pictures”, “excellent service”, and “Good value, 
quick delivery”. Figure 14 clearly indicates the visibility of consumer feed-
back received by sellers on amazon.co.uk, which, in turn, makes such feed-
back an important marketing tool.
19 See a webpage entitled “Sell on Amazon” available on http://services.amazon.co.uk/
services/sell-online/how-it-works.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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Figure 14. A screenshot of feedback posted by customers of a company selling books on 
Amazon.co.uk
A2: Elance.com
Elance.com is a website owned by Elance, Inc., a company based in the Unit-
ed States. Elance.com allows companies to find, hire, manage and pay inde-
pendent contractors (cf. Heck and Rogers, 2014, p. 208). The term indepen-
dent contractor can be defined as a natural person, business, or corporation 
that provides goods or services to another entity under terms specified in 
a contract (Miller, 2013). The main difference between an employee and an 
independent contractor is that the independent contractor has the freedom 
to choose the means of accomplishing the work result (cf. Ferrera, Reder, 
Lichtenstein, Bird, Darrow, 2011, p. 511).
Figure 15. A list of freelancers in Elance.com, including the rating received by those freelancers
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In 2012, independent contractors hired via Elance.com billed more than USD 
200 million (see Heck and Rogers, 2014, pp. 209-210). Elance.com allows 
companies to give feedback to the independent contractors. The feedback 
includes a rating ranging from 1 to 5 stars and a short comment. The feed-
back is based on the quality of work and performance demonstrated by the 
independent contractors. Figure 15 displays statistics, including average 
rating, published by Elance.com in relation to three independent contrac-
tors. The three independent contractors are Cerulean Information Technol-
ogy Private Limited, Perfectial, and SynapseIndia. According to the statis-
tics shown in Figure 15, Cerulean Information Technology Private Limited 
completed 38 jobs and received an average rating of five stars for these jobs. 
Perfectial completed 19 jobs and received an average rating of four and a 
half stars for these jobs. SynapseIndia completed 686 jobs and received an 
average rating of four and a half stars for these jobs. Because the feedback 
posted by clients of independent contractors is visible, it is an important 
factor when choosing an independent contractor in Elance. For example, 
an independent contractor having an average rating of one star would raise 
distrust to potential customers.
Both Amazon.co.uk and Elance.com allow their customers to appeal 
feedback only on the basis of restricted grounds, e.g., obscene language or 
relation to a fraudulent transaction.20 The reason for restricting the grounds 
for appeal may be the fact that the resolution of a large number of feedback 
disputes would require Amazon.co.uk and Elance.com to spend significant 
financial resources for the remuneration of dispute resolution professionals 
that have to resolve the disputes concerning feedback.
If a feedback system does not provide fair redress options for disagree-
ments arising from feedback or offers only limited fair redress options (as it 
is the case with Amazon.co.uk and Elance.com), it may lose the trust of its 
users. In particular, the trust can be lost in two different ways. First, if nega-
tive reviews are removed in a non-transparent way, customers/independent 
contractors will question the accuracy of all reviews in the system, presuming 
that the overall feedback is being made falsely positive (see Rule and Singh, 
2011, p. 4). Second, if unfair negative reviews are included in the system, then 
customers/independent contractors will become suspicious about the accu-
racy of the overall reviews in the system (see Rule and Singh, 2011, pp. 4-5).
Because CODR may resolve disputes without the need for hiring dis-
pute resolution professionals, it may be applied to websites using feedback, 
such as Amazon.co.uk and Elance.com. This procedure will provide the cus-
tomers/independent contractors who have given a negative feedback and 
received a negative reaction with a way to appeal it.
20 For more information on the grounds on which feedback published on Amazon.co.uk 
can be appealed, please visit “Feedback FAQs” available on http://www.amazon.co.uk/
gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=1040616 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). For more 
information on the grounds on which feedback published on Elance.com can be 
appealed, please read Section 7 of “Site Usage Policy” available on https://www.elance.
com/p/legal/site-usage-policy.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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B: Disputes in global online job marketplaces
Nowadays, there are several global online job marketplaces using crowd-
sourcing, such as Elance.com21, Freelancer.com22, and Upwork.com.23 These 
online job marketplaces offer a web-based set of services to match up com-
panies with projects and independent contractors with relevant expertise 
(see Hugos, 2012, p. 185). In order to illustrate the scale of the existing global 
online job marketplaces, it is sufficient to note that Upwork.com has more 
than 12 million registered independent contractors and over 5 million reg-
istered clients.24 Every year, contractors in Upwork.com perform work for 
more than USD 1 billion.25
In the online job marketplaces, disputes may arise on whether the qual-
ity of the work is sufficient. Such disputes are currently resolved through 
ODR procedures offered by the online job marketplaces.26 For example, 
Elance, Inc. offers an online mediation and online arbitration service to the 
users of the Elance.com (cf. Lacey, 2012, p. 241). The mediation process is 
conducted by an Elance representative who tries to get the two parties to 
agree on a resolution. If the parties cannot resolve their dispute through 
mediation, they can use the online arbitration service. The arbitration pro-
ceeding does not require the appearance of the parties in person. The cost 
for the arbitration proceeding is split into three equal parts among Elance, 
the contractor, and the company which hired the contractor. At present, the 
arbitration fee is USD 299 for jobs under USD 1000 and USD 599 for jobs 
over USD 1000 (cf. Lacey, 2012, p. 241).
Because global online job marketplaces give access to millions of indepen-
dent contractors around the world who do not need to spend time or money 
on commuting, we may expect that the number of users of global online job 
marketplaces will increase (cf. Standing, 2014, p. 76).27 So, the amount of the 
disputes could rise to such a number that cannot be handled by the tradi-
tional model of dispute resolution, including ODR (cf. Vernon, 2010, p. 2).
CODR may be a solution to this problem because it would allow global 
online job market places to employ crowdsourcing workers, providing low-
21 See htttp://www.elance.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
22 See htttp://www.freelancer.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
23 See http://www.upwork.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
24 See http://www.upwork.com/about/(last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
25 Idem.
26 Elance offers free dispute resolution services for fi xed price jobs managed within the 
Elance platform that have funds still held in an escrow or released from the escrow with-
in the past 30 days. See http://help.elance.com/entries/34320-Dispute-Assistance-for-
Fixed-Price-Jobs (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
 Freelancer allows any of its users to fi le a dispute against another user, as long as the proj-
ect has a related milestone payment. See http://www.freelancer.com/faq/topic.
php?id=25 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). Upwork allows its users to fi le disputes for both 
fixed-fee and hourly contracts. See https://support.upwork.com/hc/en-us/
sections/202260418-Disputes (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
27 As of December 2016, there were more than twelve million freelancers registered in 
Upwork. See https://www.upwork.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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cost legal services to resolve disputes between other crowdsourcing work-
ers. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that a large number of legal profes-
sionals are registered in the global online job places.28
C: Social networks
CODR is well suited for resolving disputes concerning insults in social net-
work sites, such as Facebook and MySpace (cf. Schmitz, 2010, p. 230).29 The 
Internet age has opened the door to a new form of social harassment called 
“cyber-bullying” performed on social networking sites such as Facebook 
and MySpace (cf. Peters Mayer, 2008, p. 115; Ong, 2010, pp. 110-111; Sim-
monds, 2014, pp. 79-91). The insults published in these websites are open to 
anyone in the friend list of the victim.
At present, if a user is insulted by a comment of another user, the insult-
ed user needs to request Facebook to remove the insulting comment in accor-
dance with Section 3(6) of the Terms of Service of Facebook.30 Pursuant to 
Section 3(6), all users have to make a commitment not to “bully, intimidate 
or harass any user.” If Facebook finds that a message posted by a user falls 
within the scope of Section 3(6), Facebook will remove the message. How-
ever, it may happen that Facebook has the opinion that a message does not 
fall within the meaning of Section 3(6) despite of the fact that the message is 
considered as an insult by the person mentioned in the message. For exam-
ple, Hofer and Torricelli (2009) comment a case when nurses posted online 
pictures of hospitalised patients together with ironic comments. The pictures 
provoked harsh protest in the public opinion as well as strong reactions from 
the employer and public authorities. Despite the strong opposition of the 
users of social networks, ironic comments such as “You are beautiful” may 
not be regarded by the administrators of social networks as insults.
By allowing the users of social networks to resolve disputes concerning 
disputes through CODR procedures, the operators of social network web-
sites will provide the insulted persons with one more option – a CODR pro-
cedure that will be composed from users of the social networks. The peer 
community element will create an atmosphere of trust and respect in the 
procedure (see Schmitz, 2010, p. 213).
28 For example, on 13 December 2014, there were 9906 freelancers registered in Elance as 
providers of legal services. See https://www.elance.com/r/contractors/cat-legal/p-5 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
29 Facebook has already implemented a system allowing users of Facebook applications 
and developers of such applications to communicate regarding disputes. For more infor-
mation on the procedure, see https://developers.facebook.com/docs/games_pay-
ments/fulfi llment/disputes#updatedisputestatus (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). The proce-
dure is ODR as no crowd is involved in it. Since (1) many disputes may not be resolved 
by the current facilitative dispute resolution and (2) the use of internal human resources 
for the resolution of such disputes may be a signifi cant fi nancial burden for Facebook, the 
procedure may soon be transformed in an adjudicatory CODR procedure (similar to the 
ECRF) which will provide defi nitive solutions at no cost or low cost.
30 The Terms of Service of Facebook is available at https://www.facebook.com/legal/
terms (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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D: Virtual worlds
CODR seems to be an appropriate type for the dispute resolution process in 
virtual worlds31, such as Second Life32, There33, and Active Worlds34, which are 
populated by millions of “residents”, i.e., individuals who direct their ava-
tars in an essentially limitless number of interactions with other residents 
in the three-dimensional worlds (cf. Larson, 2010; Gavrilova and Monwar, 
2013, p. 114). The term avatar refers to the digital representation of a human 
being in a virtual world (see Damer and Hinrichs, 2014, p. 18).
At present, the virtual worlds do not have dispute resolution for resolv-
ing mechanisms between the citizens of those worlds. Thus, Section 6 of the 
Terms of Service governing Second Life states the following.
“We are not responsible or liable for the conduct or content of any user. We 
reserve the right, but not the obligation, to monitor or become involved in dis-
putes between you and other users.”35
The “Safety FAQs” published by There states that, if a user has a problem 
with another user, he can “instantly cut off all communication with another 
avatar.”36 The website of Active Worlds states the following:
“We can’t settle land disputes, remove unwanted objects, OR CLEAN UP 
ABANDONED buildings.”37
Here CODR may be a solution. CODR does promise to provide the citizens 
of the virtual worlds with an effective method to resolve their disputes. The 
solution is based on the fact that the members of the virtual communities, 
who act as a third neutral party in a CODR procedure, will have knowledge 
about the unique issues involved in virtual transactions, such as selling or 
exchanging a virtual property (cf. Schmitz, 2010, pp. 230 and p. 232; Fair-
field, 2008, pp. 429-433). The main idea is that virtual property is substan-
tially different from physical property (see Glushko, 2014, p. 512) by being a 
collection of bytes that a machine reads and converts into an image. More-
over, being members of the virtual communities, the citizens of the virtual 
worlds may be incentivized to participate in CODR by invoking their sense 
31 The virtual world is an interactive computer simulation which lets its participants see, 
hear, use, and even modify the simulated objects in the computer generated environ-
ment. See Barfi eld, 2006, p. 649.
32 Second Life, http://www.secondlife.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
33 There, http://www.there.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
34 Active Worlds, http://www.activeworlds.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
35 The Terms of Service governing Second Life is available at http://www.lindenlab.com/
tos (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
36 See the “Safety FAQs” of There available at http://www.prod.there.com/info/whatis-
there/safety/faq (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
37 See http://www.activeworlds.com/help/aw43/document.php?building (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2017).
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of service to the community. Here we explicitly note that the CODR proce-
dures in virtual worlds may not use financial and other incentives.
The existing ODR procedures in virtual worlds can serve as a starting 
point for the design of their CODR counterparts. For example, the virtual 
infrastructure (e.g., virtual buildings, virtual lamps, virtual tables, and virtual 
chairs) of the arbitration center in Second Life created by the Portuguese gov-
ernment can be easily used for resolving disputes through CODR procedures.
Figure 16. A virtual arbitration room of the arbitration center created by the Portuguese 
government in Second life
Figure 16 displays a screenshot of a virtual arbitration room of the arbitra-
tion center created by the Portuguese government in Second life. In the arbi-
tration room, we see participants and audience in an arbitration process, vir-
tual furniture that is used by audience and the participants in the arbitration 
process, and virtual lamps, which lighten the arbitration room. Currently 
nothing happens. There are several events that can occur. We mention three 
of them. First, the arbiter may ask questions to the parties. Second, the par-
ties may present their cases to the arbiter. Third, the arbiter may pronounce 
the arbitration award.
E: Disputes in online games
Online games may generate a number of disputes, e.g., disputes related to 
virtual property (virtual weapons, virtual soccer players, virtual coins, etc.) 
and disputes concerning inappropriate online gaming behavior (cf. Barker, 
2012; cf. Camner, 2014, p. 6). CODR is suitable for such disputes as their 
resolution often requires specific knowledge about gaming matters, which 
non-players may lack.
To our knowledge, League of Legends is the first online game which 
includes a CODR procedure for resolving disputes. The CODR procedure, 
named League of Legends Tribunal, allows players to report behavior that 
violates the game’s community guidelines. Players who choose to partic-
ipate in the Tribunal receive randomly assigned cases, to which they can 
assign one of two solutions, namely, “punish” and “pardon”. It should be 
noted that jurors participating in the tribunal have a “justice rating”, which 
can be reduced or increased depending on the consistency of their votes 
with the other jurors (Camner, 2014, p. 6).
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F:  Online disputes submitted to jury-based litigation processes
By using CODR, public courts can reorganize their jury-based litigation pro-
cesses for resolving online disputes in such a way as to (1) make them more 
cost-efficient and (2) ensure that jurors have the skills necessary for resolv-
ing online disputes.
To make jury-based litigation processes more cost-efficient, CODR can (1) 
automatically shortlist jurors from a list of jurors willing to participate in the 
procedure, (2) enable disputants to remotely interview the shortlisted jurors 
and select a number of them, and (3) allow the selected jurors to participate 
in the procedure remotely. Thus, CODR may reduce trial expenses related to 
interviewing, selecting, and convening jurors to be conducted remotely.
To ensure that the jurors have skills required for the resolution of online 
disputes, CODR can include a comprehensive online test related to the dis-
puted matter. By way of illustration, to pass the test, the jurors may need to 
perform various online operations, e.g., creating online accounts on soft-
ware applications related to the dispute, conducting online transactions in 
online marketplaces, purchasing virtual property in virtual worlds.
Although, at present, there are no litigation-based CODR procedures, 
the European Small Claims Procedure (a litigation-based ODR procedure) 
demonstrates that litigation may include new forms of dispute resolution 
and, therefore, supports the speculation that litigation-based CODR proce-
dures may appear in the future.38
4.4.2 Offline Disputes
Next to online disputes we still have offline disputes. Here, CODR proce-
dures can be designed to resolve offline disputes, such as family disputes and 
personal relationships disputes. Typical examples of CODR resolving offline 
disputes are CODR procedures functioning as online opinion polls. For 
example, after examining the databases of cases published on iCourthouse, 
we found out that also offline disputes were published for resolution on 
iCourthouse. The offline disputes include, but are not limited to (1) landlord-
tenant disputes39, (2) personal injury disputes40, (3) sales of tangible goods41, 
(4) traffic disputes42, and (5) disputes related to purchase of real estates.43
It should be noted that CODR has a potential to improve the cost-effi-
ciency of jury-based litigation processes for resolution of offline disputes 
in the same way it can improve the cost-efficiency of jury-based litigation 
processes for resolution of online disputes.44
38 For more information on the European Small Claims Procedure, see Section 2.2.1.C.
39 See, for example, case No 2012-11652 published on iCourthouse.com.
40 See, for example, cases No 2008-11618 and 2007-11593 published on iCourthouse.com.
41 See, for example, case 2007-11596 published on iCourthouse.com.
42 See, for example, case 2006-11582 published on iCourthouse.com.
43 See, for example, case 2006-11578 published on iCourthouse.com.
44 The potential of CODR to improve the cost effi ciency of jury-based litigation processes 
for resolution of online disputes is discussed in Section 4.4.1(E).
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4.5 The CODR procedures
The development of CODR procedures has been completed in less than ten 
years. Still, at this moment, it is not a widely accepted procedure. Below we 
explain how CODR works, i.e., we examine the parties (4.5.1), the stages of 
CODR (4.5.2), and the characteristics of the CODR procedures (4.5.3).
4.5.1 Parties
Five parties may participate in a CODR procedure, namely, the disputants 
(P1 and P2), the third party (P3), the technology (P4), and the provider of 
the technology (P5). These five parties are examined in more detail below. 
The concept of the fourth party, the technology providing dispute resolu-
tion services, was introduced by Katsh and Rifkin (2001). The concept of the 
fifth party, the provider of the technology used for the provision of dispute 
resolution services, was introduced by Lodder (2006).
Disputants (P1 and P2)
The first two parties (P1 and P2) are the disputants. They are traditional for 
every form of dispute resolution. Disputants may act differently in different 
disputes (cf. Moffitt and Bordone, 2012). Here, we remark that, in the fol-
lowing, the complaining party P1 is also called the plaintiff and P2 is called 
the respondent. In the ECRF CODR procedure, a seller is the complaining 
person and the buyer is the respondent. In order to resolve disputes effec-
tively, dispute resolution professionals need to have an understanding of 
how disputants view themselves, the dispute, and each other (see Moffitt 
and Bordone, 2012).
Third neutral party (P3)
The third neutral party is a prominent entity in decision making, whether it 
is in court cases or in dispute resolutions outside the court. There are three 
types of CODR procedures, viz. a pure CODR, a mixed CODR, and a CODR 
that uses negotiation to resolve disputes. Below we briefly describe them for 
the purpose of classifying them later.45.
In a pure CODR, the third neutral party (P3) is the crowd (see Figure 
17a). A pure CODR procedure is a procedure in which the third party is 
composed by the crowd only.
In a mixed CODR, the third party (P3) is composed by (a) the crowd and 
(b) appointed mediators or adjudicators (see Figure 17b). A mixed CODR 
procedure is a procedure where the third party in the process of dispute 
45 For more information on pure CODR, mixed CODR, and CODR resolving disputes 
through negotiation, please see Subsection 4.5.4.
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resolution is a combination of members of the crowd and appointed profes-
sional arbitrators, judges, or mediators.46
In CODR that uses negotiation as a mechanism for resolving disputes, 
the crowd only assists the parties, but it is not a party in the dispute resolu-
tion process (see Figure 17c). We explicitly remark that in this case technol-
ogy fully replaces the position of the third neutral party.
17a 17b 17c
Figure 17. Parties in CODR procedures
The technology (P4)
The technology is regarded as a fourth party because of its indepen-
dent input to the management of the dispute (cf. Katsh and Rifkin, 2001, 
pp. 93-117; Moore, 2014, p. 79). Clearly, in this case, we do not give the tech-
nology the position of a neutral party as we did above in P3, last line. Under 
the current circumstances, the fourth party may complete several tasks, such 
as organising information, sending automatic responses, shaping the writ-
ing communications in a more polite and constructive manner, e.g., block-
ing foul language, monitoring performance, scheduling meetings, clarify-
ing interests and priorities (see Katsh and Rifkin, 2001, p. 129). The concept 
46 It should be noted that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the 
participation of a panel with mixed membership (e.g., a judge and lay judges) is not con-
sidered a violation of the right of fair trial stated in Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). See the ECtHR case Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. 
Belgium (1981) 4 EHRR 1. So, mixed CODR procedures may comply with the above-men-
tioned right of fair trial.
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of fourth party suggests that software aids can collaborate with the third 
party, but does not replace it (cf. Katsh, 2012). Obviously, the technology 
used for dispute resolution can be highly diverse (cf. Moore, 2014, p. 79). For 
example, the technology may include software allowing electronic voting, 
face-to-face videoconferencing, and web chat.
It should be noted that designers of CODR procedures can use the tech-
nology to: (1) to implement certain values in CODR procedures; (2) achieve 
certain goals of CODR procedures; and (3) enhance the qualities of CODR 
procedures. Below, we discuss these three possibilities in more detail.
Regarding the first possibility, it should be noted that values embedded 
in technology may be better protected than values embedded in legal rules. 
This is because, in comparison with legal rules, technology-implemented 
restrictions are enforced directly (cf. Lessig, 2006, p. 110). For example, by 
embedding privacy principles in the technological design of CODR plat-
forms, the designers of such procedures may integrate privacy values in 
them, without the need to rely on the enforcement of legal rules by law 
enforcement authorities.47
Pertaining to the second possibility, technology can be used for achiev-
ing goals of CODR procedures. For instance, by enabling the technology to 
record all information collected during the dispute resolution process, the 
designers of CODR procedures will achieve at least two goals, namely, the 
accountability of the third neutral party and providing users of the platform 
with the opportunity to learn about the operation of the platform (Rabinov-
ich-Einy, 2009, pp. 1-2).
In relation to the third possibility, the technology can enhance the quali-
ties of CODR procedures. To illustrate, we discuss below how technology 
can enhance two qualities of CODR procedures, namely, speed and fairness. 
The technology can make a CODR procedure even faster by automatically 
aggregating the contributions of the members of the crowd and rendering 
final decisions based on the aggregated contributions. Without such techno-
logical features, the disputants will need to aggregate the contributions by 
themselves, which can delay the resolution of their disputes. The technology 
can enhance the fairness of CODR procedures by ensuring that these proce-
dures comply with various fairness elements, including the elements of our 
interpretation of procedural fairness.48 For instance, the independence of the 
third neutral party can be achieved by technological tools which (1) detect 
relationships between the disputants and the members of the crowd and (2) 
disallow members of the crowd who lack independence from participating 
in CODR cases.49
47 The idea of implementing privacy in the design of IT systems was initially proposed by 
Cavoukian in 1990s (cf. Cavoukin, 2009).
48 Section 7 contains various proposals on how technology can ennsure compliance with 
elements of our interpretation of procedural fairness.
49 For a more detailed discussion on how the technology can be used for ensuring indepen-
dence of the members of the crowd, see Subsection 7.1.2.
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The provider of the technology (P5)
The provider of the technology is depicted on the top of the pyramid as 
a fifth party because it delivers the technology that is used for resolving 
disputes to the fourth party (see Bol, 2005, pp. 23-29). The fifth party can be 
either an individual or an institution (cf. Poblet, 2012, p. 15). The concept of 
fifth party has been developed to explain the liability of the provider of the 
technology in relation to (1) the third party and / or (2) the parties having 
a dispute as well as (3) the possibile contractual relationships between the 
provider of the technology and the other parties. The liability of the provid-
er of the technology may arise from a technical failure resulting in the inter-
ruption of videoconferences or chat sessions. The contractual relationships 
between the provider of the technology and the parties may include, for 
example, relationships concerning the availability and the type of the tech-
nology used for dispute resolution. Although the provider of the technology 
is not a topic of our research, it is wise to understand that the provider may 
have some influence on the course of the dispute. The influence can even be 
exercised beyond the knowledge and observation of the provider.
4.5.2 Stages of CODR
Below, we provide an overview of the CODR procedure from the begin-
ning to the end. We will adapt the framework provided by Katsh and Rifkin 
(2001) and implement the ideas taken from the Malone framework.50 The 
Katsh and Rifkin framework distinguishes four different stages for the ODR 
procedure, namely, (1) filling the complaint, (2) notifying the respondent, 
(3) reaching the decision, and (4) enforcing the decision (Katsh and Rifkin, 
2001). We follow the stages, but clearly deviate from the description of the 
stages as given by Katsh and Rifkin (2001). For our description we will use 
ideas from Malone’s framework supplemented by our own observations 
and ideas. Where we adopted ideas related to the description of the stages 
by Katsh and Rifkin or the Malone framework we will mention it explicitly.
Stage 1:  Filing the complaint
The first stage of the CODR process is the filing of a complaint. The elec-
tronic complaint form is the first interaction between the participants P1 and 
P2 and the dispute resolution provider P3. As Katsh and Rifkin (2001, p. 94) 
pointed out, every such interaction should be an opportunity to promote 
convenience and build trust. What does this mean in the context of CODR?
With regard to the convenience of the complaint, it means that special 
technological skills or equipment should not be required from the dispu-
tants to fill their complaints. For instance, the complainant should not be 
50 Since the Malone framework classifi es crowdsourcing applications and CODR proce-
dures are crowdsourcing applications, an empirical framework of CODR based on 
empirical studies may signifi cantly overlap with the Malone framework. To avoid such 
an overlap, we decided not to develop a framework based on empirical studies.
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obliged to embed fonts in the complaint because it may require special 
skills.51 For example, in this context, it should be pointed out that the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) accepts only patent applica-
tions containing embedded fonts.52 As a result, online patent applications 
are occasionally rejected by the USPTO (Pressman, 2012, p. 298).
The filling in of the complaint should require only basic computer skills, 
such as using the mouse and the keyboard as well as running and closing 
basic software applications. This is because the differences in digital profi-
ciencies create inequality (see Ragnedda and Muschert, 2013, p. 2). People-
Claim is an example of a CODR platform using a simple online complaint 
form (see Figure 18). In Figure 18, we see that the complaint form used by 
PeopleClaim provides the complainant with options from which to select 
the type of entity of the respondent (business, individual, professional, gov-
ernment agency, or other) and the relationship of the complainant to the 
respondent (e.g., customer/client, patient, employee, tenant, party to an 
agreement). Such options facilitate the filling in of the complaint.
Figure 18. A complaint form used by PeopleClaim
We note that making a complaint is further convenient for the complaining 
party if the cost for filling in is low. In this regard, it should be noted that all 
existing CODR procedures functioning as online opinion polls and arbitra-
tion tribunals rendering self-enforceable decisions do not charge the parties 
fees for receiving dispute resolution services. Yet, the complaint should not 
only be easy to fill in, but it should also be easily understandable by the 
crowd. If the crowd is composed of laypersons, the complaint should be 
directly comprehensible to all members of the crowd. Otherwise, there is 
a risk that the crowd would not understand the complaint and, as a result, 
could make a wrong decision.
51 The term “font embedding” refers to a method of including fonts in documents. By 
embedding a font with a document, the creator of the document will ensure the text will 
appear correctly on the computers of other users. For more information on “font embed-
ding”, see the following webpage created by Microsoft: http://www.microsoft.com/
typography/embed/embed.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
52 See a webpage “20 of the Most Frequently Asked Questions from Customers” published 
on http://www.uspto.gov/patents/ebc/top_questions_ebc.jsp (last visited Jan. 3, 2017) 
by the United States Trademark and Patent Offi ce.
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To build trust in a complaint procedure, a CODR system should provide 
information at regular intervals about what happens in CODR (cf. Katsh 
and Rifkin, 2001, p. 94; Cortés, 2010, p. 78). Moreover, similarly to the infor-
mation systems used by public organisations for providing services to the 
public, other factors, such as the availability, confidentiality, and non-repu-
diation should be considered in order to increase the level of trust in the 
CODR systems (cf. Kritis, 2006, p. 18; Moffitt and Bordonne, 2012).
Stage 2:  Notifying the respondent
The second stage of the CODR process is notifying the respondent (i.e., 
the person who is addressed by the complaint). But who should inform 
the respondent? There are two options, namely, (1) a CODR platform that 
is designed in such a way that it automatically sends a notification to the 
respondent’s email provided by plaintiff, or (2) an internal messaging sys-
tem that sends a message to the online profile of the respondent. The second 
option applies only to cases when both parties are members of the same 
online community.
The first variant for notifying the respondent is used in most of the pres-
ent CODR procedures.53
The second variant was used only by the ECRF. If a dispute has arisen 
from a transaction related to some online community, then sending a mes-
sage to the internal community account of the respondent seemed a more 
reliable way for notifying the respondent than sending a notification to an 
email address provided by the plaintiff.
We believe that the use of an internal messaging system will provide the 
respondent with more trust in the notification. If the respondent receives the 
notification to his email address (provided by the plaintiff), he may consider 
it as a scam. For example, in the past, scammers sent an official email that 
appeared to be from eBay, to bidders in eBay who lost an auction. The email 
stated that the sellers gave them a second chance to win the auction (cf. 
McAdams, 2014, p. 197). In the email, the bidders were requested to send 
their credit card details to the scammers. If the bidders agreed to do so, the 
scammers used the data to commit crimes. In order to prevent its users from 
such scams, eBay uses an internal messaging system, called eBay Messages, 
to send notifications informing the bidders that they have a second chance 
to win an auction (cf. McAdams, 2014, p. 197).
Stage 3:  Reaching the decision
The third stage of the CODR procedure is reaching the decision. Two ques-
tions need to be answered with regard to how the crowd may lead the 
CODR process, similar to the traditional mediators and adjudicators, and 
will subsequently reach a decision. The two questions are as follows: (A:) 
53 Sidetaker.com and iCourthouse notify the respondent by an email provided by the plain-
tiff.
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How can the crowd ask questions to the parties? (B:) Should the decision in 
CODR be taken after deliberations?
A:  How can the crowd ask questions to the parties?
For the question “How can the crowd ask questions to the parties?”, there is 
definitely a way which allows every member of the crowd to ask the parties 
questions. However, if the crowd contains many people, allowing everyone 
to ask questions can make the procedure extremely slow and burdensome. 
Such a procedure will not promote convenience and trust (cf. Katsh and 
Rifkin, 2001, p. 94). Assume that every member of a crowd (consisting of 
100) people asks questions to the parties, then answering to every question 
will take a large amount of time, especially if the procedure allows rebuttal 
and surrebuttal. Consequently, there is a relation between the building block 
“the crowd” and the building block “the organisation structure and process” 
of the framework of CODR built on the basis of the Malone framework. 
More particularly, the larger the number of the crowd, the slower the CODR 
process when allowing deliberations.
Below, we mention three approaches to a solution of the problem related 
to the large amount of time required for conducting deliberations amongst 
the members of a large crowd.
A first approach to this problem is to ask the parties only to put forward 
questions supported by the majority of the crowd. However, in this case, 
the questions will not reflect the opinions of the entire group. Yet, bring-
ing many different views on a problem increases the likelihood that a solu-
tion will be found (cf. Page, 2008).
The second approach is to allow only some randomly chosen members 
of the crowd to ask questions. This idea seems plausible, but the small group 
of people entitled to ask questions will not reflect the opinions of a diverse 
crowd.
The third approach is to allow some of the members of the crowd which 
best reflect the diversity of the group to ask questions. To find the appropri-
ate members of the crowd, a questionary can be given to the crowd and, on 
the basis of the results, the CODR platform can automatically establish a 
representative group. 
B:  Should the decision in CODR be taken after deliberations?
If CODR allows deliberation, group polarisation can occur and lead to irra-
tional aggregated decisions which will not promote trust and convenience 
(see Sunstein, 2009; Katsh and Rifkin, 2001, p. 94). Group polarisation means 
that during deliberation people are likely to move towards a more extreme 
point in the direction to which the group members were originally inclined 
(see Sunstein, 2009, p. 60). Group polarisation appears because of two rea-
sons (cf. Abelson, 2014, p. 28). First, each group member may be exposed to 
potentially new arguments, which support the shared initial position of all 
group members. Second, the group members may try to position themselves 
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more extremely on the issue than their peers in order to present themselves 
as being more pure on the issue (Abelson, 2014, p. 28).
If CODR does not allow deliberations, the opinion of a minority of the 
crowd will not be taken into account at all by the majority of the crowd. As 
a result, members of the minority will not be able to present important con-
clusions that can otherwise change the opinion of the majority. Similar to a 
dictatorship regime where the opposition does not have the right to present 
its views, this seems to be a repression of the minority by the majority.
Hence, there is not a straightforward answer to the question of whether 
a decision in CODR should be made after deliberation. If the designers of 
CODR procedures would like to allow deliberation, they need to put mea-
sures to reduce the chance of occurrence of group polarisation. This can be 
done, for instance, by ensuring that the members of the crowd have diverse 
expertise. As Merchant (2010, p. 125) states, such diversity “will provide a 
broader set of perspectives, which, in turn, reduces the potential for mind-
less conformity.” We have already discussed the benefits of diverse crowd in 
Subsection 4.2.2 related to the first building block “the crowd” of the frame-
work of CODR built on the basis of the Malone framework.
If the designers of CODR procedures do not want to allow deliberation, 
they will need to ensure that the opinion of a minority of the crowd will 
be taken into account by the majority of the crowd. This can be done, for 
example, by collecting the pre-decision dissenting opinions and providing 
them to the majority of the crowd.
Stage 4:  Enforcing the decision
The fourth stage of a CODR procedure is the enforcement of the decision. 
In this regard, it must be said that the outcome of a CODR procedure can 
be either a recommendation or a decision. If it is a recommendation, obviously 
there is no need for enforcement.
At present, the decisions rendered by CODR procedures are not legally 
binding and can be enforced only through private authorities. In the Neth-
erlands, Jongbloed and Nakad-Weststrate (2010) developed and advocated 
a new procedure in which the notaries play an important role. With the help 
of the notaries an enforcement procedure might be possible. We consider 
this procedure beyond the scope of our research. We recommend the reader 
to follow the development with interest.
Moreover, software that the online communities use offers unprecen-
dented possibilities for automatic self-enforcement (cf. Van Kokswijk, 2010, 
p. 242). A self-enforcement mechanism is a mechanism that does not rely 
upon the public legal system (see Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz, 2004, 
p. 120). Instead, it relies on the enforcement of a private entity, such as a 
company or an organisation.
Self-enforcement can be enacted by software operations affecting the 
parties. We provide two examples. The first example is the enforcement of 
the decisions rendered under the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolu-
tion Policy (UDRP) by the registrar of the disputed domain name who per-
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forms software operations leading to cancelation, transfer or other changes 
to domain name registrations.54 The second example is the ECRF where the 
decision of the jury is enforced through software operations conducted by 
an eBay Customer Service Representative, who, if appropriate, removes the 
feedback (cf. Van den Herik and Dimov, 2011a, p. 247). The advantage of 
self-enforcement is that the cases are enforced immediately and do not drag 
on without a resolution (cf. Thomson and Sherr, 2012, p. 34). The disadvan-
tage of self-enforcement is that the pre-enforcement situation can be revert-
ed back by a court decision. The reason is that self-enforceable measures are 
binding only to entities that have committed to abide by the rules allowing 
self-enforcement.
Self-enforcement is a feasible option for CODR procedures resolving 
disputes in online communities because it will underline the autonomy of 
these communities. An involvement of the government in the online dis-
pute resolution process, including the enforcement of the decision, may 
be undesirable by the members of online communities and accepted as an 
intrusion. Consequently, in online communities, self-enforced CODR pro-
cedures may be a more trusted method of dispute resolution than CODR 
procedures enforced by the government. It is worth mentioning that ODR 
procedures, including CODR procedures, need to promote trust in order to 
operate effectively (cf. Katsh and Rifkin 2001). Thus, the promotion of trust 
is an important aspect not only in relation to the enforcement of the deci-
sions, but to all stages of the fourth building block (organisation structure 
and process) of the framework of CODR built on the basis of the Malone 
framework.
4.5.3 Characteristics of CODR procedures
In order to provide an adequate understanding of CODR, we use six criteria 
to identify certain characteristics of the three types of CODR procedures, 
namely, online opinion polls, online mock jury systems, and arbitration tri-
bunals rendering self-enforceable decisions. The criteria were selected based 
on a review of documents published by CODR providers. Important sources 
are: (a) Rules of Procedures and (b) documents containing answers to Fre-
quently Asked Questions (FAQ).55 The characteristics reveal (1) the specifics 
of the different types of CODR procedures related to the dispute resolution 
54 A registrar is a company or organisation that is involved in registering domain names on 
the Internet. See Stafford, 2008, p. 20. It should be noted that each registrar has concluded 
a Registrar Accreditation Agreement with the ICANN obliging the registrar to enforce 
UDRP decisions. The Registrar Accreditation Agreement is available on https://www.
icann.org/resources/pages/approved-with-specs-2013-09-17-en (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
55 We reviewed the documentation related to: Allrise.com (www.allrise.com); eBay’s Com-
munity Review Forum (the archived webpage is available at https://web.archive.org/
web/20110227000536/http://ebaycourt.com/cc/courtindex.jsf); eJury (www.ejury.com); 
iCourthouse (www.icourthouse.com); PeopleClaim (www.peopleclaim.com); Sidetaker.
com (www.sidetaker.com); VirtualJury (www.virtualjury.com) (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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mechanism (Criterion 1) and (2) the specifics of the third party participating 
in the procedures (Criteria 2-6).
The criteria are as follows.56
Criterion 1: the mechanism used for resolving disputes.
Criterion 2: eligibility to participate in CODR as a member of the crowd.
Criterion 3: the number of members of the crowd: fixed or not fixed.
Criterion 4:  composition of the third neutral party in the process of dispute 
resolution.
Criterion 5: use of deliberations between the members of the crowd.
Criterion 6:  the number of members of the crowd: a small or a large group 
of people.
Below, we discuss the six criteria. We note that the third and the sixth criteria 
are related to the number of the members of the crowd. At the end of this 
subsection, we present the characteristics of the three types of CODR proce-
dures in Table 2.
Criterion 1: The mechanism used for resolving disputes
The present CODR procedures use negotiation as a mechanism for resolv-
ing disputes. By providing the disputants with jury trial-like decisions, 
the online opinion polls and the online mock juries allow the disputants 
to understand their BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). 
Allowing the crowd to give its opinion on the BATNA during the negotiation 
proceedings may increase the chance of a settlement between the parties. 
The reason is that the crowd’s opinion may remove any unrealistic optimis-
tic expectations with regard to other mechanisms of dispute resolution, such 
as arbitration and litigation (cf. Lodder and Zeleznikow, 2010, pp. 41-43).
The eBay’s Community Court, which is the only example of arbitration 
tribunals rendering self-enforceable decisions, resolved disputes through a 
non-binding form of arbitration (cf. Stong, 2000, p. 140).57 In comparison to 
56 These six criteria were chosen because they will reveal important procedural characteris-
tics of CODR procedures, namely, the mechanism for resolving disputes (Criterion 1) and 
the nature of the third neutral party (Criteria 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).  The mechanism for resolving 
disputes is an important procedural characteric of every dispute resolution as it serves 
for classifi cation of dispute resolution procedures in facilitative and adjudicative. While 
facilitative dispute resolution may be appropriate in the early phases of a confl ict, adjudi-
catory dispute resolution may provide a solution if the confl ict is aggravated and cannot 
be resolved by the parties themselves (Musson, 2013, p. 56). The nature of the third neu-
tral party is especially important in the fi eld of CODR because one of the main differenc-
es between CODR and other dispute resolution procedures, including ODR, lies in the 
third neutral party. More specifi cally, while the third neutral party in traditional dispute 
resolution is composed by judges, arbitrators, or mediators, the third neutral party in 
CODR is composed by a group of people, which is called “crowd”.
57 It should be noted that it is disputable whether the non-binding arbitration can be called 
arbitration. For the purpose of this study, we will accept that the non-binding arbitration is 
a form of arbitration. For more information about this dispute, see Mironova, 2010, p. 103.
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the binding arbitration, the decisions rendered in the non-binding form of 
arbitration are not enforceable by state authorities.
At present, there are no CODR procedures resolving disputes through 
mediation and litigation. However, there are proposals for replacing the tra-
ditional juries in civil litigation procedures by cyberjuries, which would be 
a form of CODR (cf. Marder, 2005). For example, cyberjurors may replace 
the traditional juries in civil litigation (cf. Marder, 2005, p. 191). Pursuant to 
our definitions of CODR and crowdsourcing, dispute resolution procedures 
using cyberjuries should be regarded as CODR procedures only if the cyber-
jurors participate in the dispute resolution process through an open call.
Criterion 2:  Eligibility requirements that the crowd should satisfy in order to 
participate in CODR
The eligibility is based on requirements, which the crowd should satisfy in 
order to participate in CODR. We observe that CODR procedures may or 
may not require the parties to satisfy certain specific requirements to par-
ticipate in CODR. While all of the online opinion polls do not require the 
parties to satisfy any specific requirements, the online mock juries and the 
arbitration tribunals rendering self-enforceable decisions require the parties 
to satisfy such requirements.58 The reason for adding specific requirements 
to participating in a CODR procedure is to gather a crowd that has appro-
priate knowledge for resolving the dispute. Below, we examine the specific 
requirements that the crowd in the existing online mock juries and the ECRF 
should satisfy in order to participate in CODR.
Both eJuries and TrialJuries require the jurors to satisfy the six quali-
fications required for actual jury service in the United States.59 These six 
requirements are:
(1) being at age of at least 18 years;
(2) having a U.S. citizenship;
(3) having sound mind and good moral character;
(4) be able to read and write;
(5) have never been convicted of a felony; and
58 For example, iCourthouse user agreement available at www.i-courthouse.com/main.
taf?area1_id=front&area2_id=useragreement (last visited Jan. 3, 2017) does not mention 
any specifi c requirements that the members of the crowd should satisfy in order to par-
ticipate in CODR. The same is valid for the Terms of Use of PeopleClaim available at 
www.peopleclaim.com/Terms.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). Nevertheless, the online 
opinion polls require the disputants to meet certain general requirements included in the 
legal documents of their websites. Such general requirements may include, but are not 
limited to, registration of an account, providing correct registration data, agreeing with 
the legal documents (e.g., terms of use, privacy policies, user agreements) of the online 
opinion polls.
59 See the official webpage of eJury available at www.ejury.com/jurors_learn_about.
html#qual (last visited Jan. 3, 2017) and FAQ page of TrialJuries available at www.trialju-
ries.com/trialjuries/faq.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
102 Chapter 4
(6) not be under indictment or other legal accusation of misdemeanor theft 
or felony theft or any felony charge.60
JuryTest requires the jurors to attest to the fact that they are not lawyers or 
representatives of insurance companies.61 To become OnlineVerdict jurors, 
the members of the crowd must reside in a venue selected by the person 
who posted the online mock case.62
On top of the six requirements above, the ECRF requires the jurors to 
satisfy commulatively the following three requirements.63 These three 
requirements vary depending on whether the juror is a seller or a buyer. A 
seller using eBay India was allowed to participate in the open call if he: (1) 
was registered on eBay India for six months; (2) had 20 feedback scores as 
a seller with an overall rating of 97% positive feedback; and (3) completed 
at least one transaction on eBay as a buyer and one as a seller. A buyer was 
allowed to participate in the open call if he: (1) was registered on eBay India 
for six months; (2) had 10 feedback scores with overall rating of 97%; and (3) 
completed at least 10 buyer transactions.
Criterion 3: The number of members of the crowd: fixed or not fixed
The number of members of the crowd in CODR procedures can be either 
fixed or not fixed. The number of members of the crowd in online opinion 
polls is not fixed. The reason is that such procedures allow an unlimited 
number of people to vote within a defined or undefined period of time. 
Sidetaker is an example of a CODR procedure allowing an unlimited num-
ber of people to vote within a defined period of time. iCourthouse is an 
example of a CODR procedure allowing an unlimited number of people 
to vote within an undefined period of time. In iCourthouse, decisions are 
never rendered and one can vote in a case posted a long time ago. The ECRF 
was the only example of a CODR procedure with a fixed number of crowd 
members. In the ECRF, the disputes were resolved by a fixed number of 21 
jurors. If the first 11 people voted in favour of one of the parties, the case was 
closed and a decision rendered.
Criterion 4: Composition of a third neutral party in the process of dispute resolution
All past and present CODR procedures are pure CODR procedures, i.e., 
the third neutral party is composed of crowd only. However, in the future, 
mixed CODR procedures may be created. In such procedures, the third 
neutral party could be composed of a combination of (1) appointed profes-
60 See the offi cial webpage of eJury available at www.ejury.com/jurors_learn_about.html#
qual (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
61 See the webpage of JuryTest that can be used for registration of jurors. Available at www.
jurytest.net/index.cfm?action=signupjur (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
62 See Juror’s FAQ available on www.onlineverdict.com/jurors/juror-faqs (last visited Jan. 3,
2017).
63 We give the requirements for eBay India because the ECRF was used for resolution of 
disputes arising out of transactions completed through eBay India (cf. Miles, P., 2009).
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sional arbitrators, judges, and mediators and (2) jurors from the crowd.64 
For instance, the third neutral party can be composed of 3 appointed arbitra-
tors and 30 cyberjurors chosen by an open call. The appointed arbitrators, 
judges, and mediators can (a) instruct the juries on the law before they start 
their deliberations, (b) answer questions that the jury might have during 
its deliberations, and (c) suggest to the online jurors that they should take 
the vote on the basis of “evidence-driven deliberations” (cf. Marder, 2006, 
p. 266). The appointed neutrals can also ensure that the jury will not con-
duct its deliberations free from professional observation. Moreover, they can 
avoid the formation of coalitions. A mixed CODR would exist, for example, 
if the traditional juries are replaced by cyberjuries who are chosen by a local 
community through an open call.
Criterion 5: Use of deliberations between the members of the crowd
All past and present CODR procedures disallow deliberations. The lack of 
deliberations has certain advantages. After examining 3048 jury-eligible 
citizens in Arizona, USA, the researchers Schkade, Sunstein, and Kahneman 
(1999, p. 33) found that deliberating juries tend to generate, with respect to 
decisions concerning monetary compensation for punitive damages, greater 
unpredictability than is present in the judgements of the jurors who com-
pose them (Schkade, Sunstein, Kahneman, 1999, p. 4). The deliberations 
increased unpredictability in the particular sense that the judgement of one 
group of six (or twelve) jurors was highly unlikely to predict the judgement 
of another group of six (or twelve) jurors.
Criterion 6: The number of members of the crowd: a small or a large group of people
The crowd in CODR procedures can be either a small group of people or a 
large group of people. In order to provide a clear distinction between these 
two groups, we arbitrarily accept that a crowd of 30 and more individuals 
is a large group of people and a crowd of 29 and less individuals is a small 
group of people.
Because online opinion polls allow an unlimited number of people to 
vote within a defined or undefined period of time, the crowd participating in 
a case can be either a small group of people or a large group of people. The 
crowd of the online mock jury systems can also be either a small group of 
people or a large group of people. An example of such an online mock jury 
system is OnlineVerdict where the number of jurors participating in a case 
can be either 25 or 50.65 The disputes in the ECRF were resolved by a small 
group of people, more particularly, the number of jurors reads 21.
64 Such procedures will resemble the U.S. court system which is composed from profes-
sional judges and jurors elected from the local population (Von Mehren and Murray, 
2007, pp. 206 - 227).
65 See attorney’s FAQ available at https://www.onlineverdict.com/attorneys/faqs/ (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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In relation to CODR procedures in which the crowd is a large group 
of people, we remark that such a large group may, in the future, consist of 
thousands of individuals. From the chess game Kasparov versus the World, it 
can be seen that a discussion concerning a certain future move decision is 
executable even amongst 50,000 people located in different countries around 
the world. In this game, which was played in 1999 over the Internet, Garry 
Kasparov met the World Team which took its decisions, after a consultation 
in an online forum, on the basis of a plurality vote (see Nalimov, Wirth, 
and Haworth, 1999, p. 199; Fadul, 2008, p. 99). The decisions of such a large 
group in relation to a public dispute may be considered by policy makers. 
There are already cases where the online opinions of a large number of 
people initiated legislative proposals. For instance, the U.S. Unlocking Con-
sumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act was a response to an official 
online petition, which collected more than 100,000 signatures in favour of 
the legalisation of unlocking of mobile phones (cf. Dimov, 2013). The White 
House advisor Jeff Zients called the Act an “example of democracy at its 
best: bipartisan congressional action in direct response to a call to action 
from the American people” (see Dimov, 2013).
However, the members of the crowd in a large group can have several 
difficulties when communicating with each other in “real” time. Allowing 
hundreds of people to express their opinion will make the procedure very 
long. 



















– open to anyone: V
– open to people who satisfy 
specific requirements: X
– open to anyone: X
– open to people who satisfy 
specific requirements: V
– open to anyone: X




– fixed number: X
– non-fixed number: V
– fixed number: V
– non-fixed number: X
– fixed number: V
– non-fixed number: X
Criterion 4: 
Composition
– crowd only: V
– crowd and appointed 
dispute resolution 
professionals: X
– crowd only: V
– crowd and appointed 
dispute resolution 
professionals: X
– crowd only: V






– allowing deliberation: X
– disallowing deliberation: V
– allowing deliberation: X
– disallowing deliberation: V
– allowing deliberation: X
– disallowing deliberation: V
Criterion 6:
The number – 
small vs large
– a small group of people: V
– a large group of people: V
– a small group of people: V
– a large group of people: V
– a small group of people: V
Table 2. The characteristics of the three types of past and present CODR procedures
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In order to solve this difficulty, large groups tend to formalise their meetings 
by setting agendas and following a protocol to control discussion (cf. Griffin 
and Moorhead, 2011, p. 247).
For adequate reading of Table 2, we reiterate the six criteria below.
Criterion 1: the mechanism used for resolving disputes.
Criterion 2: eligibility to participate in CODR as a member of the crowd.
Criterion 3: the number of members of the crowd: fixed or not fixed.
Criterion 4:  composition of the third neutral party in the process of dispute 
resolution.
Criterion 5: use of deliberations between the members of the crowd.
Criterion 6:  the number of members of the crowd: a small or a large group 
of people.
4.6 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we provided a framework of CODR. In particular, we adopt-
ed the Malone framework and its four building blocks. They exist in every 
CODR procedure. These building blocks are (1) the crowd, (2) incentives, (3) 
the two types of disputes that can be adequately resolved through CODR, 
and (4) the CODR procedure.
Our discussion of the building blocks of CODR started with a definition 
of the term crowd. Thus, the crowd participating in CODR is not a blurry 
concept referring to a large number of persons gathered closely together, 
but a clear concept that can be applied for the needs of a scientific analysis.
After discussing the concept of the crowd, we focused on the incen-
tives that may motivate the crowd to participate in a CODR procedure. This 
issue is important because the incentives provided to the crowd have an 
impact on the operation of a CODR procedure. A CODR procedure where 
the crowd has no incentives does not work properly. This is most prevail-
ing when a lack of sufficient members of the crowd is faced, since then a 
long delay in the resolution of the cases will occur. Our study indicated that 
the crowd can be motivated to participate in CODR because of five incen-
tives, namely, (a) sense of service to the community, (b) entertainment, (c) 
the financial remuneration, (d) the credit for the crowdsourced contribution, 
and (e) the feedback received by the members of the crowd. Each of these 
incentives can be an effective motivation for certain categories of people. For 
example, (a) the credit that the members of the crowd will gain if their con-
tributions are published may motivate academicians and law practitioners 
who want to gain popularity in their professional circles and (e) the sense of 
service to the community is an appropriate incentive in online communities, 
such as Wikipedia and eBay.
This chapter also established that both types of disputes (online and 
offline) can be adequately resolved through CODR. It was pointed out that, 
while ODR was initially used mainly to resolve offine disputes, its applica-
tion was soon extended to online disputes, and thereafter again broadened 
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in a new version to offline disputes, such as family disputes and personal 
relationships disputes. Providing a low cost and quick dispute resolution, it 
was shown that CODR is particularly appropriate for online communities, 
such as online auctions, global online job marketplaces, social networks, and 
virtual worlds. Moreover, the peer community element of CODR will create 
an atmosphere of trust and respect in the procedure amongst the members 
of the above-mentioned online communities.
Next, we focused on three aspects of the CODR procedure, namely, the 
parties, the stages, and the characteristics of CODR procedures. We found 
that five parties may participate in a CODR procedure, namely, two dispu-
tants, the third party, the technology, and the provider of the technology. 
One of the important peculiarities of CODR is related to the third party in 
the procedure. While in ODR the third party is an appointed neutral, the 
third party in CODR is essentially the crowd. Moreover, in some CODR 
platforms, the technology may play a major part. This scenario is beyond 
the scope of our research.
Pertaining to the stages, we examined four stages of CODR, namely: (1) 
filling the complaint, (2) notifying the respondent, (3) reaching the decision, 
(4) and enforcing the decision. When examining these stages, we noted that 
CODR procedures have certain peculiarities compared to ODR procedures. 
For example, if the crowd is not composed from experts (what is usually the 
case), the complaint in a CODR procedure should be written in such a way 
that it is easy to understand by the crowd.
Concerning the characteristics of CODR procedures, we used six cri-
teria to identify the characteristics of the three types of CODR procedures 
(online opinion polls, online mock jury systems, and arbitration tribunals 
rendering self-enforceable decisions). We found that these three CODR pro-
cedures share some common characteristics, but also differ in other impor-
tant aspects.
The primary claim made about our framework describing the building 
blocks of CODR is that it is useful for understanding the new aspects of 
CODR stemming from the use of crowdsourcing. The framework can be 
used not only for theoretical purposes but also for generating ideas when 
designing new CODR procedures.
By providing a framework describing the building blocks of CODR 
and analysing the differences between CODR and other dispute resolution 
schemes, we are able to answer RQ1. In summary, the answer to RQ1 reads: 
CODR differs from other dispute resolution procedures in using a crowd for 
facilitating or resolving disputes. All in all, we achieved to describe a frame-
work that contains the building blocks of CODR. This chapter applied the 
framework by Malone et al. and performed a deep analysis to find the differ-
ences and analogies between CODR and other dispute resolution schemes.
In this chapter, we move from CODR to procedural fairness because the 
future development of CODR will be largely conditioned by the degree to 
which CODR complies with the requirements of procedural fairness. We 
mention three reasons for the development. First, procedural fairness may 
affect the attractiveness of CODR (cf. Grey, 1977, p. 182; Kaplow and Shawell 
2009, p. 264). Second, procedural fairness may affect the acceptance of deci-
sions of CODR (Adler, Hensler, and Nelson, 1983; McEwen and Maiman, 
1984). Third, governmental institutions will not implement CODR proce-
dures which do not comply with certain standards of procedural fairness, 
e.g., the EU Directive on ADR.1
The exploration of fairness in general is complicated at the outset 
because there is no agreement on how fairness is to be characterized and 
defined. For example, for Mill (1863), an action is fair if it maximises the 
total benefit to society and reduces the total suffering of the society. Accord-
ing to Rawls (1971), an action is fair if (1) it complies with the rules of an 
institution which is just and (2) the person who performs the action vol-
untarily accepts the rules of the institution.2 Nozick (2013) defines fairness 
as compliance with certain “natural” rights, including rights against injury 
by others, rights to freedom of choice and action, and rights to own private 
property.
The aforementioned general definitions of fairness are not suitable for 
assessing the fairness of CODR procedures because they do not define fair-
ness in the context of dispute resolution procedures. In order to appropriate-
ly assess the fairness of CODR procedures, we need to distinguish between 
distributive and procedural fairness. The concept of distributive fairness 
focusses on the criteria that are used for assessing whether the outcome of a 
procedure is fair (cf. Welsh, 2006, p. 165), whereas the concept of procedural 
fairness refers to the criteria that are used for determining whether a proce-
dure contributes to a fair outcome (cf. Lind and Tyler, 1988).
We will focus on procedural fairness only because we aim to assess the 
fairness of CODR procedures, and not the outcomes of those procedures. 
More specifically, we will focus on two types of procedural fairness, namely, 
1 For the sake of brevity, the EU Directive on ADR will be referred to as the “Directive”.
2 According to Rawls, an institution can be just only if it: (1) guarantees that every indi-
vidual has an equal right to basic liberties; (2) allows any individual to take “offi ces and 
positions” in the institution; and (3) permits inequalities that work to the advantage of 
the least advantaged in society (Rawls, 1971).
5 Our interpretation of procedural fairness
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objective procedural fairness and subjective procedural fairness. The former 
refers to compliance of a procedure with a standard whereby the procedure 
is assessed by an individual or an organisation as fair or unfair, whereas the 
latter refers to an individual’s subjective perception of fairness of a proce-
dure (cf. Mansbridge, 1990, p. 327).
In this chapter, we will initially formulate suitable interpretations of 
objective procedural fairness (Section 5.1) and subjective procedural fair-
ness (Section 5.2). Afterwards, we establish our interpretation of fairness by 
supplementing our interpretation of objective procedural fairness with our 
interpretation of subjective procedural fairness (Section 5.3). Our interpre-
tation of procedural fairness is a direct answer to RQ2 (What is procedural 
fairness in the context of adjudicative dispute resolution?). At the end of the 
Chapter, a conclusion is drawn (Section 5.4).
5.1 Objective procedural fairness
As mentioned in Section 1.5, our interpretation of objective procedural fair-
ness will be based on the the European Directive for two reasons. First, the 
Directive establishes a standard of fairness applying to ADR procedures. 
Such a standard is appropriate for examining CODR procedures, all of 
which are ADR procedures.3 Second, the Directive applies to the entire Euro-
pean Union, which has a population of about 500 million people.4 By mak-
ing our model a fair CODR procedure that is compliant with such a widely 
used standard, we will increase the practical applicability of the model.
After the choice to base our interpretation of objective procedural fair-
ness on the Directive, we need to identify the relevant provisions of the 
Directive, which relate to procedural fairness. We note that procedural fair-
ness requirements can be found in Article 9 (Fairness) of the Directive as 
well as in Article 6 (Expertise, independence, and impartiality), Article 7 
(Transparency), and Article 8 (Effectiveness). The reason is that Articles 6, 
7, and 8 of the Directive contain criteria which can be used for determining 
whether an ADR procedure contributes to a fair outcome. Thus, a proce-
dure ensuring the expertise, independence, and the impartiality of the third 
neutral party (Article 6) will more likely render a fair decision than a proce-
dure which does not meet these three fairness criteria. Transparency require-
ments (Article 7) contribute to a fair outcome by enabling the accountability 
of the third neutral party.5 The requirements related to the effectiveness of 
the procedure (Article 8) ensure that a procedure will lead to a fair outcome 
3 An overview of past and present CODR procedures is provided in Chapter 3.
4 See a statistic provided by Eurostat at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=
table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels
&plugin=1 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
5 Regarding transparency, the U.S. Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis stated that “Sun-
light is...the best disinfectant” (Daly and Fariello, 2012, p. 112).
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(cf. Hörnle, 2009, p. 6).6 For example, without requirements setting out pro-
cedural timeframes, a procedure may never lead to a fair outcome, let alone 
a fair one.
On the basis of Articles 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the Directive, we distinguish 
nine elements of objective procedural fairness, namely, expertise (Subsec-
tion 5.1.1), independence (Subsection 5.1.2), impartiality (Subsection 5.1.3), 
transparency (Subsection 5.1.4), fair hearing (Subsection 5.1.5), counterpoise 
(Subsection 5.1.6), ensuring a reasonable length of procedure (Subsection 
5.1.7), providing reasons (Subsection 5.1.8), and voluntary participation 
(Subsection 5.1.9). These nine elements are examined below.
5.1.1 Expertise
Article 6(1)(a) of the Directive obliges the EU Member States to ensure that 
natural persons in charge of ADR possess (1) the necessary knowledge and 
skills in the field of alternative or judicial resolution of consumer disputes 
as well as (2) a general understanding of law.7 The Directive requires knowl-
edge in the field of alternative or judicial resolution of consumer disputes 
since the resolution of consumer disputes has the following three specifics: 
(1) inequality of bargaining power between the consumer and the seller; (2) 
the amounts dealt with in such disputes are small, but large in their impact 
on the consumer; and (3) the consumer is usually ignorant of the technical 
aspects of the product (cf. Samson and McBride, 1993, p. 47). Paragraph 36 
from the preamble of the Directive explains that a general understanding 
of law is necessary for understanding the legal implications of the dispute.
5.1.2 Independence
The term “independence” in the context of dispute resolution is usually 
defined as a lack of relations of the third neutral party with a party that 
might influence a third neutral party’s decision (cf. Rubins and Lauterburg, 
6 Effectiveness means that a procedure leads to a decision or solution of a dispute (Hörnle, 
2009, p. 6).
7 It should be noted that third neutral parties in traditional litigation proceedings are not 
always required to have dispute resolution expertise and understanding of law. For 
example, neither the judges nor the jurors in federal litigation cases need to have legal or 
other training. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Schweiker v. McClure 
(1982) 456 U.S. 188. In the case Parham v. J.R, the court even stated that non-legal profes-
sionals, such as psychologists, psychiatrists, and other health care professionals will be 
better equipped to resolve disputes in the fi eld of health care than persons having a legal 
background. The reason is that “neither judges nor administrative hearing offi cers are 
better qualifi ed than psychiatrists to render psychiatric judgments.” See Parham v. J.R., 
442 U.S. 584 (1979). Althougth jurors do not need to have any specifi c education, they 
need to perform the tasks with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the legal 
rules. See In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
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2007, p. 154).8 More specifically, independence relates to relationships, for 
instance, whether a third neutral party (a) is professionally related to one of 
the parties, or (b) has family or business connections to or with that party 
(cf. Trakman, 2007).9 It should be noted that the concept of independence 
is a factual concept, which means absence of an objectively ascertainable 
conflict of interest (cf. Hörnle, 2009, p. 114). An example of lack of indepen-
dence is provided in the U.S. Supreme Court case Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court 
for Dist. Of Columbia.10 In that case, a judge from the U.S. Supreme Court 
was requested to recuse himself from hearing of a case involving the Vice 
President of the United States because the judge accepted a free ride on the 
Vice President’s airline (Beermann, 2010, p. 125).
Article 6(1) of the Directive obliges the EU Member States to ensure that 
the natural persons in charge of ADR are independent. The contents of para-
graphs (b), (c), (d), and (e) of Article 6(1) of the Directive are specific safe-
guards which should be implemented in the national laws of the EU Mem-
ber States in order to ensure the independence of the third neutral parties.
Paragraph (b) and paragraph (d) ensure the personal independence of 
the third neutral party, i.e., they guarantee that safeguards are built into 
the position of the third neutral party regarding duration of appointment, 
remuneration, and dismissal of the third neutral party (cf. De Lange and 
Mevis, 2006, pp. 333-334). More specifically, paragraph (b) requires that the 
third neutral party is appointed for a term of sufficient duration for ensur-
ing the independence of their actions and are not liable to be relieved from 
their duties without a just cause. Paragraph (d) states that the third neutral 
party should be remunerated in a way that is not linked to the outcome of 
the procedure.
Paragraph (c) and paragraph (e) ensure the functional independence of 
the third neutral party, i.e., the third neutral party should at all times feel 
free that he can freely give his judgements (cf. De Lange and Mevis, 2006, 
p. 334). Paragraph (c) guarantees functional independence by requiring that 
the third neutral party should not be subject to instructions from either par-
8 The term “independence” should be clearly distinguished from the term “confl ict of 
interest”. While the former relates to lack of relations, the latter refers to a confontration 
between professional and private interests. Transparency International, a non-govern-
mental organisation based in Germany, defi nes the term “confl ict of interest” as follows: 
“Situation where an individual or the entity for which they work, whether a government, 
business, media outlet or civil society organisation, is confronted with choosing between 
the duties and demands of their position and their own private interests.” See https://
www.transparency.org/glossary/term/confl ict_of_interests (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
9 The requirement that the third neutral party should be independent is an element of the 
right to fair trial set forth in Article 6 of the ECHR. The ECtHR differentiates between 
three types of independence, namely, (1) independence from the executive power, (2) 
independence from the parliament, and (3) independence from the parties. See “Guide on 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, the ECtHR, 2014. Available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf (last visited Jan. 3,
2017).
10 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. Of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
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ty or their representatives. Paragraph (e) obliges the third neutral party to 
disclose to the ADR entity any circumstances, which may affect third neutral 
party’s independence.
5.1.3 Impartiality
The impartiality is an abstract concept, which, in its essence, is a require-
ment referring to the judge’s state of mind (cf. Hörnle, 2009, p. 113).11 For 
instance, a third neutral party will not be impartial if he has an inclination 
for or against a party, takes into account irrelevant considerations or acts 
either out of self-interest or prejudice. It should be noted that establish-
ing impartiality requires an examination of the subjective state of mind of 
the mediator and, therefore, causes obvious problems of determining evi-
dence.12 That is why a commonly used approach to ensure impartiality of 
third neutral parties is obliging them to disclose any circumstances that may 
affect their impartiality. Such an obligation is vested in Article 6(1)(e) of the 
Directive.
It should be clarified that impartiality does not require “absence” of 
prior opinions on a given case (cf. Megret, 2014, p. 120). The third neutral 
parties often have preliminary opinions on the issues they have to decide. 
Impartiality should be seen as “an awareness, an alertness to inevitable exis-
tence of one’s biases” (cf. Megret, 2014, p. 120).
5.1.4 Transparency
Transparency refers to a dispute resolution environment where a dispute 
resolution process is understandable and, if necessary, possible to replicate 
(cf. Zeleznikow, 2011, p. 8).13 The Directive ensures transparency by impos-
ing two obligations to ADR entities, namely, (1) an obligation to make pub-
licly available specific information about their ADR procedures (see Section 
7(1) of the Directive) and (2) an obligation to publish annual reports contain-
ing statistical information about the operation of their ODR procedures (see 
Section 7(2) of the Directive).
11 The requirement that the third neutral party should be impartial is an element of the right 
to fair trial vested in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). See 
“Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, the ECtHR, 2014. 
Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2017).
12 To demonstrate the signifi cance of these problems, it is suffi cient to note that a challenge 
of a judge based on impartiality has never been successful under English law (Hörnle, 
2009, p. 113). In comparison, English judges have been challenged on the basis of their 
lack of independence. For example, an English judge was recused because he was a lessor 
of the plaintiff (see Hammond, 2009, p. 13).
13 Transparency may exist not only in dispute resolution procedures in which disputes are 
resolved by third parties, but also in negotiation support systems (Zeleznikow and Beluc-
ci, 2012).
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Regarding the first obligation, ADR entities are obliged to make pub-
licly available on their websites, on a durable medium upon request, and by 
any other means they consider appropriate, clear and easily understandable 
information about:
(1) their contact details;
(2) the fact that ADR entities are listed as entities falling within the scope of 
the Directive and complying with the requirements of the Directive;
(3) the third neutral parties as well as the method and the term of their ap-
pointment; 14
(4) the expertise, impartiality, and independence of the third neutral par-
ties if they are appointed exclusively by the trader;
(5) their membership in networks of ADR entities (if applicable);
(6) the types of disputes the ADR entities are competent to deal with, in-
cluding any applicable thresholds;
(7) the rules of their ADR procedures as well as the grounds on which ADR 
entity may refuse to deal with a dispute in accordance with Article 5(4) 
of the Directive15;
(8) the languages in which complaints can be submitted to the ADR entity 
and in which the ADR procedure is conducted;
(9) the types of rules the ADR entity may use as a basis for the dispute reso-
lution;
(10) any preliminary requirements that the parties must meet before the 
commencement of the ADR procedure;
(11) whether the parties can withdraw from the procedure;
(12) the costs of the ADR procedure and rules on awarding costs;
(13) the average length of the ADR procedure;
(14) the legal effect of the outcome of the ADR procedure; and
(15) information about the enforceability of the ADR decision (if relevant).
Pertaining to the second obligation, the ADR entities are obliged to make 
publicly available on their websites, on a durable medium upon request, 
and by any other means they consider appropriate, annual reports contain-
ing the following information:
14 The requirement for publication of the names of the jurors can be traced back to Roman 
law. The Roman Lex Repetundarum required the publication of the names of jurors in judi-
cial proceedings.
15 Article 5(4) of the Directive states that the EU Member States may permit ADR entities to 
maintain and introduce procedural rules that allow them to refuse to deal with a given 
dispute on the grounds that: (1) the consumer did not attempt to contact the trader con-
cerned in order to discuss his complaint and seek, as a fi rst step, to resolve the matter 
directly with the trader; (2) the dispute is frivolous or vexatious; (3) the dispute is being 
or has previously been considered by ADR entity or by a court; (4) the value of the claim 
falls below or above a pre-specifi ed monetary threshold;  (5) the consumer has not sub-
mitted the complaint to the ADR entity within a pre-specifi ed time limit, which shall not 
be set at less  than one year from the date upon which the consumer submitted the com-
plaint to the trader; (6) dealing with such a type of dispute would otherwise seriously 
impair the effective operation of the ADR entity.
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(1) the number of disputes received and the types of complaints to which 
they related;
(2) any systematic or significant problems that occur frequently and lead to 
disputes between consumers and traders;
(3) the rate of disputes the ADR entity has refused to deal with and the per-
centage share of the types of grounds for such refusal as referred to Ar-
ticle 5(4) of the Directive;
(4) the percentage shares of solutions proposed or imposed in favour of the 
consumer and in favour of the trader (this requirement applies only if 
the third neutral party is employed or remunerated by the trader);
(5) the percentage share of ADR procedures which were discontinued and 
the reasons for the discontinuation (if known);
(6) the average dispute resolution time;
(7) the rate of compliance with the outcomes of the ADR procedures; and
(8) cooperation of ADR entities within networks of ADR entities which fa-
cilitate the resolution of cross-border disputes.
5.1.5 Fair hearing
Fair hearing means that each party should have an equal opportunity to 
present evidence and law (see Hörnle, 2009, p. 13).16 Fair hearing consists of 
two sub-elements, namely, (A) ensuring that each party participates in the 
dispute resolution process and (B) ensuring that each party can present its 
case and rebut the case of the opponent. These two sub-elements are exam-
ined in more detail below.
A: Ensuring that each party participates in the dispute resolution process
The right to participation in the dispute resolution process requires the par-
ties to receive a notice informing them about the commencement of the dis-
pute resolution process (cf. Grando, 2009, p. 14). Article 8(d) of the Directive 
ensures the right to participation by obliging the ADR entity to notify the 
parties to the dispute as soon as it has received all documents containing the 
relevant information relating to the complaint.
B: Ensuring that each party can present its case and rebut the case of the opponent
Article 9(1)(a) of the Directive guarantees that each party can present its case 
and rebut the case of the opponent by stating that the disputants should 
have the possibility, within a reasonable period of time, (1) of expressing 
their point of view, (2) of being provided with the submissions of the other 
party and experts involved in the case, (3) of being able to comment on the 
aforementioned submissions.
16 The right of fair hearing constitutes an element of the right to fair trial stipulated in Article 
6 of the ECHR. See “Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, 
the ECtHR, 2014. Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_6_crimi-
nal_eng.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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5.1.6 Counterpoise
The element of counterpoise17 takes into account obstacles to effective par-
ticipation, which are not inherent to the procedure, but arise from a party’s 
inability to take part in the procedure on an equal footing (cf. Hörnle, 2009, 
p. 7).18 This element deals with preexisting power imbalances between the 
parties and consists of measures to reduce them.19 For instance, if one party 
has no financial resources to file a case, he will be less equipped for a par-
ticipation in a dispute resolution procedure than the other party (cf. Hörnle, 
2009, p. 7).20 Other examples of power imbalances include the inability of 
one party to understand the case or actively participate in the proceedings.21 
The element of counterpoise is guaranteed in most domestic legal orders 
(cf. Bohlander, 2007, p. 13).
In Article 8(b), Article 8(c), and Article 9(1)(b), the Directive establishes 
some counterpoise to preexisting imbalances in the financial status of the 
disputants. In more detail, Article 8(b) requires ADR entities to ensure that 
the disputants are not obliged to retain a lawyer or a legal advisor, but they 
may seek legal or other advice at any stage of the procedure. Article 9(1)(b) 
17 The element of counterpoise corresponds to the concept of equality of arms developed by 
the the ECtHR. According to the ECtHR, equality of arms requires that each disputant be 
given a reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not put him 
at a substantial disadvantage in respect to his opponent. See the following ECtHR cases: 
Bulut v. Austria (1996) 24 EHRR 84; Foucher v. France (1997) 25 EHRR 234; and Klimentyev 
v. Russia (2009) 49 EHRR 14. The equality of arms is an inherent feature of the right to fair 
trial enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR. See “Guide on Article 6 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights”, the ECtHR, 2014. Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/docu-
ments/guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). The term “equality of 
arms” is criticised because the use of the word “arms” implies that the disputants are 
“combatants” who are “forced to comply with the procedural rights equilibrium” (Toma, 
2016, p. 3).
18 Power imbalances are at stake if one party has signifi cantly more power than the other. 
Hörnle distinguishes three factors that can lead to a power imbalance. They are (i) 
resources, (ii) whether a party is a repeat player, and (iii) vulnerability. Resources, such as 
fi nancial resources, human resources, legal know-how, access to internal or external legal 
advice, are an obvious factor that can lead to power imbalance. The second factor is the 
‘Repeat player’ effect and power, which means that parties who have been regularly 
involved in similar types of disputes have more power than ‘one-shotters’.  The third fac-
tor is the relative importance of the case for each party (vulnerability). See Hörnle, 2009, 
pp. 29-31.
19 The element of counterpose is a direct implementation of the principle of redistributive 
justice as developed by Rawls (1971). According to Rawls, each person in a society should 
be entitled to the most extensive liberty that is comparative with a similar degree of lib-
erty being enjoyed by others (Rawls, 1971). Hence, redistributive justice requires that a 
socially disadvantaged disputant who has inadequate resources must not be placed at 
substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis their opponents.
20 Governments can address such power imbalances by providing legal aid to fi nancially 
disadvantaged disputants (see Hörnle, 2009, p. 15).  Legal aid schemes use public funds 
to pay the legal costs of low-income disputants (Schiavetta, 2008, p. 371).
21 See ‘European judicial systems - Edition 2014 (2012 data) - Effi ciency and quality of jus-
tice’, 2014, p. 453.
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obliges ADR entities to inform the disputants about the rights provided by 
Article 8(b) of the Directive. Article 8(c) requires ADR entities to ensure that 
the ADR procedure is free of charge or available at a nominal fee for con-
sumers. Article 8(b), Article 8(c), and Article 9(1)(b) make sure that dispu-
tants will be able to participate in the ADR procedure, irrespective of their 
financial situation.
Article 8(a) of the Directive establishes some counterpoise to preexisting 
imbalances in the computer skills of the disputants. In particular, Article 
8(a) states that the ADR procedure should be available and easily accessible 
online and offline to disputants, irrespective of where they are. Thus, Article 
8(a) makes the ADR procedures governed by the Directive accessible to all 
parties, irrespective of their computer skills.
5.1.7 Ensuring a reasonable length of procedure
In Hentrich v. France, the ECtHR stated that excessive delay is a breach of the 
right to a fair trial contained in Article 6(1) of the ECHR.22 The court in the 
English case R v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Cherry even found 
that procedural delays may constitute abuse of a process.23 The court stated 
as follows: “We see no warrant for not following ample precedent, now well 
set, for the proposition that mere delay which gives rise to prejudice and 
unfairness may by itself amount to an abuse of the process.”
In order to avoid excessive delays, Article 8(e) of the Directive obliges 
the ADR entities to make available the outcome of ADR procedures within 
a period of 90 calendar days from the date on which the ADR entity has 
received the complete complaint file. Nevertheless, in the case of highly 
complex disputes, the ADR entity in charge may, at its own discretion, 
extend the time period of 90 calendar days.
5.1.8 Providing reasons
The provision of reasons has at least three goals, namely, (1) showing respect 
to the person affected by a decision, (2) promoting good outcomes, and (3) 
facilitating the appeal of decisions (cf. Endicott, 2011, pp. 189-190).24 In rela-
tion to the first goal, by providing reasons for a decision, a third neutral 
party shows respect to the person affected by a decision because the third 
neutral party treats that person as someone to whom an account must be 
given. Pertaining to the second goal, the provision of reasons promotes 
good outcomes because it focuses the mind of the third neutral party on the 
22 Hentrich v. France (1994) 18 EHRR 440.
23 See R v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Cherry (1990) 91 Cr App R 283.
24 The right to fair trial stated in Article 6 of the ECHR includes the right to receive suffi cient 
reasons for decisions. See H v. Belgium (1987) 10 EHRR 339. The reasons must provide the 
parties with the opportunities to make effective use of their rights of appeal. See Suomi-
nen v. Finland (2003), ECHR 330.
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explanation of decisions. As for the third goal, it should be noted that the 
reasons allow the disputants to find flaws in the decision-making process 
and appeal the decision.
Article 9(c) of the Directive requires ADR entities to (1) notify the dis-
putants of the outcome of their ADR procedures in writing or on a durable 
medium and (2) give the disputants a statement of the grounds on which 
the outcome is based. Although the Directive does not specifically mention 
“reasons”, the word “grounds” as used in Article 9(c) has the same meaning 
as the word “reasons”.
The Directive does not clarify whether the reasons should be lengthy 
or brief. The use of lengthy reasons is typical for common law judges. For 
instance, the reasons provided by English judges contain a lengthy disclo-
sure of the arguments of the judges, examples, and interpretation of pre-
vious court decisions (Steiner, 2010, p. 139; Siems, 2014, p. 55). In contrast, 
French judges usually support their judgements with short reasons (cf. 
Steiner, 2010, p. 13).
5.1.9 Voluntary participation
The voluntary participation is an important characteristic of ADR proce-
dures (cf. Bühring-Uhle, Kirchhoff, Scherer, 2006, p. 229). In principle, an 
ADR procedure cannot resolve a dispute without the previous agreement of 
the parties. Article 9(2)(a), 9(2)(b), Article 9(2)(c), and Article 9(2)(d) guaran-
tee the voluntary participation in ADR procedures.
Article 9(2)(a) obliges ADR entities (1) to provide the disputants the 
right to withdraw from the ADR procedure at any stage if they are dissatis-
fied with its performance or the operation and (2) to inform the disputants 
about that right.25
Article 9(2)(b) further guarantees the voluntary participation of the dis-
putants by requiring ADR entities to inform them: (1) about their choice as 
to whether or not to agree to or follow the proposed solution; (2) that the 
participation in the procedure is without prejudice to the possibility of seek-
ing redress through court procedures; and (3) the proposed solution may be 
different from the outcome of court proceedings.
Article 9(2)(c) imposes obligation on ADR entities to ensure that the dis-
putants are aware of the legal effect of agreeing to or following a proposed 
solution. Pursuant to Article 9(2)(d), before agreeing to or following a pro-
posed solution, the disputants using ADR procedures should be allowed a 
reasonable period of time to reflect.
It should be noted that, pursuant to Article 9(1)(3) of the Directive, con-
sumers always have a right to voluntary participation. The Directive pro-
vides traders with a right to voluntary participation, but if the national laws 
state otherwise, the national laws shall prevail.
25 However, if the national laws require the mandatory participation of a trader in the ADR 
procedure, Article 9(2)(a) shall apply to the consumer only.
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5.2 Subjective procedural fairness
Subjective procedural fairness is mainly of interest to social psychologists 
who analyse the response of participants and observers to particular proce-
dures (cf. Röhl, 1997, p. 4). Subjective procedural fairness may include vari-
ous elements, including the moral view and the cultural belonging of the 
person evaluating the fairness of a procedure. Thus, what one person deems 
to be fair, another person may deem to be unfair. At least two studies indi-
cate that cultural belonging has an impact on subjective procedural fairness 
(cf. Brockner et al., 2001; Steiner and Gilliland, 1996). The first study found 
that the importance of voice (i.e., the opportunity to express an opinion) 
in determining the perception of subjective procedural fairness may vary 
depending on the cultural norms (cf. Brockner et al., 2001). The second study 
found that cultural differences may affect perceptions of subjective proce-
dural fairness through their impact on the preferred approaches of infor-
mation processing (cf. Steiner and Gilliland, 1996). For example, American 
subjects prefer to base their conclusions on subjective procedural fairness of 
the scientific process and empirical data, whereas French subjects rely more 
heavily on argumentation and reasoning (cf. Steiner and Gilliland, 1996).
There are three views on the question why certain factors can affect the 
perceptions of subjective procedural fairness, namely, (1) a narrow conse-
quentialist view, (2) a pure proceduralist view, and (3) a non-consequen-
tialist view. The narrow consequentialist view is that certain factors affect 
perceptions of subjective procedural fairness because they promote better 
outcomes. The pure proceduralist view is that certain factors affect subjec-
tive procedural fairness because they have inherent value in their own right. 
The non-consequential view is that certain factors promote factors other 
than consequences that individuals value (cf. Tsuchiya, Wailoo, and Edlin, 
2007, p. 6). The importance of any factor affecting the perceptions of subjec-
tive procedural fairness may be justified by using each of these three views.
A literature review on procedural subjective fairness reveals the follow-
ing nine elements of procedural subjective fairness: impartiality, indepen-
dence, fair hearing, process control, decision control, consistency, accuracy, 
correctability, ethicality, and transparency (cf. Musante, Gilbert, Thibaut, 
1983; Adler, Hensler, and Nelson, 1983; Lind, Lissak, Conlon, 1983; Tyler, 
Rasinski, and Spodick, 1985; Tyler, Rasinski and Spodick, 1985; Greenberg, 
1986; Lind and Tyler, 1988, p. 108; Tyler, 1988; Fryxell and Gordon, 1989; 
Folger and Konovsky, 1989; Brockner et al, 1994, p. 406; Levy and Williams, 
1998; Tsuchiya, Wailoo, Edlin 2007; Ivkovich and Hagan, 2011, p. 75; Brock-
ner and Wiesenfeld, 2013, p. 527). These nine elements have been identified 
on the basis of empirical studies assessing the perceptions of procedural 
fairness of various types of procedures, including, but not limited to, dis-
pute resolution procedures. Most of the empirical studies were conducted 
by using focus groups and surveys. It should be pointed out that the impor-
tance of the elements of subjective procedural fairness may vary across the 
examined procedures (cf. Gilliland, 2001, p. 40).
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The following four elements of subjective procedural fairness overlap 
with our elements of objective procedural fairness: (1) impartiality, (2) inde-
pendence, (3) fair hearing, and (4) transparency. Empirical studies indicate 
that the requirements of due process (i.e., impartiality, independence, and 
fair hearing) are major determinants of procedural fairness judgements (see, 
e.g., Lind and Tyler, 1988; Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 2013).26 The reason is 
that due process is based on instincts of fairness, which become embedded 
in human’s nature through a process of social and biological evolution (cf. 
Sheffrin, 2013, p. 31). Such instincts include the desire for respectable treat-
ment and the ability to engage and participate in the process of generating 
outcomes (cf. Sheffrin, 2013, p. 31). Tyler and Lind (2002) explained the logic 
behind these instincts by stating that they reduce the risks of maltreatment 
and a variety of mental, emotional, and physical dangers. The importance 
of transparency for perceptions of subjective procedural fairness can be 
explained with the role of transparency for assessing subjective procedural 
fairness of a procedure (cf. Gianetti, 2015, p. 137). People must be aware of a 
procedure in order to judge its fairness (cf. Licht, 2011, p. 4).
Since the purpose of this Section is to supplement our interpretation of 
objective procedural fairness, we will not re-examine the elements of subjec-
tive procedural fairness, which overlap with the elements of objective proce-
dural fairness. Below, we will examine the following elements of subjective 
procedural fairness: process control (Section 5.2.1), decision control (Section 
5.2.2), consistency (Section 5.2.3), accuracy (Section 5.2.4), correctability (Sec-
tion 5.2.5), and ethicality (Section 5.2.6).
5.2.1 Process control
Process control refers to the control over the development and selection of 
information that will constitute the basis for making a decision (cf. Thibaut 
and Walker, 1975). Although process control may overlap with the right to 
26 Due process refers to fundamental procedural legal safeguards of which every citizen has 
an absolute right when a court or a state intends to take a decision which can affect any 
right of that citizen (cf. Johnson, 2005, p. 87). The notion of due process can be traced back 
to early common law (cf. Galligan, 2004, p. 73). In the English legal tradition, the term 
“due process” is referred to as “natural justice” (cf. Hörnle, 2009, p. 5). The principle of 
natural justice originates in Article 39 of Magna Carta, whereby the King promised not to 
encroach the liberties of the English citizens unless the breach is in accordance with a 
lawful judgement of a jury trial or the law of the land (cf. Harris, 2015, p. 41). A fully 
developed version of the principle of natural justice is expressed in the early seventeenth 
century as a collective description of conditions by which the Court of the King’s Bench 
assessed whether it is entitled to review the procedure by which a legal authority was 
exercised (see Gray, 1999, p. 573). In the United States of America, the concept of natural 
justice also exists. It is recognized as a constitutional standard known as “due process”. 
Due process is implemented in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Consti-
tution. These two amendments compel state and federal governments to follow the 
aforementioned conditions in order to regulate governmental intrusions in individual 
rights and to mediate disputes among citizens and the State (cf. Paris, 2010, p. 118).
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be heard, there is a significant difference. While process control relates to 
the presentation of information that will constitute the basis for making a 
decision, the right to be heard relates to presenting one’s view. For example, 
according to Bulgarian law, recordings from video cameras are not consid-
ered as an evidence (cf. Alexandrov, 2015). This may have an impact on the 
process control of the disputants, but does not have an impact on their right 
to be heard as the disputants are allowed to present to the court any record-
ings from video cameras.
On the basis of a literature review of 107 scientific materials (in particu-
lar, articles and books) related to procedural fairness, Tsuchiya, Wailoo, and 
Edlin (2007) found out that 46 out of 107 examined papers empirically inves-
tigate the impact of process control on the perceptions of subjective proce-
dural fairness.27 In total, 44 of these 46 papers contain evidence indicating 
that the process control affects perceptions of procedural subjective fairness.
Scientific experiments conducted in court-room settings indicate that 
disputants prefer that most of the process control over the dispute resolu-
tion is vested in them and not in a third party (cf. Thibaut and Walker, 1975). 
Such a preference was reported not only by residents of England and the 
United States where the judges have weak process control, but also by resi-
dents of France and Germany where the judges have strong process control 
(cf. Thibaut and Walker, 1975). This clearly indicates that the strong process 
control strengthens the perceptions of subjective procedural fairness irre-
spectively whether the persons assessing the subjective procedural fairness 
are based in a common law country or a civil law country.28
Such heightened perceptions are not solely caused by disputant’s think-
ing that a strong process control will increase the likelihood of obtaining fair 
and beneficial outcomes. Empirical studies have shown that process control 
affects subjective procedural fairness even when disputants did not consider 
their process control to be influential on the final decision (cf. Cutler, 2007, 
p. 626). This clearly indicates that the impact of process control on percep-
tions of subjective procedural fairness cannot be explained by the narrow 
consequentialist view which is discussed above.
5.2.2 Decision control
Decision control refers to the extent to which the parties are free to reject 
or accept a decision rendered by a third party (cf. Wemmers, 1996, p. 69). 
Compared with process control, the decision control affects the percep-
tions of subjective procedural fairness to a lower extent (cf. Tyler, Rasinski, 
and Spodick, 1985). The reason is that, when people use third parties (e.g., 
27 The examined papers were identifi ed on the basis of: (i) keyword searches of electronic 
databases; (ii) hand searches of specifi c academic journals; and (iii) hand searches of 
papers by specifi c authors.
28 The judges of common law countries have a weak process control, whereas the judges of 
civil law countries have a strong process control (cf. Steiner, 2010, p. 278).
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judges and arbitrators) to resolve their disputes, they transfer their decision 
control to the third party (cf. Tyler and Blader, 2013, p. 90). In negotiation 
proceedings, where no third party is involved, disputants keep complete 
decision control. For example, a disputant in a negotiation proceeding has 
a full discretion to decide on whether or not to accept a settlement offer for 
the amount of USD 300.
On the basis of the information in the preceding paragraph, it can be 
presumed that dispute resolution proceedings which provide the disputants 
with a high degree of decision control (e.g., mediation proceedings) should 
be viewed as fairer than dispute resolution proceedings with low decision 
control (e.g., adjudication). Three empirical studies support this presump-
tion.The first study found that outcomes reached by the disputants (e.g., 
mediation settlement) are perceived as fairer than outcomes imposed by a 
third party (cf. Conlon, Moon, and Ng, 2002). The second study concluded 
that disputants who reach a settlement are likely to be more satisfied with 
the fairness aspect of the process compared with those who “lost” in adju-
dicative proceedings (Condliffe, 2012, p. 157). The third study revealed that 
the participants in the study prefer Med/Arb (i.e., mediation followed by 
arbitration) processes than Arb/Med (i.e., arbitration followed by mediation 
processes) (Condliffe and Zeleznikow, 2014).
5.2.3 Consistency
Consistency refers to the consistent application of a procedure across per-
sons and across time (cf. Leventhal, 1980). It is worth mentioning that 
Tsuchiya, Wailoo, and Edlin (2007) found out that eight out of the examined 
107 scientific publications state that consistency is a factor affecting subjec-
tive procedural fairness and five of them provided empirical support for 
this statement.29 The authors conducted their own empirical study which 
discovered that consistency was the second most important factor affecting 
subjective procedural fairness.
Consistency was also found to be an important factor affecting subjec-
tive procedural fairness in the studies by Greenberg (1986), Barrett-Howard 
and Tyler (1986), Sheppard and Lewicki (1987). Greenberg (1986) found 
that the consistent application of standards across people is one of the most 
important factors affecting the perceptions of subjective procedural fairness 
in performance evaluations. Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986) found out 
that, in business environment, decision-maker’s consistency across people 
seriously affects perceptions of subjective procedural fairness. Sheppard and 
Lewicki (1987) found that managers perceive decision-making consistency 
29 The reason for the low number of publications mentioning consistency can be the fact 
that the evaluation of consistency cannot be based on information about the application 
of a single procedure. The evaluation should be based on information about the applica-
tion of a number of procedures which is not always available to the disputants.
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in applying rules across people and settings as an important factor affecting 
subjective procedural fairness in the workplace.
The aforementioned empirical studies do not correspond to the findings 
of a study conducted by Lind and Tyler (cf. Lind and Tyler, 1988, p. 108). 
Lind and Tyler found out that consistency is not one of the most important 
factors affecting perceptions of subjective procedural fairness. The reason 
are that the factor representation (a factor including both process and deci-
sion control), ethicality, and accuracy were found to be more important than 
consistency. The differences between the results of the empirical study con-
ducted by Lind and Tyler and the other empirical studies mentioned above 
are perhaps caused by the differences in the examined procedures. While 
Lind and Tyler examined dispute resolution procedures, the other stud-
ies refer to procedures aiming to decide how to best use scarce health care 
resources (cf. Tsuchiya, Wailoo, and Edlin, 2007), procedures for evaluating 
performance (cf. Greenberg, 1986) and business decision-making procedures 
(cf. Barrett-Howard and Tyler, 1986; Lewicki, 1987). As it was pointed out in 
the beginning of this chapter, the importance of the factors affecting subjec-
tive procedural fairness may vary depending on the examined procedures.
5.2.4 Accuracy
Procedures based on inaccurate information are viewed by the participants 
in the procedures as unfair (cf. Tsuchiya, Wailoo, and Edlin, 2007, p. 30). 
For example, an allocation procedure which requires the participants in the 
procedure to keep full and accurate records of their contributions will be 
assessed as fairer than an allocation procedure which does not require the 
participants to keep such records. As the information provided by the dis-
putants may constitute an accurate information, the right to be heard and 
process control may overlap with accuracy (cf. Tsuchiya, Wailoo, and Edlin, 
2007, p. 9).
The aforementioned study by Tsuchiya, Wailoo, and Edlin (2007) found 
that accuracy was discussed in twelve out of 107 papers related to proce-
dural fairness. Eleven of those twelve papers provided empirical sup-
port indicating that accuracy affects procedural fairness. Furthermore, the 
empirical study conducted by Tsuchiya, Wailoo, and Edlin (2007) found out 
that accuracy was the most important element of procedural fairness. Lind 
and Tyler (1988, p. 108) found that the accuracy is less important than the 
representation (i.e., both process and decision control) and ethicality. As it 
has been noted in Subsection 5.2.3, the difference between the findings of 
Tsuchiya, Wailoo, and Edlin (2007) and Lind and Tyler (1988, p. 108) is prob-
ably caused by the differences in the examined procedures. The procedures 
examined by Tsuchiya, Wailoo, and Edlin (2007) relate to procedures aiming 
to decide how to best use scarce health care resources, whereas Lind and 
Tyler (1988, p. 108) examined dispute resolution procedures.
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5.2.5 Correctability
Correctability of a decision means the opportunity to correct the decision. 
For instance, such an opportunity can be provided by appeal procedures.30 
Leventhal (1980) notes that, in order to be viewed as fair by the disputants, 
the appeal procedures should comply with the other factors affecting pro-
cedural justice (except correctability). The lack of correctability of a decision 
affects the perceptions of procedural fairness in two ways (cf. Renning, 1997, 
p. 225). First, the lack of correctability negatively affects the perceptions of 
procedural fairness because the correctability has an inherent value by its 
own. Second, the lack of correctability negatively affects the perceptions of 
subjective procedural fairness because it fosters inconsistent application of a 
procedure. As it was discussed above, an inconsistent procedure is viewed 
as unfair by the disputants.
The study by Tsuchiya, Wailoo, and Edlin (2007) found that correctabil-
ity was discussed in five of the examined 107 studies. Four of these stud-
ies provided empirical support demonstrating that the correctability affects 
procedural fairness. The little scientific attention received by the correctabil-
ity is probably caused by the fact that it only slightly affects the perceptions 
of procedural fairness. In this regard, Lind and Tyler (1988, p. 108) found 
that correctability was the weakest factor affecting procedural fairness, 
whereas Tsuchiya, Wailoo, and Edlin (2007) listed correctability as the sec-
ond weakest factor (transparency was found to be the weakest).
Although Article 8(2)(b)(ii) of the Directive on ADR states that the par-
ticipation in ADR procedures should not preclude the possibility of seeking 
redress through court proceedings, the Direcive on ADR does not oblige 
ADR entities to make available appeal ADR procedures. Since court pro-
ceedings can be expensive and complex, the element of correctability may 
not be satisfied by the safeguard vested in Article 8(2)(b)(ii).
5.2.6 Ethicality
Ethicality refers to the extent to which a procedure conforms to personal 
ethical standards (cf. Lind and Tyler, 1988, p. 132).31 For example, if a thid 
neutral party does not treat the disputants with dignity and respect, the dis-
putants may consider the procedure unfair. Lind and Tyler (1988, p. 108) 
found ethicality to be the second most important factor affecting procedural 
30 Settlement agreements reached through ADR procedures may not be appealed as they 
are not decisions, but contractual agreements to which both parties agree. For example, 
agreements reached as a result of plea bargaining may not be subject to appeal (see Mack-
enzie, Vincent, and Zeleznikow, 2015).
31 Klaming (2012, p. 148) considers ethicality to be one of the indicators of the quality of 
dispute resolution proceedings. According to Klaming (2012, p. 148), persons willing to 
measure the ethicality of dispute resolution proceedings must ask the disputants the 
following question: “…was the process ethical and in line with the moral standards of 
society?”
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fairness after representation (a factor including both process and decision 
control). 32
It should be noted that the content of ethicality differs across the globe 
(cf. Jackson, 2011, p. 11). What is considered to be ethical in one society, may 
be considered unethical in another society. 33 For example, German manag-
ers rate the giving of a business gift as a more acceptable act than American 
managers (cf. Jackson and Artola, 1997). Up until the present moment, there 
is no absolute global ethical standard which is independent of the cultural 
context (cf. Shaw, 2000, p. 12). However, many societies may share common 
moral values, e.g., the Member States of the European Union share common 
moral values (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p. 269).
There are three theories on the impact of globalisation on the ethical 
standards around the world, namely, convergence, divergence, and cross-
vergence (cf. Jackson, 2011, pp. 24-25). According to the theory of conver-
gence, all societies follow the same trajectory and, therefore, they will at 
some point have the same ethical standards. For example, most societies 
embrace the ethical standards related to industrial capitalism. Pursuant 
to the theory of divergence, the ethical standards will continue to differ 
despite globalising forces. The theory of crossvergence states that new ethi-
cal standards will appear as a result of the collision between the current 
ethical standards and the globalisation. The designers of CODR procedures 
can implement the three theories by ensuring that their procedures comply, 
to the maximum possible extent, with global, local, and emerging ethical 
standards.
5.3 Our interpretation of procedural fairness
Below, we present our interpretation of procedural fairness, which consti-
tutes a direct answer to RQ2 (What is procedural fairness in the context of 
adjudicative dispute resolution?). The interpretation is formulated by add-
ing the six elements of subjective procedural fairness, which do not overlap 
with the elements of objective procedural fairness, to the nine elements of 
32 Ethicality has a strong infl uence on perceiptions of procedural fairness because it allows 
disputants to evaluate procedural fairness on the basis of their personal ethical stan-
dards, without having information about the procedure which is necessary for evaluat-
ing other elements of procedural fairness (cf. Bazerman, 2005, p. 458).
33 Liu, Volcic, and Gallois (2014, pp. 119-121) proposed four ethical principles which can be 
used to facilitate intercultural communication, namely, (1) mutuality, (2) non-judgement-
alism, (3) honesty, and (4) respect. The fi rst principle refers to acquiring understanding of 
the perspective of the other party. The second principle relates to the wiligness to recog-
nise and appreciate intercultural differences. The third principle means that participants 
in intercultural communication should see things as they are rather than they would like 
them to be. The fourth principle involves sensitivity to and acknowledgment of the needs 
of the other party. The four principles are not supported by empirical evidence demon-
strating that they can actually facilitate intercultural communications.
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objective procedural fairness. It can be used not only for evaluating fair-
ness of CODR procedures, but also for evaluating fairness of ODR and other 
ADR procedures. However, the elements of the interpretation were select-
ed with the assumed relevance for CODR in mind. The fifteen elements of 
our interpretation of procedural fairness are listed below (A-O) and briefly 
explained.
A: Expertise
The third neutral parties should have (1) the necessary knowledge and skills 
in the field of alternative or judicial resolution of consumer disputes as well 
as (2) a general understanding of law.
B: Independence
The third neutral parties should have personal and functional indepen-
dence. Personal independence of the third neutral party refers to guarantees 
that are built into the position of the third neutral party regarding duration 
of appointment, pay, and dismissal of the third neutral party. Functional 
independence means that the third neutral party should at all times feel free 
that he can freely give his judgements.
C: Impartiality
The third neutral party must not have any internal prejudices, prejudge-
ment or predisposition towards some parties or some of the elements of the 
subject matter of the dispute.
D: Transparency
The dispute resolution process should be understandable and, if necessary, 
possible to replicate.
E: Fair Hearing
The disputants should be provided with (1) a notice informing them about 
the commencement of the dispute resolution process and (2) an opportunity 
to present their cases and rebut the cases of their opponents.
F: Counterpoise
Preexisting imbalances in the financial status of the parties and the com-
puter skills of the disputants should be neutralised.
G: Ensuring a reasonable length of procedure
The outcome of the dispute resolution procedure should be available within 
a period of 90 calendar days from the date on which the provider of dispute 
resolution services has received the complete complaint file. Nevertheless, 
in the case of highly complex disputes, the provider of dispute resolution 
services in charge may, at its own discretion, extend the 90 calendar days’ 
time period.
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H: Providing reasons
The provider of dispute resolution services must give the disputants a state-
ment of the grounds on which the outcome is based.34
I: Voluntary participation
The participation of the disputants in the dispute resolution procedure 
should be voluntary. However, national laws may require mandatory par-
ticipation on traders.
J: Process control
The increase of the control over the development and selection of informa-
tion that will constitute the basis for making a decision strengthens the per-
ceptions of procedural fairness.
K: Decision control
The increase of the extent to which the participants in a procedure can reject 
or accept a decision rendered by that procedure strengthens the perceptions 
of procedural fairness.
L: Consistency
The consistent application of a procedure across persons and across time 
strengthens the perceptions of procedural fairness.
M: Accuracy
Individuals view procedures based on accurate information as more fair 
than the procedures based on inaccurate information.
N: Correctability
The opportunity to correct a decision strengthens the perceptions of fairness 
of the procedure which was used for making the decision.
O: Ethicality
The increase of the extent to which a procedure conforms to personal stan-
dards of ethics and morality increases the extent of the perceived fairness of 
the procedure.
5.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we first identified nine elements of objective procedural fair-
ness on the basis of the Directive. These elements are as follows: expertise, 
independence, impartiality, transparency, fair hearing, counterpoise, ensur-
ing a reasonable length of procedure, providing reasons, and voluntary par-
34 It should be noted that this element is not relavant to facilitative processes (e.g., media-
tion) in which the third neutral party does not render decisions.
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ticipation. Also, we identified six elements of subjective procedural fairness, 
which do not overlap with the nine elements of objective procedural fair-
ness. These six elements are process control, decision control, consistency, 
accuracy, correctability, and ethicality. Afterwards, we explained our inter-
pretation of procedural fairness which consists of (1) the nine elements of 
objective procedural fairness and (2) the six elements of subjective proce-
dural fairness which do not overlap with the elements of objective proce-
dural fairness. Thus, the total number of elements of our interpretation of 
procedural fairness is fifteen.
In this chapter, we provide an answer to RQ3 (Are the past and present 
CODR procedures fair?) by investigating whether three CODR procedures 
comply with our interpretation of procedural fairness. In order to answer 
RQ3, we will select (Section 6.1) three CODR procedures, which are expect-
ed to some extent to comply with our interpretation of procedural fairness. 
Next, we will analyse whether the selected procedures actually comply with 
our interpretation of procedural fairness (Section 6.2). Finally, a conclusion 
is drawn (Section 6.3).
6.1 Selection of three CODR procedures
We have selected three CODR procedures, which represent each of the three 
types of CODR procedures, namely, (1) online opinion polls, (2) online mock 
jury systems, and (3) arbitration tribunals rendering self-enforceable deci-
sions. If we would select fewer than three CODR procedures, our analysis 
would lack completeness because it will draw conclusions about the fairness 
and procedural justice of CODR procedures without taking into account the 
characteristics of all three types of CODR procedures. If we select more than 
three CODR procedures, we may not be able to analyse each of the pro-
cedures in depth due to resolving and analysing subordinate differences 
between any two CODR procedures of the same type.
In order to select three CODR procedures, we will use the following two 
criteria: (1) the availability of documents explaining the examined proce-
dures; and (2) the use of adjudication for resolving disputes. The reason for 
choosing the first criterion is that the examination of the compliance of a 
procedure with our interpretation of procedural fairness requires a detailed 
description of the examined procedure. We have chosen adjudication as a 
second criterion because it is, subject to one exception, used by all CODR pro-
cedures.1 Thus, we can build a model of a fair CODR procedure on the basis 
of similar procedures and, more particularly, CODR procedures using adju-
dication. A model built on procedures using different mechanisms for resolv-
ing disputes may have internal inconsistencies because it will be created on 
the basis of comparing “apples with pears”, and not “apples with apples”.
1 All existing and past CODR procedures use adjudication for resolving disputes, except 
for PeopleClaim, which uses a combination between negotiation and mediation. People-
Claim is examined in detail in Section 3.1.B2.
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Obviously, there is a significant difference between mediation and adjudica-
tive ADR procedures (cf. Spies, 2014, p. 4). More specifically, while media-
tion facilitates the parties to resolve the conflict on their own, arbitration 
involves a decision by the intervening arbitrator (Ladd and Blanchfield, 
2016, p. 208).
Below, we explain how we will use the two criteria to select three CODR 
procedures representing online opinion polls (Subsection 6.1.1), online mock 
jury systems (Subsection 6.1.2), and arbitration tribunals rendering self-
enforceable decisions (Subsection 6.1.3).
6.1.1 Selection of a CODR procedure representing online opinion polls
In order to select a CODR procedure representing online opinion polls, we 
assess all CODR procedures that function as online opinion polls in accor-
dance with the aforementioned criteria. Table 3 shows our findings.
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CODR procedure 
functioning as online 
opinion poll
Availability of documents 
explaining the examined 
procedures
Use of adjudication for resolving 
disputes
iCourthouse (i-courthouse.com) The procedure of iCourthouse is 
explained in detail in iCourthouse’s 
Rule of Procedure2 and a FAQ 
document.3
iCourthouse uses adjudication 
for resolving disputes. More 
particularly, iCourthouse uses 
arbitration rendering evaluation 
reports indicating the number of 
verdicts for the plaintiff and for the 
defendant. 
Sidetaker (sidetaker.com) Sidetaker does not have a rule of 
procedure. Sidetaker’s procedure is 
explained to some extent in a FAQ 
document.4
Sidetaker uses adjudication for 
resolving disputes. More 
particularly, Sidetaker uses 
arbitration rendering evaluation 
reports indicating the percentage of 
verdicts in favour of the plaintiff 
and for the defendant.
PeopleClaim (peopleclaim.com) The operation of PeopleClaim is 
clearly explained in textual and 
video form on peopleclaim.com . 
Furthermore, some information 
about PeopleClaim’s operation is 
provided in a FAQ document.5 
PeopleClaim uses negotiation and 
mediation for resolving disputes. 
In more detail, if the dispute is not 
resolved through negotiation, the 
parties may allow the public to 
provide suggestions related to the 
resolution of the dispute. 
Table 3. Assessment of CODR procedures that function as online opinion polls in accordance 
with two criteria, namely, availability of documents explaining the examined procedures 
and the use of adjudication for resolving disputes 
2 The i-courthouse’s rule of procedure is available at www.i-courthouse.com/main.
taf?area1_id=front&area2_id=rulesofproc (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
3 The FAQ document explaining the operation of i-courthouse is available at www.i-court-
house.com/main.taf?area1_id=front&area2_id=faqs (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
4 The FAQ document explaining the operation of sidetaker is available at www.sidetaker.
com/faq.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
5 The FAQ document explaining the operation of PeopleClaim is available at www.people-
claim.com/faq.aspx?cID=1 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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The information in Table 3 clearly indicates that only iCourthouse and Side-
taker meet the two criteria chosen by us. PeopleClaim does not meet the 
second criterion because it uses negotiation and mediation, but not adjudi-
cation. Hence, we need to select either iCourthouse or Sidetaker.
We choose to examine iCourthouse because it has published a rule of 
procedure, which can help us to analyse in detail iCourthouse’s procedural 
fairness. We note that Sidetaker has not published such a rule of procedure.
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CODR procedure functioning 
as an online mock jury system
Availability of documents explaining the examined procedures
eJury (ejury.com) The operation of eJury is explained in two documents, namely, Terms & 
Conditions for Attorneys6 and Terms & Conditions for eJurors.7
JuryTest (jurytest.net) The operation of JuryTest is explained in two webpages entitled 
“Lawyers”8 and “Jurors”.9 It should be noted that JuryTest has published 
a sample case report which provides valuable information about the 
operation of JuryTest.10
OnlineVerdict (onlineverdict.com) The operation of OnlineVerdict is explained in four webpages, namely, 
(1) a webpage explaining the operation of OnlineVerdict to jurors11, 
(2) a webpage explaining the operation of OnlineVerdict to attorneys12, 
(3) a webpage containing FAQ related to jurors13, and (4) a webpage 
containing FAQ related to attorneys.14
TrialJuries (trialjuries.com) The operation of TrialJuries is explained in a webpage entitled “How it 
Works”15 and a webpage “FAQ”.16
Table 4. Assessment of CODR procedures that function as online mock jury systems in 
accordance with one criterion, namely, the use of adjudication for resolving disputes
6 Terms & Conditions for Attorneys is available at www.ejury.com/attys_terms.html (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2017).
7 Terms & Conditions for eJurors is available at www.ejury.com/jurors_terms.html (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2017).
8 The webpage explaining the operation of JuryTest to lawyers is available at www.jury-
test.net/index.cfm?action=howlaw (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
9 The webpage explaining the operation of JuryTest to jurors is available at www.jurytest.
net/index.cfm?action=howjur (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
10 The simple case report published by JuryTest is available at www.jurytest.net/survey-
Quest/QuestResult.cfm?jQuest=y&vtype=pr&n_id=989&typ=d&fi d=165&c_id=989 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
11 The webpage explaining the operation of OnlineVerdict to jurors is available at www.
onlineverdict.com/jurors/how-it-works (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
12 The webpage explaining the operation of OnlineVerdict to attorneys is available at www.
onlineverdict.com/attorneys/attorney-how-it-works (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
13 The webpage containing FAQ related to jurors is available at www.onlineverdict.com/
jurors/juror-faqs (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
14 The webpage containing FAQ related to attorneys is available at www.onlineverdict.
com/attorneys/faqs (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
15 The webpage entitled “How it Works” is available at https://www.tlextranet.com/tri-
aljuries/howitworks.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
16 The webpage entitled “FAQ” is available at https://www.tlextranet.com/trialjuries/faq.
html (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
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6.1.2 Selection of a CODR procedure representing online mock jury 
systems
We will select a CODR procedure representing online mock jury systems on 
the basis of one criterion only, namely, availability of documents explain-
ing the examined procedures. The use of adjudication for resolving disputes 
cannot be used as a criterion for selecting CODR procedures representing 
online mock jury systems because all such procedures use “mock” adjudi-
cation for the resolution of disputes. Table 4 displays the findings of our 
assessment of CODR procedures that function as online mock jury systems 
in accordance with the criterion chosen by us.
Taking into account the information provided in Table 4, we choose to 
proceed with JuryTest because of the availability of a sample case report 
which may provide us with valuable information related to the operation of 
JuryTest. We note that all examined CODR procedures functioning as online 
mock jury systems provide their users with comprehensive documents 
explaining their operation.
6.1.3 Selection of CODR procedures representing arbitration tribunals 
rendering self-enforceable decisions
Up until the present moment, four CODR procedures representing arbitra-
tion tribunals rendering self-enforceable decisions exist or have existed. 
These three CODR procedures are (1) the ECRF, (2) Marktplaats Gebrui-
kersjury, (3) Taobao User Dispute Resolution Center, and (4) and League of 
Angels Tribunal. In order to select a CODR procedure representing arbitra-
tion tribunals rendering self-enforceable decisions, we assess all four proce-
dures in accordance with the aforementioned criteria: availability of docu-
ments and use of adjudication. Table 5 shows our findings.
The information in Table 5 clearly indicates that all four CODR pro-
cedures meet the two criteria chosen by us. However, we chose the ECRF 
because of two reasons, namely, (1) its legal documents are published in 
English, which is the language of the present work and (2) its legal docu-
ments are comprehensive (the cummulative length of the ECRF’s legal 
documents is 3809 words, whereas the total length of the League of Angels 
Tribunal legal document is 950 words). Thus, we avoid the need for transla-
tion and the accompanying problems, such as non-equivalence between the 
legal terms in different languages.
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 CODR procedure functioning as 
arbitration tribunals rendering 
self-enforceable decisions
Availability of documents 
explaining the examined 
procedures




Although the ECRF was 
discontinued on 31st of January 
2012, the legal documents 
governing the ECRF are 
available on www. archive.org, 
a website which allows archives 
of the World Wide Web to be 
searched and accessed. The 
operation of the ECRF is 
explained in two documents, 
namely, Community Court 
FAQs17 and the Community 
Court Help.18
The ECRF uses adjudication 
for resolving disputes. More 
precisely, the ECRF uses non-
legally binding arbitration 





The operation of Marktplaats 
Gebruikersjury is explained 




Similarly to the ECRF, 
Marktplaats Gebruikersjury uses 
non-legally binding arbitration 
rendering self-enforceable 
decisions.
Taobao User Dispute Resolution Center
(http://pan.taobao.com/)
The operation of Taobao User 
Dispute Resolution Center is 
explained in Chinese at http://
pan.taobao.com/
Taobao User Dispute Resolution 
Center uses non-legally binding 
arbitration rendering self-
enforceable decisions.
League of Angels Tribunal
http://na.leagueoflegends.com/tribunal/
The operation of the League of 
Angels Tribunal is described in a 
FAQ document.19
League of Angels Tribunal uses 
non-legally binding arbitration 
rendering self-enforceable 
decisions.20
Table 5. Assessment of CODR procedures that function as arbitration tribunals rendering 
self-enforceable decisions in accordance with two criteria, namely, availability of documents 
explaining the examined procedures and the use of adjudication for resolving disputes
17181920
17 The Community Court FAQ’s is accessible at http://web.archive.org/web/20101202200651/
http://ebaycourt.com/cc/FAQ.jsf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
18 The Community Court Help page is accessible at http://web.archive.org/web/
20101202200619/http://ebaycourt.com/cc/CommunityCourtHelp.jsf (last visited Jan. 3,
2017).
19 League of Angels’ FAQ document effective as of 29th of November 2014 is accessible at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20141129183148/http://na.leagueofl egends.com/tribunal/
en/faq/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). It should be noted that the League of Angel’s FAQ is 
not currently available as the tribunal is down for maintenance. See http://tribunal.na.
leagueoflegends.com/en_US/maintenance.html (last visited Dec. 262016).
20 It should be noted that the verdicts of the tribunal are direcly enforceable only if they 
relate to low-level penalties, such as email warnings. The player support staff of League 
of Angels is responsible for reviewing and sanctioning severe cases. See Section 5 of 
League of Angel’s FAQ document effective as of 29th of November 2014. The document is 
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20141129183148/http://na.leagueofl egends.
com/tribunal/en/faq/(last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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6.2 Analysis of compliance with our interpretation
Below, we will assess the compliance of iCourthouse (Subsection 6.2.1), 
JuryTest (Subsection 6.2.2), and the ECRF (Subsection 6.2.3) with our inter-
pretation of procedural fairness. It is followed by a section summary (Sub-
section 6.2.4).
6.2.1 The compliance of iCourthouse with our interpretation
An assessment of the compliance of iCourthouse with each of the fifteen ele-
ments of our interpretation of procedural fairness (A-O) follows.
A: Expertise
iCourthouse’s Rules of Procedure do not require the members of the crowd 
to have any particular expertise.21
B: Independence
iCourthouse lacks rules ensuring the personal and functional independence 
of the jurors. Furthermore, iCourthouse has rules incentivising the appoint-
ment of jurors who may have relationships which may influence their deci-
sions. More specifically, Rule 6 of iCourthouse’s Rule of Procedure states:
“Rule 6: Invitation to Juror Duty
(a)  Each party may invite persons to serve as jurors on a case. There is no limit on the number of 
invitations that can be issued.
(b)  Persons invited to serve as juror on a case may forward the invitation to others.”
Rule 6 of iCourthouse’s Rule of Procedure de facto permits the parties to 
invite their families, friends, and co-workers to act as jurors in their case. 
Such jurors will most probably vote in favour of the party who invited them.
C: Impartiality
iCourthouse has not adopted any measures aiming to ensure that the jurors 
are impartial. iCourthouse’s Rule of Procedure does not oblige the jurors to 
act impartially. For example, if a juror decides a case merely on the infor-
mation of the nationality of the party, the juror will not contravene iCourt-
house’s Rule of Procedure.
Also, it is worth noting that the jurors can see the verdicts (including the 
reasons for the verdicts) posted by other jurors. This can lead to an informa-
tional cybercascade in which people will decide the case on the basis of the 
other verdicts and not on the basis of the merits of the case.22
21 iCourthouse’s Rules of Procedure can be found at www.i-courthouse.com/main.
taf?area1_id=about&area2_id=rulesofproc (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
22 Informational cybercascades were discussion in Section 3.1 (D).
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D: Transparency
iCourthouse’s Rules of Procedure consist of eight rules governing iCourt-
house’s dispute resolution procedure.23 These eight rules are easily acces-
sible on the website of iCourthouse. iCourthouse’s Rules of Procedure make 
the dispute resolution procedure understandable and easy to replicate.
E: Fair Hearing
iCourthouse complies with the two sub-elements of the element of fair hear-
ing, namely, (1) ensuring that each party participates in the dispute resolu-
tion process and (2) ensuring that each party can present its case and rebut 
the case of the opponent.
Regarding the first sub-element, we note that iCourthouse’s Rule of Pro-
cedure does not state whether an adequate notice is sent to the defendant 
once the claim is filled with iCourthouse. However, our empirical research 
indicated that the defendant receives an adequate notice by email immedi-
ately after the submission of the claim. The text of the notice is provided in 
Figure 19.
After the defendant completes the trial book, the website of iCourthouse 
informs the disputants about the commencement of the procedure.24
Pertaining to the second sub-element, the claimant and the defendant 
are allowed to present statements and evidence in a trial book, which will 
be read by the jurors.25 Hence, both disputants have the right to be heard.




If you wish to dispute this claim and tell your side of the story, come to iCourthouse at 
http://www.icourthouse.com/defendant.html and complete the registration process.
Be sure to use the same email address this message was delivered to.
After you register, you can reach your trial book (where you present your side of the case) by (1) clicking 
on the My iCourthouse button, (2) logging in with your user name and password, and (3) clicking on the 
“Edit and view your trial book” link displayed on your My iCourthouse page.
If you do not respond to this summons within seven days, the case will proceed without you. 
You will not be able to tell your side of the story at the iCourthouse.
Figure 19. A notice sent by iCourthouse to the defendant
23 iCourthouse’s Rules of Procedure can be found at www.i-courthouse.com/main.
taf?area1_id=about&area2_id=rulesofproc (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
24 The status of the iCourthouse cases is available at www.i-courthouse.com/main.
taf?area1_id=cases (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
25 See Rule 5 of iCourthouse’s Rule of Procedure. The Rule of Procedure is accessible at 
http://www.i-courthouse.com/main.taf?area1_id=about&area2_id=rulesofproc (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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F: Counterpoise
iCourthouse does not neutralise the existing imbalances in the financial 
status of the disputants and the computer skills of the disputants. This is 
because iCourthouse’s procedure is available and accessible exclusively 
online. Thus, disputants who do not have access to the Internet due to lack 
of financial resources will not be able to participate in the dispute resolution. 
The same applies to disputants who do not have computer skills.
G: Ensuring a reasonable length of procedure
iCourthouse’s Rule of Procedure does not specify a time period within 
which the outcome of the procedure should be made available. As a result, 
there are many cases which have not been decided for over 15 years.26
H: Providing reasons
Although the jurors are allowed to publish the reasons for their decisions, 
the publication of reasons is not mandatory. If the jurors do not publish 
the reasons for their decisions, the disputants may not be able to under-
stand whether the case was decided on the basis of a rational analysis. For 
example, an iCourthouse juror in case 2006-11528 made a decision without 
providing any comments. All what the disputants can see in relation to the 
contribution of the juror is as follows: “Juror 7: Has rendered a verdict in 
favour of the defendant (Mar 24, 2006).”
I: Voluntary participation
The participation in iCourthouse is voluntary. The decisions made through 
iCourthouse will be binding and enforceable only if the disputants agree so. 
In this regard, iCourthouse’s FAQ states as follows:
“You can use the following language to make your decision enforceable: “We, the parties to case 
number --- agree that the verdict rendered by the jury in the iCourthouse case will be binding on us, 
and will be enforceable as a judgment in a court of appropriate jurisdiction.”27
J: Process control
The disputants do not have a strong process control because they can sub-
mit limited statements and evidence. More specifically, the disputants are 
allowed to submit a brief summary of the case, which cannot exceed 100 
words, opening statement which cannot exceed 400 words, and arguments 
which cannot exceed 400 words. The submission of evidence is governed by 
Rule 2 of iCourthouse’s Rule of Procedure which states that: (i) parties are 
not allowed to submit files which are smaller than 100 kilobytes; and (ii) the 
total evidence submitted by the parties shall not exceed 1 megabyte.
26 See, for example, iCourthouse case numbers 2001-10662, 2001-10665, 2001-10666. Those 
three cases have not been resolved since 2001.
27 iCourthouse’s FAQ document is accessible at http://www.i-courthouse.com/main.
taf?area1_id=cases&area2_id=faqs (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
Procedural fairness of CODR procedures 135
The aforementioned restrictions significantly limit the control of the 
disputants over the development and selection of information that will 
constitute the basis for making a decision. For example, the disputants are 
unable to upload high resolution pictures and videos which often exceed 1 
megabyte. Besides, the disputants are unable to upload complex arguments 
exceeding 400 words.
K: Decision control
The disputants have a strong decision control because the evaluation reports 
rendered by iCourthouse will not be legally binding unless the disputants 
agree otherwise. In case the disputants would like to make the evaluation 
report issued by iCourthouse binding, they need to accept a clause pub-
lished by iCourthouse. 28 The clause reads as follows:
“In the event that a dispute arises out of this transaction, the parties agree to submit that dispute for 
binding resolution through iCourthouse. In the event that a party shall refuse to submit the dispute 
to iCourthouse, or files an action in any other court without first offering dispute resolution through 
iCourthouse, that party shall lose any right to attorney’s fees it might otherwise be entitled to. The 
parties further agree that any verdict of iCourthouse may be reduced to a judgement in any court 
having jurisdiction over the parties, at the option of any party, without further adjudication.”
It should be noted that the inclusion of the aforementioned clause can be 
problematic because iCourthouse does not render final verdicts. It renders 
evaluation reports indicating the number of verdicts in favour of the claim-
ant and the defendant. However, the number of verdicts in favour of the 
claimant and the defendant may change over time. Hence, if the disputants 
include the aforementioned clause in their legally binding agreement, a dis-
pute may arise as to when the evaluation report rendered by iCourthouse 
becomes final. In order to avoid such a dispute, the disputants may “agree 
that only the verdicts given before a specific date and time will count, or 
that only the first given number of verdicts will count.”29 However, as Schia-
vetta (2008, p. 157) points out, if the disputants reach an agreement, but later 
become aware that some of the third parties lack independence or impartial-
ity it will be too late to have the agreement void.
L: Consistency
The cases submitted to iCourthouse are publicly available on the Internet.30 
However, under iCourthouse’s Rule of Procedure, the jurors are not obliged 
to read previous cases and render decisions which are consistent with previ-
ously decided cases. The only obligation of the jurors is to “read and review 
28 The clause is available at http://www.i-courthouse.com/main.taf?area1_id=front&
area2_id=faqs (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
29 See iCourthouse’s FAQ available at www.i-courthouse.com/main.taf?area1_id=front&
area2_id=faqs (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
30 The cases submitted to iCourthouse are publicly available at www.i-courthouse.com/
main.taf?area1_id=cases (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
136 Chapter 6
the entire contents of each party’s Trial Book before rendering a verdict.”31 
Therefore, in iCourthouse, similar cases may lead to totally different ver-
dicts.
It is worth mentioning that the iCourthouse cases are not classified in 
accordance with the issues discussed in the cases. The iCourthouse cases 
are merely listed in accordance with their case number. As a result, even if 
the jurors would like to render consistent decisions, the jurors may not be 
able to find relevant previously decided cases. The consistency of the deci-
sions requires classification of cases on the basis of the issues discussed in 
them. Such a classification is provided, for example, in respect to the UDRP 
decisions.32
M: Accuracy
iCourthouse allows either disputant to notify the jurors about inaccurate 
information submitted by the other disputant. Thus, iCourthouse ensures 
that the jurors will make a decision based only on accurate information. For 
example, in iCourthouse case No 2006-11530, one of the jurors clearly states 
that the evidence presented by the claimant is inaccurate. The exact com-
ment of the juror follows.
“The plaintiff presents no evidence; the picture is so tiny it is impossible to tell what, if any, damage 
there is to the face; there is no medical evidence presented telling what this “scarring” is, what 
caused it, etc. There is also no explanation as to who the “characters” in this little mini drama are...
what capacity did the defendant have at the restaurant? What would his motive be for poisoning 
you? Where is the medical evidence? Sorry. You need to present a far better case than this.”33
N: Correctability
The decision rendered through iCourthouse can be appealed in iCourthouse 
unless the disputants have agreed that the decision cannot be appealed. For 
instance, the disputants can appeal the decision by using the paid feature 
“JurySmart” provided by iCourthouse.34 This feature allows the parties to 
receive a written report of the results of their appeal case, which includes 
(i) each juror’s verdict, (ii) comments and questions posed by jurors, and 
(iii) detailed profiles about each juror containing each juror’s age, sex, occu-
pation, education, and annual income. Being more detailed, the JurySmart 
report seems more credible than the case summaries, which are provided by 
iCourthouse to disputants who use the regular functionality of iCourthouse.
31 See Rule 7 of iCourthouse’s Rule of Procedure available at www.i-courthouse.com/main.
taf?area1_id=cases&area2_id=rulesofproc (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
32 The website of the Czech Arbitration Court, an accredited UDRP provider, allows the 
visitors of the website to search for UDRP decisions by using a large number of criteria 
related to the issues discussed in the UDRP decisions. The website of the Czech Arbitra-
tion Court is available at http://udrp.adr.eu (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
33 The comment of the juror is available at www.i-courthouse.com/main.taf?area1_id=
trialbook&trialbook_id=16895 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
34 For more information on JurySmart, please visit www.i-courthouse.com/main.taf?area1_
id=jurysmart (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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O: Ethicality
The assessment of the compliance of iCourthouse with the component 
of ethicality will vary depending on the personal standards of ethics and 
morality of the users of iCourthouse. Hence, an objective assessment of the 
compliance of iCourthouse with the component of ethicality is not possible.
For the sake of clarity, we note that there are two types of assessments, 
namely, objective and subjective assessments (cf. Maunganidze, Kasayira, 
and Mudhorozi, 2012, p. 332). The objective assessment is a form of ques-
tioning which has a single correct answer, whereas the subjective assessment 
is a form of questioning which may have more than one correct answer.
6.2.2 The compliance of Jurytest with our interpretation
An assessment of the compliance of JuryTest with each of the fifteen ele-
ments of our interpretation of procedural fairness (A-O) is provided below.
A: Expertise
JuryTest does not require jurors to have legal skills and/or expertise in alter-
native dispute resolution.35 Candidates for jurors should meet four require-
ments, none of which is related to their expertise. The requirements are as 
follows: (1) jurors should not be lawyers; (2) jurors should not be insurance 
company representatives; (3) jurors should not participate as consultants to 
the lawyers who will use the services provided by JuryTest; and (4) jurors 
should not disclose the names of any parties mentioned in the mock cases.36
B: Independence
JuryTest neither obliges the jurors to be independent nor uses any safe-
guards aiming to ensure the independence of the jurors. However, by 
requiring the jurors to keep confidential the facts and the names of any of 
the parties in cases in which they are involved as jurors, JuryTest ensures 
that the jurors would not be able to create relationships with the disputants 
involved in the case.37 Such relationships may have an impact on the inde-
pendence of the jurors.
C: Impartiality
In order to register as jurors, the jurors need to meet the requirements men-
tioned in Subsection 6.2.2 A. However, JuryTest does not oblige the mock 
jurors to be impartial when deciding the cases.
35 The requirements to which JuryTest jurors should comply are available at http://jurytest.
net/index.cfm?action=signupjur (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). It should be noted that jurors 
in general are not required to have expertise as they are merely triers of facts (cf. Har-





The operation of JuryTest is explained in detail on its website.38 More partic-
ularly, the operation consists of six steps, namely, (1) preparing a summary 
of the case, (2) uploading exhibits, (3) recording the case by using a toll free 
number, (4) reviewing the case by the jurors, (5) provision of feedback by 
the jurors, and (6) receiving the feedback of the jurors. 39 The first, second, 
third, and sixth steps must be completed by the disputant who wants to test 
his real case, whereas the fourth and the fifth steps must be completed by 
the jurors. The detailed explanation of the operation of JuryTest makes this 
CODR procedure understandable and easy to replicate.
E: Fair hearing
JuryTest does not comply with the two sub-elements of the element of fair 
hearing, namely, (1) ensuring that each party participates in the dispute 
resolution process and (2) ensuring that each party can present its case and 
rebut the case of the opponent.
As for the first sub-element, since only one disputant (i.e., the dispu-
tant wanting to test its real case) is involved in the mock trials organised 
by JuryTest, no notice of commencement of the procedure is sent to other 
disputants. However, a disputant may, at its sole discretion, submit to other 
disputants a notice of commencement of the procedure outside JuryTest 
platform. The notice may contain a request for a response. The received 
response can be submitted to the JuryTest jurors.
Pertaining to the second sub-element, JuryTest does not provide all dis-
putants with an opportunity to present their cases and rebut the cases of their 
opponents because only one disputant is involved in the mock trial. How-
ever, JuryTest strongly recommends the disputant using JuryTest to present 
the other side of the case by a “colleague playing opposing counsel”.40
F: Counterpoise
Since only one disputant is involved in the CODR procedure provided by 
JuryTest, JuryTest does not have any rules aiming to neutralise the existing 
imbalances in the financial status of all disputants and the computer skills 
of all disputants.
G: Ensuring a reasonable length of procedure
JuryTest states that jurors will provide their feedback within a day or two.41 
If the disputant testing his real case pays a slight surcharge to JuryTest, the 
jurors will provide their feedback quicker.42 Hence, JuryTest ensures a rea-
sonable length of procedure.
38 The operation of JuryTest is explained at http://jurytest.net/index.cfm?action=howlaw 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
39 See http://jurytest.net/index.cfm?action=howlaw (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
40 See www.jurytest.net/how/how_popup.cfm?action=L1 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
41 See www.jurytest.net/how/how_popup.cfm?action=L5 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
42 See www.jurytest.net/how/how_popup.cfm?action=L5 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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H: Providing reasons
JuryTest requires jurors to complete a detailed questionnaire, which may 
include questions about the reasons for making a decision.43 A sample ques-
tionnaire published by JuryTest contains a number of such questions, e.g., 
“What was the primary reason for your verdict decision?”, “How did you 
decide the amount of damages you awarded, if any?”, “What were the two 
strongest points in favour of the plaintiff, Estate of Edward Smith?”, “What 
were the two strongest points in favour of the defendant, Maxwell Jones, 
M.D.?” 44
I: Voluntary participation
The disputant wanting to test his real case voluntary agrees to use the ser-
vices of JuryTest. The same applies for jurors.
J: Process control
The disputant wanting to test his real case has a strong process control 
because it has the opportunity to provide the jurors with: (i) an audio sum-
mary of up to 30 minutes; and (ii) unlimited evidence. The disputant willing 
to record an audio summary can do so either by calling a toll-free number or 
by receiving a phone call from JuryTest’s staff.45
The disputant recording the summary can support his argument by 
adding visual exhibits to the audio summary.46 Jurors will see the exhibits in 
the same order in which they were presented by the disputant.47According 
to JuryTest, the use of visual exhibits makes the presentation more interest-
ing and allows the disputant to capture the full dimensions of the case.48
Once recorded, the summary is converted to a streaming media file and 
delivered to the jurors.49
K: Decision control
The verdicts rendered by the jurors are recommendations, which can be 
used as a negotiating tool by the disputant who conducted the mock trial 
organised by JuryTest. More specifically, the disputant using the services 
provided by JuryTest will receive information about his Best Alternative to 
a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), which can be used for deciding whether 
or not to accept a negotiation offer (cf. Blake, Browne, Sime, 2014, p. 186). It 
should be noted that the disputant using the services provided by JuryTest 
has a full decision control, i.e., a yes-no control over the acceptance of the 
verdict rendered by JuryTest jurors.
43 See www.jurytest.net/how/how_popup.cfm?action=L5 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
44 See www.jurytest.net/surveyQuest/QuestResult.cfm?jQuest=y&vtype= pr&n_id=
989&typ=d&fi d=165&c_id=98 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
45 See http://jurytest.net/index.cfm?action=howlaw (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
46 See http://jurytest.net/how/how_popup.cfm?action=L2 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
47 Idem.
48 Idem.
49 See http://jurytest.net/index.cfm?action=howlaw (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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L: Consistency
JuryTest does not publish any information about the verdicts rendered by 
JuryTest jurors. The only exception is a sample case report.50 Thus, the ver-
dicts rendered by JuryTest jurors may be inconsistent with previously decid-
ed cases. In order to ensure consistency of the decisions, JuryTest needs to 
publish at least short summaries of the decided cases in which any confi-
dential information is removed. In addition to ensuring consistency of the 
decisions, these short summaries will provide other disputants with infor-
mation about their BATNAs, which can be used for out-of-court settlement 
of disputes.
M: Accuracy
JuryTest does not have any mechanisms ensuring that the verdicts of Jury-
Test will be based on accurate information. Consequently, if a disputant 
using the services of JuryTest provides incorrect information to JuryTest 
jurors, no one can challenge the accuracy of the information. In comparison 
to iCourthouse, JuryTest jurors are not allowed to ask the disputants ques-
tions aiming to find out whether the information provided to the jurors is 
accurate.
N: Correctability
If JuryTest jurors made a decision on the basis of incorrect information, the 
disputant using the services of JuryTest can always commence a new mock 
trial procedure on the basis of the correct information. Consequently, the 
users of JuryTest have unlimited opportunity to correct the information 
used for making decisions.
O: Ethicality
An objective assessment of the compliance of JuryTest with the component 
of ethicality is not possible. The reason is that the assessment of ethicality 
depends on personal standards of ethics and morality, which differ across 
people.
6.2.3 The compliance of the ECRF with our interpretation
Below, we provide an assessment of the compliance of the ECRF with each 
of the fifteen elements of our interpretation of procedural fairness (A-O).
50 See the sample case report published by JuryTest. The report is available at https://www.
jurytest.net/surveyQuest/QuestResult.cfm?jQuest=y&vtype=pr&n_id=989&typ=d&fi d=
165&c_id=98 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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A: Expertise
The ECRF jurors are not required to have understanding of law and/or 
skills in alternative dispute resolution.51 However, they are required to meet 
certain requirements related to their eBay transaction history. These require-
ments are examined in detail in Section 3.3.A.
B: Independence
Independence of the jurors in the ECRF is guaranteed by the requirement 
that jury members will not be allocated to a case if they have ever had a 
transaction with either party of the case. It should be noted that in com-
parison with traditional arbitration, including online arbitration, where the 
independence of the arbitrator is guaranteed by obliging the arbitrator to 
declare certain relationship with the disputants, the ECRF automatically 
prevents an appointment of an arbitrator who has certain relationship with 
the disputants. Consequently, since requiring the arbitrators to disclose any 
circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator’s impar-
tiality or independence cannot in practice ensure that the arbitrator will 
disclose any relationship between the disputants, the independence of the 
third neutral party in the ECRF is better guaranteed than in the traditional 
arbitration. This is because instead of relying on the arbitrator to disclose 
information concerning his impartiality or independence it automatically 
detects relationships between the member of the crowd and the disputants. 
Actually, the ECRF can be regarded as the first dispute resolution platform 
that is able to establish automatically relationships between the disputants 
and the third neutral party. This method for guaranteeing independence 
is completely new. Once it is fully developed and applied, it will certainly 
ensure a fairer dispute resolution procedure.
C: Impartiality
The impartiality in the ECRF is ensured by four ways. First, the ECRF keeps 
the names and other contact information of the jurors in anonymity.52 It 
makes impossible for the disputants to contact the jurors and to affect their 
impartiality.
Second, the jury is randomly allocated.53 Consequently, an eventual par-
tial juror will have difficulties to find the case in which he has interest. The 
only way to do this is to participate in several cases, until he is appointed to 
the “right” case. Therefore, more cases in the ECRF will mean a better guar-
antee for the impartiality of the crowd.
51 See Community Court’s FAQs, http://www.ebaycourt.com/cc/FAQ.jsf. The archived 
webpage is available at https://web.archive.org/web/20111213132628/http://www.
ebaycourt.com/cc/FAQ.jsf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). See also “Community Court Help”, 
http://ebaycourt.com/cc/CommunityCourtHelp.jsf. The archived webpage is accessi-
ble at https://web.archive.org/web/20101123102540/http://ebaycourt.com/cc/Com-




Third, if it is highly likely that the juror is impartial, the ECRF will stop 
referring cases to this juror. In order to find out whether the juror is impartial, 
the ECRF checks (1) how many times the members of the crowd are in minor-
ity on a decision, (2) how long they review the information submitted by the 
buyer and the seller, and (3) the rationale that the jurors provide to back up 
their decisions (cf. Rule and Nagarajan, 2010, p. 6). If a member of the crowd 
is several times in the minority on a decision, takes a decision in a very short 
time or without reasoning, it is likely that he is either partial or takes deci-
sions without using a rational approach (cf. Rule and Nagarajan, 2010, p. 6).
Fourth, if there are only hesitations concerning his impartiality, the “sus-
pected” juror receives a test, which is composed from already solved case. If 
he does not pass the test, the ECRF will no more refer cases to him (see Rule 
and Nagarajan, 2010, p. 6).
D: Transparency
The webpages “Community Court’s FAQs” and “The Community Court 
Help” provided the users of the ECRF with extensive information about 
the operation of the ECRF.54 This information makes the ECRF procedure 
understandable and easy to replicate.
E: Fair hearing
The ECRF complies with the two sub-elements of the element of fair hear-
ing, namely, (1) ensuring that each party participates in the dispute resolu-
tion process and (2) ensuring that each party can present its case and rebut 
the case of the opponent.
Regarding the first sub-element, the defendant receives a notice about 
the claim through email.55 The notice of the claim provides the defendant 
with instructions on how to respond to the claim.56 The claimant is informed 
about the submissions of the defendant by email and provided with the 
opportunity to respond to the submissions within a time period of 2 days.57
It should be pointed out that the submission of notices via email has two 
disadvantages compared to submission of notices via regular mail (cf. Ken-
nedy and Mighell, p. 207). First, since many users receive a large number of 
spam message, notices can get lost or overlooked amongst spam messages. 
Second, as spam filters become more aggressive, notices may be identified 
as spam and never reach the recipient. In order to decrease the chance of 
unreceived messages due to the aforementioned problems, the ECRF could 
have sent the notices by using a number of forms of communication. For 
54 See Community Court’s FAQs, www.ebaycourt.com/cc/FAQ.jsf. The archived webpage 
is available at www.web.archive.org/web/20111213132628/http://www.ebaycourt.
com/cc/FAQ.jsf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
55 See Community Court’s FAQs, www.ebaycourt.com/cc/FAQ.jsf. The archived webpage 
is available at www.web.archive.org/web/20111213132628/http://www.ebaycourt.
com/cc/FAQ.jsf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
56 Idem.
57 Idem.
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example, the Czech Arbitration Court allows the parties in UDRP disputes 
to use three different communication forms, namely, (1) electronic form (via 
an online platform with notifications by email), (2) hard copy sent by regis-
tered post or courier service, and (3) facsimile form (telefax). 58
Concerning the second sub-element, each disputant in an ECRF case is 
allowed to upload information in order to support its case. This information 
might include, for example: (1) dates of bidding, buying, and paying; (2) the 
date of sending or receiving an item; (3) proof that the item is paid, sent or 
received; (4) information about the condition in which the item was sent or 
received; (5) all other information that will support the case.59 Moreover, the 
disputants can write a statement of up 5000 characters and include up to 3 
photos.60 A disputant has to agree to a Privacy Policy in order to send photos 
to the ECRF.61 This is required as the photos may contain personal informa-
tion about some of the disputants.62 If a disputant does not agree with the 
Privacy Policy, the jury will not be able to see photo evidence from either side 
of the case. They will see a message informing them which disputant did not 
agree to the Privacy Policy.63 The right to rebut the case of the opponent in 
the ECRF is guaranteed by the right of the buyer to respond to the claim.64 
The defendant has 10 days after the receival of the notification of the claim.65 
Then, the claimant has two days to respond to the defendant’s statement.66
In the light of the aforementioned observations, we may conclude that 
the ECRF provides the parties with a fair hearing.
F: Counterpoise
The ECRF procedure is available and accessible exclusively online. Thus, 
disputants who do not have (1) financial resources to purchase access to the 
Internet and/or (2) computer skills required for using online applications 
would not be able to participate in the ECRF.67 Therefore, the ECRF does not 
neutralise the existing imbalances in the financial status and the computer 
skills of the disputants.
58 See Section 2.13 “Communication during a UDRP proceeding” of the “Help” webpage 
published by the Czech Arbitration Court. The webpage is available at https://udrp.adr.
eu/adr/help/index.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
59 See, Community Court’s FAQs, www.ebaycourt.com/cc/FAQ.jsf. The archived webpage is 
available at www.web.archive.org/web/20111213132628/http://www.ebaycourt.com/








67 Since the disputants using the ECRF are users of an e-commerce website (eBay.com), they 
presumably have computer skills required for using online applications. However, this 
may not always be the case, e.g., the computer skills of an individual may be limited to 
purchasing goods from eBay and the skills necessary for taking and uploading photos 
and other evidence may lack.
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G: Ensuring a reasonable length of procedure
According to the webpage “Community Court’s FAQs” published by the 
ECRF, the length of ECRF procedures cannot exceed 22 days. The time peri-
od of 22 days can be divided into three parts, namely, (1) the defendant has 
10 days to respond to the claim, (2) the claimant has 2 days to add a rebuttal, 
and (3) the jury has 10 days to render a verdict.68
H: Providing reasons
The ECRF does not require the jurors to provide reasons for their deci-
sions.69 Although the personnel working at the ECRF is allowed to monitor 
the decisions rendered by the ECRF, the lack of reasons for the ECRF deci-
sions complicates the identification of bias and other violations of ECRF’s 
rules. 70
I: Voluntary participation
The documents explaining the operation of the ECRF do not mention any 
mandatory participation obligations to the disputants in ECRF.71 Hence, the 
disputants voluntary participate in the CODR procedure.
J: Process control
The submissions of the disputants in the ECRF are limited to statements of 
up to 3 photos and a text of 5000 characters.72 This prohibition is in line with 
the ECRF’s statement that: “The best case is one that is concise, to the point, 
logical, and avoids irrelevant information or personal attacks.” 73
Hence, disputants are unable to present video evidence and sound evi-
dence related to the case. This seriously limits the process control of the dispu-
tants. For example, a buyer would not be able to upload a video demonstrat-
ing that the purchased product does not operate as described by the seller.
One explanation for the prohibition to upload video evidence is that 
video evidence may be subject to a number of technical challenges, includ-
ing a lack of bandwidth infrastructure in some countries and need to make 




70 See Community Court’s FAQs, http://www.ebaycourt.com/cc/FAQ.jsf. The archived 
webpage is available at https://web.archive.org/web/20111213132628/http://www.
ebaycourt.com/cc/FAQ.jsf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). See also “Community Court Help”, 
http://ebaycourt.com/cc/CommunityCourtHelp.jsf. The archived webpage is accessi-
ble at https://web.archive.org/web/20101123102540/http://ebaycourt.com/cc/Com-
munityCourtHelp.jsf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
71 Idem.
72 See “The Community Court Help” available at http://ebaycourt.com/cc/Community-
CourtHelp.jsf. The archived webpage is available at https://web.archive.org/web/
20101123102540/http://ebaycourt.com/cc/CommunityCourtHelp.jsf (last visited Jan. 3, 
2017).
73 Idem.
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K: Decision control
The disputants in the ECRF do not have any opportunity to reject or accept 
an ECRF decision.74 If the jurors vote to remove the disputed feedback, 
an eBay Customer Service representative will remove the feedback.75 If 
the jurors vote to keep the disputed feedback, the disputed feedback will 
remain intact in seller’s profile.76 This means that the disputants do not have 
any decision control over the ECRF decisions.
L: Consistency
Since the decisions of the ECRF are not made publicly available, the ECRF 
jurors are unable to take into account previously published decisions when 
deciding a case. As a result, the decisions rendered by the ECRF may be 
inconsistent.
Therefore, the ECRF does not use any mechanism ensuring the consis-
tency of the ECRF decisions. As noted with regard to JuryTest, the consisten-
cy of the ECRF decisions can be ensured by (1) publishing short summaries 
of the decisions (without any confidential information) and (2) classifying 
the decisions in accordance with the issues discussed in them.
M: Accuracy
The ECRF allows either disputant to notify the jurors about inaccurate infor-
mation submitted by other disputants. Since the jurors are experienced eBay 
members, they will be able to disregard information, which is proven to be 
inaccurate. Therefore, we may conclude that the ECRF ensures that the cases 
will be resolved on the basis of accurate information.
N: Correctability
Once delivered, an ECRF judgement cannot be corrected. This is clearly stat-
ed in the following paragraph of ECRF’s FAQ:
“The jury’s decision is final and binding. There is no appeals process. eBay will not respond to any 
appeals made in relation to Community review forum verdicts. You cannot submit a case of unfair 
feedback twice.”77
O: Ethicality
An objective assessment of the ethicality of the ECRF is not possible because 
the ethicality depends on personal standards of ethics and morality which 
differ widely amongst the people.
74 See Community Court’s FAQs, http://www.ebaycourt.com/cc/FAQ.jsf. The archived 
webpage is available at https://web.archive.org/web/20111213132628/http://www.






This section analysed the compliance of iCourthouse, JuryTest, and the 
ECRF with our interpretation of procedural fairness. Our summarised find-
ings are shown in Table 6.
The findings clearly indicate that each of the three examined procedures 
do not comply with the requirements of our interpretation of procedural 
fairness. Expertise, counterpoise, and consistency appear to be the only ele-
ments with which none of the examined procedures complies. iCourthouse 
and JuryTest comply with seven of the fifteen elements of our interpretation 
of procedural fairness, whereas the ECRF complies with nine of the exam-
ined components. We note that the objective assessment of ethicality is not 
possible due to the variance of ethical and moral standards across people.
In the light of the foregoing, we may conclude that there is much space 









Expertise - - -
Independence - - V
Impartiality - - V
Transparency V V V
Fair hearing V - V
Counterpoise - - -
Ensuring a reasonable 
length of procedure
- V V
Providing reasons - V V
Voluntary participation V V V
Process control V
(There are serious 
limitations to the process 
control)
V V
(There are serious 
limitations to the process 
control)
Decision control V V -
Consistency - - -
Accuracy V - V
Correctability V V -
Ethicality Objective assessment is 
not possible
Objective assessment is 
not possible
Objective assessment is 
not possible
Table 6. Findings of the assessment of iCourthouse, JuryTest, and the ECRF with our 
interpretation of procedural fairness [ – means “does not comply”, V means compliance]
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6.3 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we started selecting three CODR procedures to examine as to 
whether they comply with our interpretation of procedural fairness. For the 
selection, we used the following two criteria: (1) availability of documents 
explaining the examined procedures; and (2) use of adjudication for resolv-
ing disputes used by the procedures. The first criterion was chosen because 
the examination of the compliance of a procedure with our interpretation of 
procedural fairness requires a detailed description of the examined proce-
dure. The second criterion was chosen for two reasons. First, the three types 
of CODR procedures have representative procedures using adjudication. 
Second, we intend to build a model of a fair CODR procedure on the basis 
of similar procedures.
After selecting the procedures, we examined their compliance with our 
interpretation of procedural fairness. We found that the examined CODR 
procedures functioning as online opinion polls and online mock jury trials 
comply with seven elements of our interpretation of procedural fairness, 
whereas the ECRF complies with nine such elements.
It is possible that the automatic enforcement of the judgements rendered 
by the ECRF is the reason for the compliance of the ECRF with more ele-
ments of procedural fairness than CODR procedures functioning as online 
opinion polls and online mock jury trials. The enforcement of largely unfair 
decisions will have a direct impact on eBay’s community. In order to ensure 
that such an impact will be well-accepted by the eBay’s community, eBay 
designed the ECRF in such a way as to be more fair than the other two 
examined CODR procedures.
The direct answer to RQ3 (Are the past and present CODR procedures 
fair?) is that the examined CODR procedures do not comply with some of 
the elements of our interpretation of procedural fairness. It should be point-
ed out that our answer to RQ3 is based on the examination of three CODR 
procedures (i.e., iCourthouse, JuryTest, and the ECRF), and not on examina-
tion of all CODR procedures.

In this chapter, we design and construct a model of a CODR procedure that 
complies with our interpretation of procedural fairness. Thus, we answer the 
PS (To what extent is it possible for CODR procedures to resolve disputes in a 
way that complies with the requirements of procedural fairness) and accom-
plish our research goal (proposing a model of a CODR procedure that would 
guarantee a fair dispute resolution).
In Section 7.1, we describe our model of a fair CODR procedure. It con-
stitutes a plethora of ideas for making CODR compliant with our interpre-
tation of procedural fairness. The actual implementation of the ideas may 
vary depending on the characteristics of the respective CODR procedure. 
The model should not be accepted as an exhaustive list of ideas for ensur-
ing compliance of CODR with our interpretation of procedural fairness. The 
model is designed as a starting point for academic debate in the fields of 
procedural fairness of CODR procedures. In Section 7.2, we summarize the 
model, i.e., we highlight the fifteen elements without giving the underlying 
role of the ideas.
7.1 THE COMPOSITION OF THE MODEL
The model consists of fifteen elements, each of which corresponds to one 
of the elements of our interpretation of procedural fairness. The fifteen ele-
ments of our model of a fair CODR procedure are expertise (7.1.1), indepen-
dence (7.1.2), impartiality (7.1.3), transparency (7.1.4), fair hearing (7.1.5), 
counterpoise (7.1.6), ensuring a reasonable length of procedure (7.1.7), 
providing reasons (7.1.8), voluntary participation (7.1.9), process control 
(7.1.10), decision control (7.1.11), consistency (7.1.12), accuracy (7.1.13), cor-
rectability (7.1.14), and ethicality (7.1.15). Each of these elements is exam-
ined in more detail below.
7.1.1 Expertise
A CODR procedure should ensure that the members of the crowd meet the 
expertise requirements vested in Article 6(1)(a) of the Directive on consumer 
ADR (i.e., the necessary knowledge and skills in the field of alternative judi-
cial resolution of consumer disputes and a general understanding of law) by 
allowing only members of the crowd meeting those requirements to partici-
pate in the procedure.
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The screening process as to whether a member of the crowd complies 
with the requirements of Article 6(1)(a) may consists of three steps, namely, 
(1) completion of an online application, (2) taking a short subject matter test, 
and (3) crowd verification of credentials proving that the requirements of 
Article 6(1)(a) are met. In the first step, the members of the crowd will need 
add information about their knowledge and skills in the field of alterna-
tive judicial resolution of consumer disputes and a general understanding 
of law. In the second step, they will need to take an online test, which aims 
to find out whether the information in the online application corresponds to 
their actual knowledge and skills. In the third step, the knowledge and the 
skills of the members of the crowd will be verified by using crowd verifica-
tion.
Crowd verification is a process in which the crowd has the task to veri-
fy information (cf. Wintterlin and Blöbaum, p. 86, 2016). At present, crowd 
verification is used for various purposes, including, without any limitation 
so far, verifying biological network models1 and software verification (cf. 
Logas, Kirchner, Murray, Schäf, Whitehead Jr., 2014). Furthermore, there are 
proposals for using crowdsourcing for verification of international treaties 
and verification of disaster signals published in social media (see Meier, 
2013; Aftergood, 2015). In order to conduct crowd verification of credentials 
proving that the requirements of Article 6(1)(a) are met, the members of the 
crowd should contact organisations or individuals, which can verify the cre-
dentials.
7.1.2 Independence
To ensure the independence of the members of the crowd, a CODR proce-
dure should not allow persons that have actual relationship with the dis-
putants to be a member of the crowd. This can be achieved by adopting 
rules for independence and incorporating them in the CODR procedure. It 
means that the CODR procedure should automatically find any relationship 
between the crowd and the disputants that can question the independence 
of the crowd. The CODR procedure should not allocate to a case members 
of the crowd who are not independent. For instance, in the online auctions, 
members of the crowd should not be allocated to cases if they have ever had 
a sale transaction with some of the parties. Using modern technologies, a 
CODR procedure can be designed in such a way that it will automatically: 
(1) detect relationships between members of the crowd; and (2) disallow 
members of the crowd who lack independence from participating in CODR 
cases.2
1 See the website “sbv improver” available at https://sbvimprover.com/challenge-3/vid-
eos-and-seminars/tutorials/online-crowd-verifi cation (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
2 For instance, the ECRF automatically fi nds relations between the members of the crowd 
and the seller. When the ECRF fi nds such a relation it does not allocate the member of the 
crowd to the case.
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7.1.3 Impartiality
The best way for ensuring impartiality in a CODR procedure is to restrict the 
members of the crowd from identifying cases in which they have interest. 
This will prevent the crowd from basing its decision on internal prejudices, 
prejudgements, or predispositions towards one of the parties. We propose 
four ways for restricting the members of the crowd to identify the case in 
which they have interest.
First, the members of the crowd that wish to participate in CODR should 
be able to do that without having an opportunity to choose the case, which 
they will solve. It means that if they express their willingness to participate 
in the CODR procedure, they will have to solve a randomly selected case.3 
This will prevent the members of the crowd from choosing cases in which 
they have interest. So, a random procedure is recommended.
Second, in order to decrease the chance of “searching for the right case” 
through “solving other cases”, the members of the crowd can have the 
right to participate only a limited number of times in the CODR procedure. 
The ECRF allows the eBay members to vote as much as they can but if the 
CODR procedure has to resolve a small amount of cases, a requirement for 
a maximum number of votes per month or per day can be helpful. How-
ever, restricting the crowd from participating multiple times in the dispute 
resolution process will perhaps decrease the amount of the members of the 
crowd. In turn, less members of the crowd can lead to a delayed decision 
or even a decision that is never rendered. Therefore, the balance between 
ensuring impartiality by restricting the members of the crowd to vote sev-
eral times and ensuring the operability of the procedure by providing a suf-
ficient number of members of the crowd is necessary and recommended.
Third, a problem arises, if only a few cases that need to be resolved are 
in the CODR platform. In this case, the members of the crowd will be able to 
pick the case in which they have interest after participating in all other cases 
if any. Even if they have the right to participate in the CODR procedure only 
one or a few times, they can motivate other members of the crowd to partici-
pate in the procedure in order to render an unfair decision or register sev-
eral times with different accounts in order to manipulate the outcome of the 
decision. A solution of this problem can be the creation of a large number of 
“fake cases”, which aim will be to prevent members of the crowd from pick-
ing cases in which they have interest. The amount of the “fake cases” should 
be sufficient in order to guarantee that the members of the crowd will not 
be able to identify and participate in a case in which they have interest. The 
“fake cases” can be also used for analysing the fairness of the procedures 
and taking measures for ensuring it. For instance, a case which decision is 
3 Randomly allocation of the members of the crowd to the case is one of the safeguards 
used by the ECRF. See Community Court FAQs, http://www.ebaycourt.com/cc/FAQ.
jsf. The archived webpage is available at https://web.archive.org/web/20111213132628/
http://www.ebaycourt.com/cc/FAQ.jsf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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obvious can be given to the crowd for a solution and, subsequently, can be 
used not only to show how fair the process of dispute resolution is but also 
to restrict access to the CODR procedure to members of the crowd that make 
a certain number of unfair decisions. So, we recommend the use of “fake” 
cases when the number of cases is quite low.
Fourth, all personal information that can lead to identification of the 
disputants and the members of the crowd should be removed.4 This is nec-
essary to ensure that the members of the crowd will not contact the parties 
in order “to sell” their votes and the disputants will not contact the mem-
bers of the crowd in order to push them to render a certain decision.5 For 
instance, among others, the following information should be removed: the 
names and the addresses of the disputants; the names and the addresses of 
the members of the crowd; and the nationality of the the disputants and the 
members of the crowd. However, removing all information that can lead 
to identification of the disputants can also lead to removal of information 
that can influence the outcome of the dispute. It will decrease the fairness of 
the procedure because the right of the disputants to present their cases will 
be restricted. This is a complex problem. Our recommendation is that the 
CODR procedure should be designed in such a way that it will remove any 
information that can lead to identification of the disputants, while it should 
not remove any information that can influence the outcome of the dispute 
resolution process.6
7.1.4 Transparency
To make their CODR procedures understandable and possible to replicate, 
such procedures should be clearly explained. Whether such an explana-
tion is to be laid out in documents called “Rules of Procedure”, “Frequently 
Asked Questions”, or “Terms and Conditions” is of little importance. What 
matters is that such an explanation is sufficiently precise and detailed. If 
the explanation is too sketchy, the CODR procedure will lack transparency 
and may render arbitrary decisions. With a particular regard to arbitration 
tribunals rendering self-enforceable decisions, the designers of such tribu-
4 The eBay’s Community court maintains the members of the crowd anonymous. See 
Community Court FAQs, http://www.ebaycourt.com/cc/FAQ.jsf. The archived web-
page is available at https://web.archive.org/web/20111213132628/http://www.ebay-
court.com/cc/FAQ.jsf (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
5 The removal of personal information can also protect disputants from spam. Such a pro-
tection is particularly needed in case of online opinion polls which usually allow anyone 
to participate in them (see Subsection 3.1.D). Spammers can use the free access to such 
CODR procedures in order to collect personal information and exploit it for sending 
spam.
6 Colin Rule, an expert in ODR, noted, in an email sent to us on 5th of January 2017, that the 
anonymisation of information can be diffi cult to achieve because the disputants are usu-
ally not good at self-censoring their submissions. One solution to this problem is to 
assign the task of anonymising contributions to crowdsourced workers who have proven 
skills in data anonymization.
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nals must provide clear explanations of the enforcement processes. No such 
explanations are needed for online opinion polls and online mock jury sys-
tems as the decisions rendered by such procedures are not enforced by their 
operators.
7.1.5 Fair hearing
In this subsection, we will propose ideas for ensuring compliance of CODR 
with the two sub-elements of the element of fair hearing, namely, (A) ensur-
ing that each party participates in the dispute resolution process and (B) 
ensuring that each party can present its case and rebut the case of the oppo-
nent.
A: Ensuring that each party participates in the dispute resolution process
If a CODR procedure serves a particular online community, a notice inform-
ing the disputants about the commencement of the dispute resolution pro-
cess can be sent through an internal system for sending messages. If the 
CODR procedure does not serve an online community, one way to send a 
notice to the defendant is to send a notice to the contact address provided 
by the disputants. However, the claimant can provide an incorrect address 
in order to prevent the defendant from participating in the procedure or 
in order to prevent rendering a decision. He can also provide an incorrect 
address because of a mistake or because he is not able to search for new con-
tact details or for some other reason. Providing the crowd with an opportu-
nity to make a research and find any possible contact address of the defen-
dant will increase the chance of finding the correct contact address of the 
defendant.7
For example, if the dispute relates to a domain name, the crowd can be 
entitled to search for the contact information of the defendant on the website 
associated with the disputed domain name. Under Uniform Domain-Name 
Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP), such searches are conducted by the pro-
vider of UDRP services.8
7 In an email dated 5th of January 2017, Colin Rule, expert in ODR, informed us about two 
drawbacks related to providing the crowd with the opportunity to search for the contact 
details of the defendants. The fi rst drawback is the defendants may not like the fact that 
unknown people are searching for their contact details. The second drawback is that the 
crowd may fi nd wrong contact details. These two drawbacks can be mitigated by requir-
ing members of the crowd responsible for searching contact details of the defendants to 
successfully pass (1) identity checks and (2) exams showing that their research skills are 
at a satisfactory level.
8 Article 2(a)(c) of the UDRP of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy states that achieving notice requires the submission of a notice to email addresses 
or email links shown on a webpage associated with the disputed domain name. See 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-rules-2015-03-11-en (last visited Jan. 3, 
2017).
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By using crowd searching, the designers of CODR procedures can easily 
assign the task of finding the contact details of the defendant to the crowd. 
It should be noted that crowd searching is used for far more complex legal 
tasks than searching for contact details. CaseText, for instance, allows the 
crowd to identify the relationship between two cases. In order to do so, the 
crowd needs to find the relevant paragraphs of the examined cases, which 
reveal the interrelationship between them. Afterwards, the crowd should 
select one of four options, namely, (1) “positive”, (2) “referencing”, (3) “dis-
tinguishing”, and (4) “negative”. The option “positive” means that the citing 
case explicitly approves the reasoning of the earlier case. The option “refer-
encing” means that the citing case simply relies on an earlier case without 
further argument. The option “negative” means that the citing case over-
rules, narrows, calls into question the earlier cases or does not find the rea-
soning of the earlier cases to be persuasive. The crowd may not only choose 
one of the four options, but also add a brief explanation describing the rela-
tionship between the two examined cases. A screenshot of CaseText is pro-
vided in Figure 20. The screenshot shows an excerpt from the case MASS. v. 
E.P.A.9 The task of the crowd is to identify the relationship between MASS. 
v. E.P.A and an earlier case, namely, Sierra Club v. Thomas.10 The crowd 
needs to choose in between one of the aforementioned four options.
Figure 20. A screenshot of casetext.com
It should be noted, if the crowd can search for the contact details of the 
defendant, the crowd may contact the defendant to the identified contact 
details without the knowledge of the claimant. This will threaten the impar-
tiality and the independence of the members of the crowd. Therefore, the 
crowd, which searches for the contact details of the defendant should not be 
9 Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
10 Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F. 2d 783 (1987).
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the same as the crowd which resolves the dispute between the claimant and 
the defendant.
B: Ensuring that each party can present its case and rebut the case of the opponent
A fair CODR procedure should have rules, which ensure that the disputants 
are entitled to present their case in front of the crowd and rebut the case of 
the opponent. However, a problem can arise if some part of the CODR pro-
cedure is completed with the participation of certain members of the crowd, 
but the other part of the procedure is completed with the participation of 
other members of the crowd. This can infringe the right of each disputant to 
present their side of the case because a part of the case is presented before 
another crowd, which will not take the decision. Consequently, the CODR 
procedure should be organised in such a way as to ensure that either the 
same crowd participates in the whole process or if there are changes in the 
composition of the crowd, the crowd that renders the decision will be famil-
iar with all the information presented by the disputants.
7.1.6 Counterpoise
To comply with the element of counterpoise, which is embedded in the 
Directive on Consumer ADR, CODR procedure should neutralise (A) the 
existing imbalances in the financial status of the disputants and (B) the com-
puter skills of the disputants.
A: Neutralising the existing imbalances in the financial status of the disputants
To neutralise the existing imbalances in the financial status of the dispu-
tants, a CODR procedure should be governed by rules which ensure that: 
(1) the disputants are not required to hire legal professionals; (2) the dispu-
tants are not required to pay more than nominal fees for participating in the 
procedure; and (3) the disputants are not required to make phone calls if the 
fees for such calls are more than nominal. It is worth mentioning that no one 
of the past and existing CODR procedures requires the disputants to hire a 
lawyer or pay any fees.
B: Neutralising the existing imbalances in the computer skills of the disputants
To neutralise the existing imbalances in the computer skills of the dispu-
tants, CODR procedures should be easily accessible online and offline. Thus, 
disputants having weak or no computer skills will be able to use them.
Designers of CODR procedures can ensure that their procedures are eas-
ily accessible online by allowing the disputants to use user-friendly interfac-
es. A user-friendly interface needs to meet the following seven conditions: 
(1) be intuitive; (2) allow the disputants to change the settings in accordance 
with their personal preferences and save them for future use; (3) be predict-
able and allow the disputants to control their online accounts; (4) appear as 
a single application rather than a random combination of different applica-
tions; (5) allow the disputants to correct mistakes; (6) automatically save the 
156 Chapter 7
input of the disputants; (7) allow the disputants to select the desired level of 
difficulty of interaction (e.g., novice, intermediate, expert) with the interface 
(cf. Bessonova, Oboznov, Bakanov, 2012, p. 98).
To make CODR procedures easily accessible offline, disputants should 
be able to interact with each other and with the third neutral party by post. 
The quick and low-cost processing of a large number of regular mails can be 
achieved through the use of an automated mail processing (AMP) system. 
For example, such a system may: (1) read a bar code included in the incom-
ing correspondence; (2) scan the incoming correspondence; and (3) auto-
matically upload the incoming correspondence in a folder which contains 
all files appertaining to the dispute to which the correspondence relates. 
An AMP system may allow the operator of the CODR procedure to process 
thousands of letters per hour. By way of illustration, India Post installed 
an AMP system, which processes about 40,000 letters every hour (Pandya, 
2013, p. 2).11
7.1.7 Ensuring a reasonable length of procedure
A reasonable length of a CODR procedure can be ensured by adopting 
rules which oblige the third neutral party to deliver a solution or a deci-
sion within a fixed time period, which can be extended only in exceptional 
circumstances. A CODR procedure can enhance the compliance of the third 
neutral party with this obligation by: (1) sending automatic reminders to the 
third neutral parties about the approaching procedural deadlines; (2) auto-
matically replacing unresponsive members of the crowd with responsive 
members of the crowd; (3) imposing sanctions on third neutral parties who 
do not meet the procedural deadlines; and (4) appointing only one juror to 
a case if the there are not enough members of the crowd.12 The sanctions 
may include, for example, temporary prohibitions to participate as a third 
neutral party in the CODR procedure.
7.1.8 Providing reasons
To provide disputants with reasons about the decisions rendered through 
CODR procedures, the rules governing such procedures should oblige each 
member of the crowd to support his vote with reasons.
If the decision in a CODR procedure is made by a large crowd, the 
CODR procedure can be designed in such a way as to provide the dispu-
tants not only with the reasons of individual members of the crowd, but 
also with a brief summary of all reasons used by the members of the crowd. 
11 Colin Rule, an expert in ODR, noted, in an email sent to us on 5th of January 2017, that 
AMP may be cost effi cient only for large scale organizations, such as India Post.
12 In an email sent to us on 21st of December 2016, Pablo Cortés, an expert in ODR, implied 
that a single panelist with a certifi ed reputation may be able to offer a sustainable CODR 
procedure.
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Such a summary will provide the crowd with a comprehensive picture of 
the reasons for the decision and, therefore, enhance disputants’ perceptions 
of transparency of the procedure.
A summary of all reasons used by the members of the crowd can be cre-
ated in at least two ways. First, the summary can use a computer algorithm, 
which analyses the reasons for the decisions and creates an automatic sum-
mary.13 In this regard, it should be noted that algorithms for summarising 
crowdsourcing content already exist. For instance, researchers succeeded to 
create an algorithm which creates summaries of sport events by using con-
tent from Twitter, a crowdsourcing application which allows the members 
of the crowd to post short messages (cf. Lee, Lee, Jung, Song, 2016, p. 432). 
Second, the members of the crowd can be required to provide a short sum-
mary of the reasons for their decisions. A compilation of all such summaries 
can be presented to the disputants.
7.1.9 Voluntary participation
For this element to be met, the disputants should not be obliged to partici-
pate in the CODR procedure (e.g., on the basis of contractual agreements 
or legislative acts). This means that the rules governing CODR procedures 
should not include requirements of attendance and legal sanctions for non-
participation. Furthermore, in order to avoid any confusion, the rules should 
clearly state that the disputants have the right of voluntary participation.
7.1.10 Process control
In order to provide the disputants with the maximum possible process con-
trol, the designers of CODR procedures should ensure that the disputants 
are allowed to present any kind of information. Any limits to the types of 
information, which can be presented may decrease the perceptions of fair-
ness of the CODR procedure. For example, the ECRF may be perceived as 
unfair CODR procedure because it does not allow the disputants to upload 
videos. Video evidence can be a compelling type of evidence in disputes 
related to modern technologies. This is because it allows the disputants to 
show to the third parties the process of operation of software, hardware, and 
websites.
Furthermore, in order to provide the disputants with the maximum pos-
sible process control, a CODR procedure may provide the parties with a list 
of tools which can be used for taking digital evidence and with the opportu-
13 In an email dated 5th of January 2017, Colin Rule, an expert in ODR, explained to us that 
it is not currently feasible to use algoritms to summarise free-text supplied reasons. He 
suggests collection of reasons through structured forms, thus allowing the data to be eas-
ily used in algorithms.
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nity to decide whether to continue with each procedural stage.14 Such tools 
may include, for example, a list of freely available digital forensic tools, e.g., 
tools for digital media acquisition and backup. 
7.1.11 Decision control
In the context of negotiation and mediation-based CODR procedures, a high 
degree of decision control can be ensured by providing the disputants with 
the opportunity to accept and reject the decisions rendered by those pro-
cedures. The disputants in adjudication-based CODR procedures have no 
decision control because the decision control is transferred to the third neu-
tral party.
Since empirical studies show that outcomes reached by disputants (e.g., 
mediation settlement) are perceived as more fair than outcomes imposed by 
a third party, designers of CODR procedures can enhance the perceptions of 
fairness of their procedures by including mediation procedures in adjudica-
tion-based CODR procedures (cf. Conlon, Moon, and Ng, 2002). The combi-
nation of mediation and arbitration processes (also known as Med-arb) is not 
a new phenomenon. Various providers of dispute resolution services, includ-
ing the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Hong Kong International Arbitration 
Centre (HKIAC) recognise and support the use of Med-arb (cf. Chua, 2015). 
In this regard, it is interesting to note that an empirical study found that dis-
putants prefer Med-arb proceedings in which the mediation and arbitration 
is conducted by the same person than vice versa (Condliffe, 2012, p. 154). Con-
dliffe (2012, p. 154) notes that there is no clear explanation on the reason of 
this preference and points out the need for further research in this area.
In the light of the aforementioned observations, we can presume that 
adjudication-based CODR procedures, which may include online opinion 
polls, online mock jurors, and arbitration tribunals rendering self-eforce-
able decisions, will provide more decision control to the disputants if they 
include mediation prior to adjudication. To further enhance subjective pro-
cedural fairness, designers of Med-arb CODR procedures may require the 
same members of the crowd to conduct both the mediation and arbitration 
parts of the procedures.
7.1.12 Consistency
To ensure the consistent application of a CODR procedure, the designers 
of the CODR procedure should (1) require the crowd to take into account 
previously decided CODR cases, (2) provide the crowd with access to previ-
14 In an email sent to us on 5th of January 2017, Colin Rule, an expert in ODR, noted that the 
element of process control is not only about collecting evidence, but also about making 
“the disputants always feel that they are in the drivers’ seat as the dispute moves from 
step to step.”
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ously decided CODR cases, and (3) implement tools for trend analysis and 
generation of statistical reports.
In order to take into account relevant previously decided CODR cases, 
the crowd should be able to search in the case archive according to various 
criteria, e.g., subject, date, and keywords included in the decisions. If the 
CODR procedure does not provide the crowd with a comprehensive case 
search function, the crowd may find it difficult to find the relevant cases. 
This, in turn, may lead to an inconsistent application of the CODR proce-
dure.
iCourthouse is an example of a CODR procedure which does not provide
the crowd with a comprehensive search function. The case search interface 
of iCourthouse contains a list of pages with summaries of cases. Figure 21 
is a screenshot of the case search interface of iCourthouse. Figure 21 shows 
links to 123 pages with summaries of cases. Figure 21 also shows four cases 
which appear on page 33, namely, Case Number 2006-11374, Case Num-
ber 2006-11373, Case Number 2006-11372, and Case Number 2006-11371. If 
a member of the crowd would like to search for a case within certain legal 
domain (e.g., a contract law), the member of the crowd should browse 
through all 123 pages in order to find the relevant case.
Figure 21. A screenshot of the case search interface of iCourthouse
The Arbitration center for Internet disputes of the Czech Arbitration Court 
is an example of an ODR platform, which provides its users with a com-
prehensive search function. More specifically, the ODR platform allows the 
users to search through various categories of cases. Figure 22 is a screenshot 
of the case search interface of the Arbitration center for Internet disputes of 
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the Czech Arbitration Court. Figure 22 shows seventeen boxes, which relate 
to different categories of cases. There are five main categories. The first one 
is subdivided into seven classes. The fourth category is subdivided into four 
classes. The other three categories are not further subdivided.
When the user of the case search interface clicks on one or more of those 
boxes and, then on a search button, the user will access a list of cases in the 
selected category.
Figure 22. A screenshot of the case search interface of the Arbitration center for Internet 
disputes of the Czech Arbitration Court
Figure 23. A screenshot of an interface window of the platform “CrowdSource”
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The categorisation of CODR decisions can be done by using crowdsourcing. 
For example, the members of the crowd can categorise CODR decisions by 
clicking through a category tree, such as the tree used by the Czech Arbitra-
tion Court. It is worth mentioning that at least two websites provide crowd-
sourcing data categorisation services.15 Figure 23 shows a screenshot of an 
interface window of the platform “CrowdSource” allowing the crowd to cat-
egorise businesses. The interface window on Figure 23 provides the crowd 
with information about a business, i.e., the name of the business, the address 
of the business, and a link to the website of the business. The crowd needs to 
choose one out of eleven categories describing the activities of the business. 
If the crowd cannot find the relevant category or the business is closed, the 
members of the crowd must tick an appropriate box.
If, due to a large volume of data, the categorization of data as proposed 
above is not sufficient for providing the crowd with the opportunity to 
identify relevant cases, the designers of the CODR platform may attempt 
to ensure the consistency of the decisions rendered by the CODR platform 
by implementing tools for (1) trend analysis and (2) generation of statistical 
reports.16 These two types of tools will be briefly examined below.
The tools for trend analysis collect information and identify patterns or 
trends in the information (cf. Zikmund, 2016). For example, such tools can 
provide the crowd with a description of case law trends related to the dis-
pute at stake. It should be noted that there are existing tools that are used 
for analysis of large volume of data.17 By way of illustration, TwitterMonitor 
(1) detects topic trends published on the micro-blogging website Twitter, (2) 
identifies and clusters words that appear in high rate, (3) extracts contextual 
knowledge related to the identified word, and (4) provides descriptions of 
the identified trends (Vishal, 2013, p. 133).
The tools for generation of statistical reports on the basis of crowdsourc-
ing contributions can be divided in two categories, namely, non-iterative 
and iterative (cf. Hung, Tam, Tran, Aberer, 2013, p. 2). Non-iterative tools 
use heuristics to compute a single aggregated value of the contributions of 
the crowd (cf. Hung, Tam, Tran, Aberer, 2013, p. 2). For example, if the mem-
15 Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) and the platform “CrowdSource” allow their users to 
assign data categorization tasks to the crowd. See the article “How to Create a Categori-
zation Project” published by AMT on http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSMechTurk/
latest/RequesterUI/Create-Categorization-Project.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2017) and the 
article “Data Categorization” published by CrowdSource on http://www.crowdsource.
com/solutions/data-solutions/data-categorization/(last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
16 Colin Rule, an expert in ODR, stated in an email sent to us on 5th of January 2017, that it is 
unrealistic to expect the members of the crowd to rely on previous case law for their deci-
sions because the examination of case law may require a lot of time. Guidelines created 
on the basis of trend analysis and statistical reports can be a solution to this issue.
17 Google Trends (www.google.com/trends, last visited Jan. 3, 2017) and Trendistic (www.
trendistic.com, last visited Jan. 3, 2017) are two notable tools for identifying trends. 
Google Trends identifi es trends on the basis of data from the web, whereas Trendistic 
identifi es trends on the basis of data from the micro-blogging service Twitter (www.twit-
ter.com, last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
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bers of the crowd resolve identical cases, the solution proposed in the major-
ity of the cases will be selected as the single aggregated value of all solutions 
to those cases. Iterative tools aggregate crowdsourcing contributions by (1) 
taking into account the expertise of the members of the crowd who answer 
that question (2) adjusting the expertise of each member of the crowd 
depending on the answers given by him (cf. Hung, Tam, Tran, Aberer, 2013, 
p. 2). By using iterative tools to generate statistics of CODR decisions, the 
designers of a CODR procedure may ensure that the opinion of members of 
the crowd having relevant expertise will have more weight on the statistics 
than the opinion of members who lack such expertise. The tools for trend 
analysis and generation of statistical reports can benefit online opinion polls 
and arbitration tribunals rendering self-enforceble decisions by increasing 
the consistency of their decision-making processes. The tools mentioned in 
the preceding sentence can benefit online mock jury systems by providing 
the lawyers who want to test their cases with (1) information about latest 
trends in the case law related to their cases as well as (2) statistical reports 
about the outcome of similar mock cases.
7.1.13 Accuracy
In order to ensure that the information provided by the disputants is correct, 
a CODR procedure can enable the members of the crowd to verify the accu-
racy of the information presented by the disputants.18 More particularly, the 
crowd can be allowed to verify alleged facts presented by the disputants.19 
Below, we discuss three situations in which the crowd can be used for veri-
fications of facts. First, by using Google Maps (a desktop web mapping ser-
vice developed by Google), the crowd can verify whether a claimant who 
was allegedly bitten by a dog in claimant’s backyard has a backyard. Sec-
ond, by using web.archive.org (a database of archived webpages), the crowd 
can verify whether the defendant has published on his website fraudulent 
pre-contractual misrepresentations before the conclusion of a contract with 
the claimant. If the crowd finds that the fraudulent pre-contractual misrep-
resentations were published on the website of the defendant before the con-
clusion of the contract, the claimant may be entitled to damages (depending 
on the jurisdiction).20 Third, by using publicly available online forensic tools, 
the crowd can verify the authenticity of photos published by the disputants. 
For example, in order to verify the authenticity of photos, the crowd can use 
18 The concept of crowd verifi cation has been discussed in Subsection 7.1.1.
19 In an email dated 5th of January 2017, Colin Rule, an expert in ODR, explained to us that 
jurors may not have the skills necessary for such a verifi cation. To address this drawback, 
CODR should be designed in such a way as to ensure that only members of the crowd 
having good information verifi cation skills should be responsible for verifying alleged 
facts presented by the disputants.
20 For example, in Australia, an action for damages for fraud (the tort of deceit) lies against 
the author of pre-contractual fraudulent mispresentations (Barton, 2013).
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the publicly available tool “Izitru”.21 After uploading a photo on “Izitru”, 
the tool will use six different forensic tests to analyse the authenticity of the 
photo. If the photo passes all six tests, “Izitru” will issue a certificate indicat-
ing that the photo has not been edited.
7.1.14 Correctability
Correctability of CODR decisions can be guaranteed by allowing the dispu-
tants to appeal the decisions. The appeal procedure can be either a CODR pro-
cedure or an ODR procedure.22 If the appeal procedure is a CODR procedure, 
it should be designed in such a way as to prevent the members of the crowd 
who participated in making the appealed decision from making an appeal 
decision. This will ensure that, if some or all of the members of the crowd 
who made the first decision are not impartial or independent, those members 
of the crowd would not be able to make the appeal decision. This principle 
is used in various courts, including the International Criminal Court (ICC).23
In order to ensure that the members of the crowd in the first instance are 
not the same as the members of the crowd in the appeal, the designers of the 
CODR procedure may implement automatic checks, similar to the checks 
conducted by the ECRF. As it has been mentioned before, the ECRF would 
automatically prevent a juror from being allocated to a case if (1) he had had 
a transaction with either the buyer or the seller or (2) if he had once voted on 
a case in which the buyer or the seller was/were already involved.
It should be noted that only adjudication-based CODR procedures, 
which may include online opinion polls, online mock jury systems, and 
arbitration tribunals rendering self-enforceable decisions, can ensure the 
correctability of their decisions. In contrast, negotiation and mediation-
based CODR procedures, which may include certain online opinion polls 
(e.g., PeopleClaim), do not need to ensure the correctability of their deci-
sions as they do not render decisions.
21 See www.izitru.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
22 Irrespective of the type of the chosen appeal procecedure, it is preferable if the procedure 
is specially designed as an appeal procecedure. This is because the idea of appealing a 
decision by using the procedure used for rendering that decision is not common in the 
fi eld of dispute resolution. For instance, in the U.S., challenges to district court decisions 
should be addressed to appellate courts, whereas the U.S. Supreme court hears challeng-
es to appellate court decisions. See article “Court Role and Structure” published by the 
Administrative Offi ce of the U.S. Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary on http://
www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure (last visited Jan. 3, 
2017).
23 See the offi cial website of the International Criminal Court available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/Appeal.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). See also Article 22(1)(5) of the Bul-
garian civil procedure code (ГРАЖДАНСКИ ПРОЦЕСУАЛЕН КОДЕКС) which states 
that a judge cannot decide a case if he/she participated in deciding the case in another 
judicial instance. Article 341(5) of the French Code of Civil Procedure (code de procédure 
civile français) states that the disputants may request the recusal of a judge if he/she, 
previously, heard and determined the matter as a judge or an arbitrator.
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7.1.15 Ethicality
The designers of a CODR procedure can ensure the maximum extent of ethi-
cality of a procedure by (1) conducting empirical studies aiming to investigate 
the personal ethical standards of the members of the crowd and (2) imple-
menting the personal ethical standards of the majority of the members of the 
crowd in the CODR procedure. The personal ethical standards of the majority 
of the members of the crowd can be implemented in CODR in two ways.
First, they can be implemented in the rules of the procedure. For exam-
ple, in order to ensure ethicality of the procedure from the point of view 
of disputants and members of the crowd in the Middle East, the rules may 
state that the case should be decided on the basis of sharia, i.e., Muslim ethi-
cal principles (cf. Selby, 2012, p. 14).
Second, the personal ethical standards of the majority of the crowd can 
be implemented in formal codes of ethics which state the values and ethical 
principles the members of the crowd are expected to display. Ethical codes 
can get specific to the point of offering guidelines on how the crowd should 
behave in situations susceptible to ethical dilemmas, such as whether or not 
the crowd should follow the rules of the procedure which the crowd consid-
ers to be unjust.
It should be noted that ethical codes are used by many organisations, 
including private companies (cf. Schermerhorn, Jr, 2009, p. 60). For exam-
ple, Gap Inc., an American worldwide clothing and accessories retailer, has 
adopted a formal Code of Vendor Conduct which sets out ethical standards 
to which the factories supplying clothes for Gap Inc. should comply. By way 
of illustration, the Code of Vendor Conduct obliges the factories to provide 
the workers in the factories with “a safe and healthy environment” and hire 
them “on the basis of their ability to do the job, not on the basis of their per-
sonal characteristics or beliefs” (see Schermerhorn, Jr, 2009, p. 60).
7.2 Chapter summary
In this section, we provided a brief summary of our model of a fair CODR 
procedure, which consists of fifteen elements. Below, we summarise each of 
those fifteen elements (A-O) for a brief overview of the essence of the ele-
ments.
A: Expertise
To comply with this element, CODR procedures should include (1) rules 
which allow only members of the crowd having the required expertise to 
participate in CODR and (2) screening processes aiming to find out whether 
the members of the crowd comply with those rules. The screening processes 
may consists of the following three steps: (1) completion of an online appli-
cation; (2) taking a short subject matter test; and (3) crowd verification of 
credentials.
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B: Independence
The independence of the members of the crowd can be achieved by design-
ing CODR procedures which automatically: (1) find any relationship 
between the members of the crowd and the disputants; and (2) make sure 
that a member of the crowd who has a relationship with either disputant 
will not be allocated as an adjudicator or a mediator.
C: Impartiality
We propose four solutions to safeguard the impartiality of the members of 
the crowd, namely, (1) restricting the members of the crowd from the oppor-
tunity to choose the cases which they will solve, (2) providing the members 
of the crowd with the right to participate only limited times in the CODR 
procedure, (3) creation of a large number of “fake cases”, which aim to pre-
vent members of the crowd from picking cases in which they have interest, 
and (4) removing all personal information that can lead to identification of 
the parties.
D: Transparency
Disputants should be provided with a clear, sufficiently precise, and detailed 
explanation of the CODR procedure.
E: Fair hearing
To secure the right of each party to participate in the dispute resolution pro-
cess, the members of the crowd should have the opportunity to conduct a 
research and find any possible contact details of the defendant. To make 
sure that each party can present its case and rebut the case of the opponent, 
either the same crowd should participate in the whole CODR process or, if 
there are changes in the composition of the crowd, the crowd that renders 
the decision should be familiar with all the information presented by the 
disputants.
F: Counterpoise
To neutralise financial inequalities, a CODR procedure should not oblige the 
disputants to hire legal professionals and/or pay more than nominal legal 
fees. To neutralise computer skills inequalities, a CODR procedure should 
have a user-friendly interface and be accessible offline.
G: Ensuring a reasonable length of procedure
The outcome of a CODR procedure should be announced within a pre-
defined fixed time period, which can be extended only in exceptional cir-
cumstances. To safeguard the timely delivery of the outcome, the CODR 
procedure should (1) send automatic reminders to the third neutral parties 
about the approaching procedural deadlines and (2) impose sanctions on 
third neutral parties who do not meet the procedural deadlines.
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H: Providing reasons
A CODR procedure should provide the disputants with reasons supporting 
each vote of the members of the crowd and, if the decision is rendered by a 
large number of members of the crowd, with a brief summary of all reasons 
used by the members of the crowd.
I: Voluntary participation
The disputants should not be subject to any mandatory participation 
requirements.
J: Process control
A high degree of process control requires that the disputants are (1) allowed 
to present any kind of information and (2) provided with a list of tools 
which can be used for taking digital evidence.
K: Decision control
A high degree of decision control requires that the disputants are provided 
with the opportunity to accept and reject the decisions rendered by nego-
tiation and mediation-based CODR procedures. The inclusion of mediation 
procedures in adjudication-based CODR procedures will provide the dispu-
tants using such procedures with a degree of decision control which, in turn, 
will enhance disputants’ perceptions of fairness of the procedures.
L: Consistency
Consistency in a CODR procedure can be ensured by (1) requiring the crowd 
to take into account previously decided CODR cases and (2) providing the 
crowd with access to such cases.
M: Accuracy
The accuracy of the information provided by the disputants can be ensured 
by providing the members of the crowd with the opportunity to verify the 
information presented by the disputants.
N: Correctability
Correctability of CODR decisions can be guaranteed by the allowing the 
disputants to appeal the decisions.
O: Ethicality
The compliance of a CODR procedure with the component of ethicality 
requires (1) conducting empirical studies aiming to investigate the personal 
ethical standards of the member of the crowd and (2) implementing the per-
sonal ethical standards of the majority of the members of the crowd in the 
CODR procedure.
In this chapter, we provide answers to the three research questions (Sec-
tion 8.1). Next, we answer the problem statement (Section 8.2). Afterwards, 
we explain how this research contributes to the body of work already per-
formed in the area of CODR (Section 8.3) and present proposals for future 
research (Section 8.4).
8.1 Answers to the research questions
RQ1: In what way does CODR differ from other dispute resolution schemes?
In order to answer RQ1, we provided a framework of CODR and analysed 
the differences between CODR and other dispute resolution schemes. We 
found that CODR differs from other dispute resolution procedures in using 
a crowd for facilitating or resolving disputes. We defined the crowd par-
ticipating in CODR as a group of people who participate in the dispute 
resolution process through an open call (see Section 4.2). Furthermore, we 
specified two requirements which must be met to classify a call to partici-
pate in CODR as “open” (See Subsection 2.1.1). The first requirement is that 
everyone from the online community where the call is published should be 
entitled to participate in CODR, provided that the candidate meets certain 
conditions. The second requirement is that it should be published or made 
available in such a way that every member of the online community where 
the open call is published should be able to find information about it.
RQ2: What is procedural fairness in the context of adjudicative dispute resolution?
There can be different interpretations of procedural fairness in dispute reso-
lution. As Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead rightly pointed out: “Fairness, like 
beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder”.1 Therefore, we decided to present 
our own interpretation of procedural fairness. It is established by supple-
menting our interpretation of objective procedural fairness with our inter-
pretation of subjective procedural fairness. We briefly characteristise both 
interpretations. The objective procedural fairness refers to compliance of a 
procedure with a standard whereby the procedure is assessed by an indi-
vidual or an organisation as fair or unfair (see Section 1.3). Subjective proce-
dural fairness refers to an individual’s subjective perception of fairness of a 
procedure (see Section 1.3).
1 White v White, [2001] 1 A.C. 596.
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We based our interpretation of objective procedural fairness on the EU 
Directive on ADR because of two reasons. First, the Directive is appropriate 
for assessing the fairness of CODR procedures because it establishes a stan-
dard of fairness applying to ADR procedures, which include CODR proce-
dures. Second, by making our model of CODR compliant with a law having 
a wide territorial scope (i.e., the entire European Union), we will increase 
the practical applicability of the model. Our interpretation of subjective pro-
cedural fairness is based on studies in the field of social psychology, which 
examine perceptions of procedural fairness (see Section 5.2).
We identified nine elements of objective procedural fairness, namely, 
expertise, independence, impartiality, transparency, fair hearing, counter-
poise, ensuring a reasonable length of procedure, providing reasons, and 
voluntary participation (see Section 5.1). We also identified six elements of 
subjective procedural fairness, which do not overlap with the elements of 
objective procedural fairness (see Section 5.2). These six elements are as fol-
lows: process control, decision control, consistency, accuracy, correctability, 
and ethicality (see Section 5.2). Hence, for the purposes of this research, our 
interpretation of procedural fairness consists of fifteen elements.
RQ3: Are the past and present CODR procedures fair?
To answer this research question, we selected three CODR procedures and 
assessed their compliance with our interpretation of procedural fairness. 
The three selected procedures are iCourthouse, JuryTest, and the ECRF. 
Their selection was based two criteria, namely, (1) availability of documents 
explaining the examined procedures and (2) use of adjudication for resolving 
disputes (see Section 6.1). After assessing the compliance of the three CODR 
procedures with our interpretation of procedural fairness, it became clear 
that none of these procedures comply with all elements of our interpretation 
of procedural fairness (see Section 6.2). While the ECRF complies with nine 
of the examined elements, iCourthouse and JuryTest comply with seven ele-
ments. It should be pointed out, however, that an objective assessment of eth-
icality is not possible because ethical and moral standards vary across people.
8.2 Answer to the problem statement
PS: Can a CODR procedure resolve disputes in a procedurally fair way?
In Chapter 7, we presented a model of a CODR procedure that complies with 
our interpretation of procedural fairness. The model consists of fifteen ele-
ments, each of which corresponds to one of the elements of our interpre-
tation of procedural fairness. Each element of the model can be practically 
implemented in CODR procedures by using legal and/or technological solu-
tions. For example, to comply with the element of correctability, the designer 
of a CODR procedure can use a legal solution only and, more specifically, the 
insertion of a clause in the terms and conditions governing the procedure, 
which states that procedural outcomes can be appealed. However, to comply 
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with the element of ensuring a reasonable length of procedure, the design-
ers of CODR procedures need to use a technological solution, i.e., a software 
application, which sends automatic reminders to third neutral parties.
The direct answer to the PS is that a CODR procedure which imple-
ments our model can fairly resolve disputes, at least within the meaning of 
our interpretation of procedural fairness.
8.3 Contributions
The present thesis aims to contribute to the existing academic debate by pro-
viding a better understanding of the relationship between CODR and proce-
dural fairness. We did so by four activities. (A) We identified and described 
the building blocks of CODR, (B) we provided our own interpretation of 
procedural fairness, (C) we assessed the compliance of three CODR proce-
dures with our interpretation of procedural fairness, and (D) we provided 
a model of a CODR which complies with our interpretation of procedural 
fairness (D). These contributions are summarised below.
A: Identifying and describing the building blocks of CODR
While CODR was analysed in previous publications, this thesis provided 
the first comprehensive analysis of the building blocks of CODR. This had 
not been done in earlier publications. The building blocks identified by 
us can be used as a base for academic debate as well as for designing new 
CODR procedures.
B: Our own interpretation of procedural fairness
Although many interpretations of procedural fairness exist, our interpreta-
tion is the first to merge objective and subjective procedural fairness. Thus, 
CODR procedures implementing our interpretation of procedural fairness 
will not only comply with legal procedural requirements (objective proce-
dural fairness), but will also be perceived by the disputants as fair (subjec-
tive procedural fairness).
C:  Assessment of the compliance of three CODR procedures with our 
interpretation of procedural fairness
This thesis is the first academic work which examines the compliance of 
three CODR procedures with (1) an interpretation of objective procedural 
fairness based on the requirements of the Directive on Consumer ADR and 
(2) the interpretation of subjective procedural fairness.2 The findings of the 
assessment provide the designers of the examined procedures with valuable 
feedback which can be used by them to improve their procedures.
2 We note that one of our previous works (Van den Herik and Dimov, 2011b) examined the 
compliance of the ECRF with the requirements of due process.
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D: A model of a CODR, which complies with our interpretation of procedural 
fairness
In this thesis, we provided the first model of a fair CODR procedure. The 
model can be implemented by designers of new CODR procedures who 
want to create procedures, which are legally compliant and perceived as 
fair by the disputants. The model can also be used by researchers as a base 
for generating more ideas on how to ensure the compliance of CODR with 
our and other interpretations of procedural fairness. It should be noted that 
two ODR experts (Pablo Cortés and Colin Rule) have positively evaluated 
the model. 3
8.4 Future research
Future research in the field of CODR needs to be focused in at least eleven 
directions, namely, (A) integrating CODR in online platforms which generate 
a large number of disputes, (B) implementing artificial intelligence technolo-
gies in CODR, (C) integrating CODR with crowdsourcing applications, (D) 
use of virtual reality in CODR, (E) measuring perceptions of fairness among 
disputants using current CODR procedures, (F) examining the procedural 
fairness of all CODR procedures, (G) developing and evaluating a CODR 
platform implementing our model of a fair CODR procedure, (H) assessing 
the distributive fairness of CODR procedures, (I) exploring the potential of 
case-based reasoning (CBR) for ensuring procedural fairness of CODR pro-
cedures, (J) identifying the measures for satisfying the elements of our inter-
pretation of procedural fairness, and (K) investigating the potential use of 
computational models of argumentation for ensuring procedural fairness of 
CODR procedures. An illustration of each of these eleven directions follows.
A: Integrating CODR in online platforms which generate a large number of disputes
Global online job market places, social networks, and virtual words gener-
ate a large number of disputes. The potential of CODR to resolve such dis-
putes was examined in Subsection 4.4.1. More research is required to bring 
the ideas in Subsection 4.4.1 down to the level of practical implementation.
B: Implementing artificial intelligence technologies in CODR
Artificial intelligence technologies can facilitate the resolution of disputes 
through CODR. For example, the following two areas of artificial intelligence 
could be interesting for CODR: (1) automated summarising and (2) intel-
ligent agents. With regard to automated summarising, summaries from the 
decisions of the crowd can be provided to the disputants. Thus, it would not 
be necessary for the disputants to read every decision from the members of a 
large crowd. Pertaining to intelligent agents, it should be noted that they can 
3 This happened in personal email communication by Pablo Cortés (21 December 2016) 
and by Colin Rule (5 January 2017).
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be used to: (1) keep track of deadlines; (2) organise the documents of the case; 
(3) contact the disputants and members of the crowd; and (4) scrutinise the 
cases and send them to members of the crowd who have sufficient expertise.
C: Integrating CODR with crowdsourcing applications
There is a large number crowdsourcing applications (cf. Hung, Thang, Wei-
dlich, Aberer, 2015). Such applications are used for various purposes, includ-
ing, but not limited to, data mining, data acquisition, information extrac-
tion, information retrieval, and data integration (cf. Hung, Thang, Weidlich, 
Aberer, 2015). More research is needed on the implementation of such appli-
cations in CODR procedures. By way of illustration, more research is needed 
on the integration of CODR with crowdsourced e-discovery applications, 
such as CrowdFlower.4. By allowing the quick discovery of evidence, such 
applications will facilitate the resolution of CODR disputes. It is worth men-
tioning that CrowdFlower can collect over 15,000 unique relevance judge-
ments on nearly 3,000 documents within 24 hours (see Philipis, 2011).
D: Use of virtual reality in CODR
A lack of direct contact between the disputants and a mediator may lead to 
problems with creating appropriate mental connections and result in lack of 
will to settle disputes amicably (Mania, 2015). The use of virtual reality in 
CODR will allow members of the crowd acting as mediators to have a direct 
contract with disputants, thus building a high level of trust in disputants. 
Up until the present moment, there are no publications on how to imple-
ment virtual reality in CODR in practice.
E: Measuring perceptions of fairness among disputants using current CODR 
procedures
Although we are aware that hundreds of thousands of disputants use CODR, 
there are no studies measuring the fairness perceptions of disputants in 
CODR procedures (cf. Erickson and Wang, 2014).5 Such measurements will 
allow designers of CODR procedures to identify and address elements of 
subjective procedural fairness which have not been identified yet and, as a 
result, enhance the subjective procedural fairness of their CODR procedures.
F: Examining the procedural fairness of all CODR procedures
This research examined the procedural fairness of three CODR procedures 
only, namely, iCourthouse, JuryTest, and the ECRF. An examination of the 
other CODR procedures will provide valuable scientific information on 
CODR that will underpin the future development of CODR.
4 E-discovery can be defi ned as discovery in dispute resolution proceedings, where the 
information sought is in electronic format (cf. Henseler, 2010). For more information on 
CrowdFlower, see https://www.crowdfl ower.com/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
5 Taobao User Dispute Resolution Center alone resolved 238,000 online-shopping disputes 
in 2013.
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G: Developing and evaluating a CODR platform implementing the model of a fair 
CODR procedure proposed in this work
Ebner and Zeleznikow (2015, p. 159) note that, to become a more mature 
domain, Online Dispute Resolution must develop not only theoretical mod-
els, but also implement practical solutions. In our opinion, the same applies 
to the field of CODR. For example, a CODR platform implementing our 
model of a fair CODR procedure can be used for evaluation of whether 
the proposed model, including the proposed technological measures, can 
ensure practical compliance with the requirements of procedural fairness 
identified by us. Depending on the findings of the evaluation, our model of 
a fair CODR procedure may need to be adjusted in order to ensure such a 
compliance.
H: Assessing the distributive fairness of CODR procedures
While this work examined in detail the procedural fairness of CODR proce-
dures, there is no research on the distributive fairness of CODR procedure. 
Such research is necessary for assessing the perceptions of distributive fair-
ness of CODR procedures. Negative perceptions of distributive fairness may 
hamper the development of CODR procedures as they may adversely affect 
disputant’s attitudes towards the procedures.6
I: Exploring the potential of case-based reasoning (CBR) for ensuring procedural 
fairness of CODR procedures
Case-based reasoning (CBR) is an approach to problem solving that relies on 
previously solved problems to resolve new problems (cf. Maher, Balachan-
dran, Zhang, 2014). For example, CBR can ensure the consistency of CODR 
decisions by identifying patterns of CODR cases and providing the crowd 
responsible for resolving those cases with previously decided cases which 
contain the identified patterns. More research is required to determine 
whether and how CBR can be used to effectively ensure fairness of CODR 
procedures.
J: Identifying the measures for satisfying the elements of our interpretation of 
procedural fairness
In this thesis, we proposed a number of legal and technological measures 
for satisfying the elements of our interpretation of procedural fairness. More 
research is necessary for identifying measures which are more effective than 
the measures proposed in this work. One of the fist steps of such a research 
should be the assessment of whether each of the elements can be better sat-
isfied by legal measures or by technological measures. The research on ele-
ments that can be better satisfied by legal measures will fall mainly within 
the scope of the legal domain, whereas the research on elements that can be 
6 Schminke, Ambrose, and Noel (1997, p. 1191) note that individuals’ perceptions of dis-
tributive fairness affect their behaviours and attitudes.
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better satisfied by technological measures will fall mainly within the scope 
of technology-oriented scientific domains (e.g., informatics).
K: Investigating the potential use of computational models of argumentation for 
ensuring procedural fairness of CODR procedures
Computational models of argumentation is a research discipline falling 
within the ambit of artificial intelligence (Cerutti, Oren, Strass, Thimm, and 
Vallati, 2014, p. 459). It studies the imitation of human decision-making 
process by modelling reason against or for certain decisions (cf. Toniolo, 
2016). Researchers in the field of computational models of argumentation 
have shown that distributed argumentation patterns that appear in various 
places on the Web can be used for visualisation and comparison of decision 
rationale (Schneider, Groza, Passant, 2013, pp. 159-160). More research is 
needed to examine whether distributed argumentation patterns that appear 
in CODR decisions can be visualised and compared. If this is possible, 
designers of CODR procedures can enhance the consistency of CODR deci-
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For everyone involved, solving disputes often takes a considerable amount 
of time and money. A new type of dispute resolution called Crowdsourced 
Online Dispute Resolution (CODR) seems to have the potential to offer a 
cheap, fast, and democratic dispute resolution procedure. Since it is not clear 
whether CODR procedures comply with the requirements of procedural 
fairness, the attractiveness and the acceptance of the procedures will be low. 
To eliminate this lack of clarity, we aim to find out whether CODR can fairly 
resolve disputes. To do so, we will first provide an overview of CODR and 
formulate our interpretation of procedural fairness. Subsequently, we will 
investigate whether three of the current CODR procedures are fair. Then, 
we propose a model of a CODR procedure that complies with our inter-
pretation of procedural fairness. Finally, we conclude that a CODR can be 
designed to fairly resolve disputes.
In Chapter 1, we provide an introduction to CODR by explaining crowd-
sourcing and its use in the process of online dispute resolution (ODR). Then, 
we formulate our problem statement, three research questions, a research 
goal, and our research methodology. The research methodology is in the 
form of four research stages. To conclude the chapter, the structure of the 
thesis is described.
In Chapter 2, we will review the literature on crowdsourcing, ODR and 
CODR. The review of literature on crowdsourcing enables us to define the 
term and examine the relation between crowdsourcing and existing con-
cepts, of which we discuss collaborative systems, user-generated content, 
collective intelligence, and web 2.0. The review of literature on ODR allows 
us to select a precise definition of the term ODR, discuss five typologies of 
ODR, and examine the advantages and disadvantages of ODR. Finally, the 
review of CODR indicates that CODR is a new and unexplored research 
area.
In Chapter 3, we examine past and present CODR procedures. To facili-
tate the examination, we group the past and present CODR procedures into 
three categories, namely CODR procedures functioning as: (1) online opin-
ion polls, (2) online mock jury systems, and (3) arbitration tribunals ren-
dering self-enforceable decisions. The functions of the online opinion polls 
are extraction and aggregation of information from the general public that 
may facilitate the resolution of disputes. The function of online mock jury 
systems is testing real cases before a mock jury. The function of arbitration 




In Chapter 4, we describe the four building blocks of CODR and analyse 
the differences between CODR and other dispute resolution mechanisms. 
The examined building blocks are: (1) the crowd, (2) the incentives, (3) the 
two categories of disputes, and (4) the CODR procedures.
In Chapter 5, we provide suitable interpretations of two types of fair-
ness, namely objective procedural fairness and subjective procedural 
fairness. While the former refers to a standard whereby the procedure is 
assessed by an individual or an organisation, the latter refers to an indi-
vidual’s subjective perception of the fairness of a procedure. To conclude, 
we establish our interpretation of fairness by adding our interpretation of 
objective procedural fairness to our interpretation of subjective procedural 
fairness.
In Chapter 6, we select three CODR procedures on the basis of two crite-
ria, namely, (1) the availability of documents explaining the examined pro-
cedures, and (2) the use of adjudication for resolving disputes. The selected 
CODR procedures are iCourthouse, JuryTest, and the ECRF. Our findings 
indicate that none of the examined procedures comply with all elements of 
procedural fairness.
In Chapter 7, we design and construct a model of a CODR procedure 
that complies with our interpretation of procedural fairness. The model is a 
non-exhaustive list of ideas for making CODR compliant with our interpre-
tation of procedural fairness.
In Chapter 8, we provide an answer to the problem statement and the 
conclusions of this thesis and formulate directions for further research.
Het oplossen van geschillen kost alle betrokken partijen vaak aanzienlijk 
veel tijd en geld. Een nieuwe methode om geschillen op te lossen genaamd 
Crowsourced Online Dispute Resolution (CODR) toont potentie als goedkope, 
snelle en democratische geschillenoplossingprocedure. Voor de acceptatie 
van een geschillenoplossingmethode is van belang dat deze voldoet aan de 
eisen van procedurele billijkheid. Om deze onduidelijkheid te elimineren, 
streven wij er naar te onderzoeken of geschillen op een eerlijke manier door 
CODR opgelost kunnen worden. Om dit te doen, zullen we eerst een over-
zicht geven van CODR en onze interpretatie van procedurele billijkheid for-
muleren. Vervolgens zullen we onderzoeken of drie van de huidige CODR 
procedures billijk genoemd kunnen worden. Aansluitend, stellen we een 
model van een CODR procedure voor die overeenkomt met onze interpre-
tatie van procedurele billijkheid. Ten slotte concluderen we dat een CODR 
ontworpen kan worden om conflicten op billijke wijze op te lossen.
In hoofdstuk 1 introduceren we CODR door het begrip crowdsourcing 
en diens rol in het proces van online geschillenoplossing uit te leggen. Ver-
volgens formuleren we onze probleemstelling, drie onderzoeksvragen, een 
onderzoeksdoel en onze onderzoeksmethodologie. De onderzoeksmethodo-
logie is opgebouwd uit vier onderzoeksfases. Het hoofdstuk besluit met een 
beschrijving van de structuur van het proefschrift.
Hoofdstuk 2 is een literatuurstudie naar de begrippen crowdsourcing, 
Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) en CODR. De literatuurstudie van het begrip
crowdsourcing stelt ons in staat om het begrip te definiëren alsmede de relatie 
tussen crowdsourcing en bestaande concepten, waarvan collaborative systems, 
user-generated content, collective intelligence en web 2.0. nader onderzocht wor-
den. De literatuurstudie van het begrip ODR stelt ons in staat het begrip te 
definiëren, de typologie van ODR te bespreken en de voor- en nadelen van 
ODR te onderzoeken. Vervolgens toont de literatuurstudie van het begrip 
CODR aan dat CODR een nieuw en onontdekt onderzoeksgebied is.
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzoeken we de huidige en niet meer bestaande 
CODR procedures. We groeperen de CODR procedures in drie categorieën, 
namelijk CODR procedures functionerend als: (1) online opiniepeilingen, 
(2) online schijnjury’s en (3) arbitrage tribunalen. De functie van de online 
opiniepeilingen is om bevolkingsgegevens, die mogelijk conflictresolu-
tie kunnen faciliteren, te extraheren en te bundelen. De functie van online 
schijn jury’s is om echte zaken te testen voor een schijnjury. De functie van 





In hoofdstuk 4 beschrijven we de vier bouwstenen van CODR en analy-
seren we de verschillen tussen CODR en andere geschillenoplossingmecha-
nismen. De onderzochte bouwstenen zijn: (1) het publiek, (2) de stimuli, (3) 
de twee categorieën disputen en (4) de CODR procedures.
In hoofdstuk 5 verschaffen we geschikte interpretaties van twee typen 
billijkheid, namelijk objectieve procedurele billijkheid en subjectieve pro-
cedurele billijkheid. Terwijl de eerste verwijst naar een standaard waar de 
procedure wordt beoordeeld door een individu of een organisatie, verwijst 
de tweede naar de perceptie van een individu van de billijkheid van een 
procedure. Tot besluit formuleren we onze interpretatie van billijkheid: de 
samenvoeging van onze interpretatie van objectieve procedurele billijkheid 
met onze interpretatie van subjectieve procedurele billijkheid.
In hoofdstuk 6 selecteren we drie CODR procedures gebaseerd op twee 
criteria, namelijk, (1) beschikbaarheid van documentatie waarin de onder-
zochte procedures worden toegelicht en (2) het gebruik van berechting om 
disputen op te lossen. De geselecteerde CODR procedures zijn iCourthouse, 
JuryTest en het ECRF. Onze bevindingen geven aan dat geen van de onder-
zochte procedures voldoen aan alle elementen van procedurele billijkheid.
In hoofdstuk 7 ontwerpen en bouwen we een model van een CODR pro-
cedure die voldoet aan onze interpretatie van procedurele billijkheid. Het 
model bevat een niet-uitputtende lijst van ideeën om CODR overeenkom-
stig te maken aan onze interpretatie van procedurele billijkheid.
In hoofdstuk 8 geven wij een antwoord op de probleemstelling, presen-
teren wij de conclusies van dit proefschrift en formuleren we ideeën voor 
verder onderzoek.
Разрешаването на спорове често отнема значително време и пари. Един 
нов начин за разрешаване на спорове, наречен онлайн разрешаване на 
спорове чрез краудсорсинг (OРСК), изглежда има потенциал да разреша-
ва спорове евтино, бързо и демократично. Тъй като не е ясно дали OРСК 
процесите съответстват на изискванията на процесуалната справедли-
вост, тези процеси може да са непривлекателни и неприемливи за споре-
щите. За да се премахне тази неяснота, ние целим да установим дали OРСК 
процесите разрешават спорове по справедлив начин. За да постигнем тази 
цел, ние първо предоставяме преглед на OРСК процеси и формулираме 
нашата интерпретация на процесуална справедливост. След това изслед-
ваме дали 3 от съществуващите OРСК процеси са справедливи. Впослед-
ствие, ние предлагаме модел на OРСК процес, който е съобразен с нашата 
интерпретация на процесуална справедливост. Накрая заключаваме, че 
OРСК процеси могат да бъдат създадени по такъв начин, че да разрешават 
спорове по процесуално справедлив начин. 
В Глава 1 ние предоставяме въведение към OРСК чрез обясняване на 
практиката, наречена краудсорсинг и нейната употреба в процесите на раз-
решаване на спорове. След това ние формулираме нашия научен проблем, 
три изследователски въпроса, изследователска цел и изследователска ме-
тодология. Изследователската методология е във формата на четири етапа. 
В заключението на главата ние описваме структурата на тази докторска 
дисертация. 
В Глава 2 е разгледана литературата относно краудсорсинг, онлайн раз-
решаване на спорове (ОРС) и ОРСК. Разглеждането на тази литература 
ще ни позволи да дефинираме понятието ОРСК  и да изследваме връзката 
между краудсорсинг и сходни понятия, от които дискутираме системи за 
съвместна работа, генерирано от потребителите съдържание, колективен 
интелект и Уеб 2.0. Разглеждането на литературата относно OРС ни поз-
волява да изберем конкретна дефиниция на понятието OРС, дискутираме 
пет типа OРС и изследваме предимствата и недостатъците на OРС. На-
края ние обобщаваме, че OРСК e ново и неизследвано академично поле.
В Глава 3 разглеждаме минали и настоящи OРСК процедури. За да 
улесним изследването, ние групираме миналите и настоящите ORSK про-
цедури в 3 категории и по-конкретно OРСК процедури, функциониращи 
като: (1) онлайн проучвания на общественото мнение, (2) онлайн систе-
ми, имитиращи жури, (3) арбитрирани трибунали, произнасящи самоиз-
пълними решения. Функцията на онлайн проучванията на общественото 
мнение е да се улесни разрешаването на спорове чрез извличане и обоб-
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щаване на информация от широката общественост. Функцията на онлайн 
системите, имитиращи жури, е тестване на истински дела чрез разрешава-
нето им от имитация на жури. Функцията на арбитражните трибунали е 
да разрешават спорове чрез решения, изпълняеми от частни лица. 
В Глава 4 ние описваме четирите градивни елемента на OРСК  и ана-
лизираме разликите между OРСК и други системи за разрешаване на спо-
рове. Изследваните градивни елементи са: (1) тълпа, (2) стимули, (3) две 
категории от спорове и (4) OРСК процедури.
В Глава 5 ние предоставяме подходяща интерпретация на два типа 
справедливост, именно обективна процесуална справедливост и субектив-
на процесуална справедливост. Първият вид справедливост се отнася до 
стандарт, използван от индивиди или организации за преценяването на 
справедливостта на процесите. Вторият вид справедливост се отнася до 
субективните възприятия на индивиди относно справедливостта на про-
цеси. В заключение излагаме нашата интерпретация на справедливост 
чрез добавянето на нашата интерпретация на обективна процесуална 
справедливост към нашата интерпретация на субективна процесуална 
справедливост.  
В Глава 6 ние избираме 6 ОРСК процеси въз основа на 2 критерия, 
именно, наличие на документи, обясняващи изследваните процедури 
и употребата на присъждане за разрешаването на спорове. Избраните 
ОРСК процедури са iCourthouse, JuryTest, и ECRF. Нашите изводи са, че 
нито един от изследваните процеси не е съобразен с всички елементи на 
процесуална справедливост. 
В Глава 7 е създаден модел на OРСК  процедурите, който е съобразен 
с нашата интерпретация на процесуална справедливост. Моделът е неиз-
черпаем лист от идеи за създаването на OРСК  процеси, съобразени с на-
шата интерпретация на процесуална справедливост.
В Глава 8  ние предоставяме отговор на научния проблем и заключе-
нията на дисертацията, също формулираме насоки за по-нататъшни из-
следвания.
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